State v. WoodsState v. Woods
{¶ 1} Jeffrey Woods appeals from the decision of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in five separate cases. Woods argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him leave to withdraw the guilty pleas because he presented sufficient operative facts to demonstrate manifest injustice. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} The Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Woods in five separate cases involving a multitude of offenses. The trial court assigned two separate attorneys to defend Woods. On September 23, 2003, Woods entered into a plea agreement with the State of Ohio and was subsequently sentenced on October 21, 2003. The pleas and sentences can be summarized as follows: In CR439029, Woods pled guilty to receiving stolen property, a fourth degree felony in violation of
{¶ 3} On May 12, 2004, Woods filed motions to withdraw all guilty pleas pursuant to
{¶ 4} “The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying leave to withdraw the guilty pleas in this case without explanation or hearing where the appellant presented sufficient operative facts to demonstrate manifest injustice resulting from the plea.” This assignment lacks merit.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to
{¶ 6} “What constitutes an abuse of discretion with respect to denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea necessarily is variable with the facts and circumstances involved.” State v. Walton (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 117, 119. However, this Court recognizes that if a plea of guilty could be easily retracted after the imposition of a sentence, “the accused might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence were unexpectedly severe. . . .” (Citations omitted.) Peterseim (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 213. See Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d at 264.
{¶ 7} Here, Woods argues that manifest injustice exists because in exchange for pleading guilty one of his attorneys told him that he would be sentenced to a range of three years. Woods admits that this attorney disclosed to him that no agreed sentence had been stipulated. However, Woods stated that without this attorney‘s suggestion, he would have insisted upon a trial. In support of Woods’ allegations, he provided an affidavit from his mother and a letter from both of his attorneys.
{¶ 8} This does not rise to the level of manifest injustice. This Court has clearly established that a mistaken belief as to the consequences of the plea is insufficient to withdraw such a plea. State v. Sabatino (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 483, 486; State v. Hunt (Aug. 8, 1996), Cuyahoga App. No. 69726. As this court held in State v. Lambros (1988), 44 Ohio App.3d 102, 103:
“It seems that a defendant who has a change of heart regarding his guilty plea should not be permitted to withdraw the plea just because he is made aware that an unexpected sentence is going to be imposed. Otherwise, defense counsel merely has to allege that the defendant‘s plea was induced by some underlying `mistaken belief‘. . . . and the plea would be vacated.”
{¶ 9} Therefore, Wood‘s alleged reliance on his counsel‘s sentencing prediction of three years is not sufficient to constitute a manifest injustice.
{¶ 10} Woods further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct a hearing on his
{¶ 11} The trial court was also not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court and courts of this state, “have consistently rejected attempts to impose such a requirement on
{¶ 12} Finally, though it is not contended that the trial court failed to comply with the mandates of
{¶ 13} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow Woods to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Dyke, P.J., And Rocco, J., CONWAY, J.