829 N.E.2d 1281 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
Lead Opinion
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{¶ 1} In Blakely v. Washington (2004),
{¶ 2} Because the Ohio Supreme Court has held that Section
{¶ 3} As might be expected, the complexity of the issues presented in this case has left this court deeply divided. We recognize that the orderly administration of justice is the rock upon which government rests. More criminal cases are heard in this appellate district than in any other in this state. Our refusal to speak on these issues, no matter how discordantly on an individual basis, would create the untenable situation in which individual defendants would be sentenced differently pending the Ohio Supreme Court's decision. All of us agree that that would be an unacceptable outcome that must be avoided; hence, we have all agreed to apply the law set forth in this opinion until the Ohio Supreme Court renders a final decision.
{¶ 4} The two specific questions before this court en banc are (1) whether the statutory provisions of R.C.
{¶ 5} Although Lett raises four assignments of error,3
the gravamen of his appeal takes issue with the trial court's imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences, which are within the scope of the en banc questions. This opinion consists of five major parts. Part I details the procedural history of the appeals. In part II, we address the relevant
{¶ 7} Lett raises four assignments of error that, collectively, argue that the court erred in imposing maximum, consecutive sentences. These arguments are based on Blakely, since they claim that the court imposed the sentences by making statutorily mandated factual determinations that were not admitted by Lett at the time of his guilty pleas.
{¶ 9} In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000),
{¶ 10} After Apprendi, prosecutors in grid or guideline sentencing jurisdictions believed that the "maximum" penalty was that set forth by law and which included all possible upward departures authorized by statute. For example, like the federal courts, the state of Washington employed a grid system to determine the appropriate sentencing range for an offender. Sentences were determined by looking at two key factors on a grid: the offender's criminal history and the level of the crime. The intersection of those lines did not necessarily occur at the maximum level allowed by law, and various upward departures existed which might increase the sentence.
{¶ 11} Blakely involved the constitutionality of a prison sentence that was imposed under Washington's grid-style sentencing scheme. Blakely pleaded guilty to a second-degree kidnapping charge involving domestic violence and also to the use of a firearm, a second-degree class-B felony carrying a maximum punishment of ten years' imprisonment (120 months). Under Washington's sentencing statute, the "standard range" of incarceration for second-degree kidnapping with a firearm is 49 to 53 months. The sentencing statute permits a trial judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons justifying an "exceptional sentence." One of the aggravating factors justifying the imposition of an exceptional sentence is whether the offender acted with "deliberate cruelty." After conducting a full evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Blakely had acted with deliberate cruelty in carrying out the kidnapping and imposed a prison sentence of 90 months.
{¶ 12} The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's imposition of the exceptional sentence, holding that "`[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'"Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 13} Blakely caused a furor within the legal community, yet the Supreme Court reaffirmed it in Booker, excising both Section 3553(b)(1), Title 18, U.S. Code ("the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure)"), and Section 3742(e), Title 18, U.S. Code ("the provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range"). Booker, 543 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 14} By making the guidelines discretionary rather than mandatory, the Supreme Court was able to reaffirm its adherence to long-standing precedent that discretion in sentencing does not implicate the
{¶ 15} Thus, as the law currently stands, sentencing schemes that grant a judge discretion to impose a sentence (as opposed to grid systems, which very narrowly limit a judge's choices) are permissible under the
{¶ 17} "Except as provided in division (G) of this section or in Chapter 2925. of the Revised Code, the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose the longest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section only upon offenders who committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest likelihood of committing future *282 crimes, upon certain major drug offenders under division (D)(3) of this section, and upon certain repeat violent offenders in accordance with division (D)(2) of this section."
{¶ 18} When imposing a maximum sentence, the court must not only make the specific finding that an offender committed the worst form of the offense or would pose the greatest likelihood of committing future crime, but must state the reasons why it makes that particular finding. See R.C.
{¶ 19} We agree with the nearly unanimous view of the other appellate districts in this state5 that the findings a court must make before imposing a maximum sentence do not implicate an offender's
{¶ 20} For example, in case No. CR-445593, Lett pleaded guilty to one count of possession of drugs, a felony of the third degree. A third-degree felony is punishable by a term of incarceration of one, two, three, four, or five years. The findings required under R.C.
{¶ 21} We believe that those who conclude that the findings required under R.C.
