State v. WoodyState v. Woody
Dated: February 22, 2016
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Keith Woody, appeals the judgment of the Oberlin Municipal Court denying his suppression motion and subsequently imposing a jail sentence above the mandatory minimum. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} On the morning of March 22, 2014, Sergeant Michael Murphy of the City of Amherst Police Department was on patrol in a marked cruiser at the State Route 2 and State Route 58 intersection in Amherst, Ohio. At roughly 1:30 a.m., Sgt. Murphy received a radio dispatch informing him that a citizen had called in to report a possibly intoxicated driver traveling northbound on State Route 58. The caller also informed the dispatcher that the vehicle in question was in front of him and was driving “all оver the road.” The caller provided his name, contact information, and present location to the dispatcher. From the provided
{¶3} Upon rеceiving this information regarding the possibly intoxicated driver from the radio dispatcher, Sgt. Murphy immediately observed the vehicle in question traveling northbound on Rt. 58. Once the vehicle passed his location, Sgt. Murphy turned onto Rt. 58 and began following the vehiclе in question for roughly one-quarter mile, during which time he observed the vehicle weaving within its lane of travel, going side to side. Sgt. Murphy then effectuated a traffic stop. Sgt. Murphy identified the driver of the vehicle as Keith Woody. Sgt. Murphy also observed and identified an individuаl sitting in the front passenger seat. Sgt. Murphy detected a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from within the vehicle and emanating from the driver‘s mouth as he spoke. At this point, Sgt. Murphy had the driver exit the vehicle in order to perform a seriеs of field sobriety tests. Following the conclusion of those field sobriety tests, Sgt. Murphy placed Woody under arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
{¶4} Woody was charged with one count of driving while under the influence of аlcohol in violation of
II.
Assignment of Error I
The trial court erred in entering judgment against Appellant as there is insufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of Appellant.
Assignment of Error II
The trial court erred when it found that the officer had sufficient indicia of reliability based on a citizen‘s tip that allowed the officer to make an investigative stop of Appellant‘s vehicle.
{¶6} In his first and seсond assignments of error, Woody argues that the police officer‘s investigative stop was unconstitutional as Sgt. Murphy did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. We disagree.
{¶7} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003–Ohio–5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the crеdibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id. “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
The reasonable suspicion necessary for such a stop * * * eludes precise definition. Rather than involving a strict, inflexible standard, its determination involves a consideration of “the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). Under this analysis, “both the content of information possessed by policе and its degree of reliability” are relevant to the court‘s determination. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999).
{¶9} When the officer who conducts an investigatory traffic stop relies solely on the information provided through dispatch, “the state must demonstrate at a suppression hearing that the facts precipitating the dispatch justified a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. When the dispatch is based on information provided by an informant‘s tip, “the determination of reasоnable suspicion will be limited to an examination of the weight and reliability due that tip. The appropriate analysis, then, is whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigative stop.” Id. at 299. Relevant factors in this determination include “the informant‘s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” Id., citing White, 496 U.S. at 328. In making this determination, courts consider whether the informant can be classified as an anonymous tipster, a known confidential informant, or an
an identified citizen informant may be highly reliable and, therefore, a strong showing as to the other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary: “[I]f an unquestionably hоnest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.”
Id., quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–234 (1983).
{¶10} Here, Sgt. Murphy initiated a traffic stop based on information relayed to him via radio dispatch. This dispatch informed Sgt. Murphy that a citizen had called in to report a possibly intoxicated driver headed northbound on Rt. 58 in Amherst. The citizen informed the dispatcher that the vehicle in question was driving “all over the road.” Although the citizеn informant did not testify at the suppression hearing, it is undisputed that he provided the dispatcher with his name, present location, and contact information at the time of phoning in his tip. Sgt. Murphy testified that he recognized the citizen informant‘s name at the timе that he received the radio dispatch and knew him to be a local tow driver. Sgt. Murphy also observed the citizen informant‘s vehicle driving in proximity to Woody‘s vehicle on Rt. 58 just prior to effectuating the traffic stop of Woody‘s vehicle.
{¶11} Because the tipster was an identified citizen informant, we may ascribe a high degree of reliability to the information that he provided, and it need not be supported by independent observations by Sgt. Murphy. See id. The record demonstrates that in this case, the citizen infоrmant observed erratic driving by a possibly intoxicated driver, which caused the informant to call the police. The informant told dispatch that the vehicle in question was driving “all over the road.” The caller informed dispatch that he and the vehiclе in question were driving
{¶12} These factors lend credibility to the caller‘s account and provide sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the traffic stop. See State v. Rapp, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0062, 2013–Ohio–4408, ¶ 11; State v. Saravia, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25977, 2012–Ohio–1443, ¶ 8; State v. Roberts, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20355, 2001 WL 490014, *2 (May 9, 2001). Thus, after thoroughly reviewing the trial court‘s decision, we сonclude that Sgt. Murphy acted upon reasonable suspicion based upon the information provided by the citizen informant, and the investigatory stop of Woody‘s vehicle was constitutionally valid.
{¶13} As such, Woody‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error III
The trial court erred when it sentenced the Appellant to serve more than the minimum mandatory jail sanction then required by law.
{¶14} In his third assignment of error, Woody argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to a jail term that was higher thаn the minimum mandatory sentence. We disagree.
{¶15} A trial court generally has discretion in misdemeanor sentencing. State v. Schneider, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 09CA0026, 2009–Ohio–6025, ¶ 6. “Unless a sentence is contrary to law, we review challenges to misdemeanor sentencing for an abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of disсretion indicates that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶17} Woody contends that the trial court failed to consider the criteria listed in
{¶18} Woody has failed to identify anything in the record suggesting that the trial court disregarded the sentencing factors, and the review of the record fails to yield an affirmative showing that the trial court failed tо consider the factors set forth in
{¶19} Accordingly, Woody‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶20} With all of Woody‘s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the Oberlin Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Oberlin Municipal Court, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.