{¶ 22} Conversely, a finding that an offender committed the worst form of the offense or posed the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes is purely subjective in nature and not amenable to disposition based solely on facts found by the trier of fact or admitted in a plea. Indeed, if a defendant pleads guilty or exercises his
{¶ 23} The subjective nature of the determinations made under R.C.
{¶ 24} "Nothing we say today requires a sentencing judge to enhance, in some wooden or reflex fashion, the sentences of all defendants whose testimony is deemed false. Rather, we are reaffirming the authority of a sentencing judge to evaluate carefully a defendant's testimony on the stand, determine — with a consciousness of the frailty of human judgment — whether that testimony contained willful and material falsehoods, and, if so, assess in light of all the other knowledge gained about the defendant the meaning of that conduct with respect to his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a useful place in society. Awareness of such a process realistically cannot be deemed to affect the decision of an accused but unconvicted defendant to testify truthfully in his own behalf." *284
{¶ 25} Consequently, we hold that the findings required under R.C.
{¶ 26} Applying these standards, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supported the court's findings that a maximum sentence was appropriate since Lett posed the greatest risk of reoffending in the future.
{¶ 27} The court first considered the minimum sentence and, finding it inappropriate, sentenced appellant to the maximum sentence of 18 months. The record reflects that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony and had served a prior prison sentence. Among other felony convictions, appellant has been convicted multiple times of possession of drugs, drug trafficking, and receiving stolen property. His criminal career began in 1991, when he was a juvenile, and continues through the present time. He has been paroled from prison twice and violated each time. In 2002, appellant was granted shock probation. While on probation, appellant committed the offenses charged in this case as well as the offenses charged in case Nos. CR-443458 and CR-445593. The trial court found that appellant failed to take responsibility for his actions or to show remorse. The trial court stated that an 18-month prison term would be necessary to protect the public, in view of appellant's likelihood of committing future crimes. The trial court noted the same findings and reasons when imposing the maximum five-year sentence in case No. CR-445593. All of these factors amply justify the maximum sentence for Lett's convictions of possession of drugs and drug trafficking; therefore, Lett's assignments of error relating to maximum sentences are overruled.
{¶ 29} "If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
{¶ 30} "(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
{¶ 31} "(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
{¶ 32} "(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender."
{¶ 33} R.C.
{¶ 35} In 1974, the General Assembly revised the criminal statutes and made significant changes to the manner in which consecutive sentences could be imposed. Adopting the approach taken by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, the General Assembly ended the long-standing presumption that *286
sentences for multiple convictions be served consecutively. Former R.C.
{¶ 36} "(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other sentence of imprisonment. In any case, a sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently with a sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state penal or reformatory institution.
{¶ 37} "(B) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served consecutively to any other sentence of imprisonment, in the following cases:
{¶ 38} "(1) When the trial court specifies that it is to be served consecutively."
{¶ 39} This change in presumption from consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences constituted a sea change in the law, yet it hardly made a ripple in the literature of that period. We can guess that the change in presumption occurred for several reasons: a backlash against prosecutorial overindictment, disparity in the manner in which consecutive sentences were imposed, frustration with the virtually unreviewable nature of consecutive sentencing, and economic considerations relating to the long-term housing of prisoners.
{¶ 41} Even though Ohio law now presumes that sentences for multiple offenses should be imposed concurrently, that shift in presumption says nothing about the character of the punishment. Instead, it simply reflects the General Assembly's desire to promote consistency and accountability in the way that the courts impose punishment. This reading is entirely consistent with one of the stated purposes of S.B. 2, which is to ensure that a sentence is "consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders." R.C.
{¶ 42} As we understand the arguments by those who would find R.C.
{¶ 43} In this case, for example, Lett received a five-year sentence in one case and an 18-month sentence in another case. The court's findings rendered under R.C.
{¶ 44} This brings us to what we see as the second flaw with the position of those arguing against constitutionality: they equate consecutive sentences with additional punishment. As the historical development of consecutive or cumulative sentencing demonstrates, at no time has consecutive sentencing been considered additional punishment; rather, it has been considered "full" punishment for all offenses. While the General Assembly has now made concurrent sentences presumptive, that presumption does nothing to change the essential character of consecutive sentencing.
{¶ 45} In fact, the General Assembly has long made consecutive sentencing mandatory in cases involving the use of a firearm, and it is clear that consecutive punishments of this kind do not violate principles of double jeopardy in the sense that there would be multiple punishments for one act. If the imposition of mandatory consecutive sentences does not constitute multiple or increased punishment, there can be no viable argument that the findings that a court must make under R.C.
{¶ 46} This last point bears additional emphasis — our holding here is neither original nor unique. While Blakely andApprendi have generated thousands of opinions across the United States, we are unaware of any court in Ohio that has held that a trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences implicatesBlakely or somehow violates a defendant's
{¶ 47} In conformity with the foregoing, we hold that the findings required under R.C.
{¶ 48} The court ran the 18-month sentence in case No. CR-447030 and the five-year sentence in case No. CR-445593 consecutively to each other. Lett received a total prison sentence of six and one-half years. Before imposing the sentences in each one of these cases, the trial court made the following findings:
{¶ 49} The court found that (1) consecutive sentences were required in this case to protect the public from future crime or to punish Lett, (2) the proposed consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Lett's conduct, and (3) the proposed consecutive sentence is not disproportionate to the danger that Lett poses to the public. The court then specified that Lett committed these new offenses while on probation and found that a consecutive sentence was necessary to protect the public from any future crime that Lett might commit. R.C.
{¶ 50} The court's reasons for making the findings were manifest on the record. Lett had numerous felony convictions resulting in prison sentences, including multiple convictions of possession of drugs, drug trafficking, and receiving stolen property. His criminal career began in 1991 when he was a juvenile and continued unabated to the present time. He had twice violated parole. In 2002, Lett received shock probation. While on probation, Lett committed the offenses charged in this case as well as the offenses charged in case Nos. CR-443458 and CR-445593. The trial court found that Lett failed to take responsibility for his actions or show remorse. The trial court stated that an 18-month prison term would be necessary to protect the public and prevent Lett from committing future crimes. We have no doubt that the trial court fully *289
complied with R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., writing for the majority on the constitutionality of maximum sentences.
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, FRANK D. CELEBREZZE JR., COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, ANTHONY O. CALABRESE JR., MARY EILEEN KILBANE and CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, JJ., concur.
MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., writing for the majority on the constitutionality of consecutive sentences.
ANN DYKE, PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, KENNETH A. ROCCO, FRANK D. CELEBREZZE JR., JAMES J. SWEENEY, COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, ANTHONY O. CALABRESE JR., MARY EILEEN KILBANE AND CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, JJ., concur.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., concurring in part as to the constitutionality of the court's en banc procedure.
PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, FRANK D. CELEBREZZE JR., JAMES J. SWEENEY, COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, ANTHONY O. CALABRESE JR., KENNETH A. ROCCO, MARY EILEEN KILBANE and MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, JJ., concur.
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., dissenting as to the constitutionality of the court's en banc procedure.
CHRISTINE T. McMONAGLE, J., concurs only as to Part I of Judge KARPINSKI's dissenting opinion.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., dissents on the constitutionality of maximum sentences.
ANN DYKE, DIANE KARPINSKI, KENNETH A. ROCCO and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JJ., concur. *290
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., concurs in judgment only as to the imposition of consecutive sentences, but dissents as to the constitutionality of consecutive sentences under portions of S.B. 2.
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., concurs only as to that portion of Judge GALLAGHER's dissenting opinion that would hold that the statutes requiring findings for consecutive sentences are unconstitutional.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 53} Although Judge Karpinski is correct that the reference to the number "three" in the Ohio Constitution did not change as appellate districts were enlarged, a review of Ohio's judicial history shows that the reference to that number reflected, in part, the limited size of the early Ohio judiciary. Historically, the number "three" had more to do with the minimum requirement of a quorum than it did with a desire to limit important district decisions to less than a majority of the court. Simply put, there were far fewer judges to decide cases in the 19th century, and three judges became the smallest acceptable number for proper review.8
{¶ 54} The en banc process is embedded in American jurisprudence. "The en banc process now authorized for the district courts is designed to help the district courts avoid conflict, assure harmonious decisions within the courts' geographic boundaries, and develop predictability of the law within their jurisdiction. Consistency of decisions within each district is essential to the credibility of the district courts."Chase Fed. Sav. Loan Assn. v. Schreiber (Fla. 1985),
{¶ 55} I recognize that our decision to consider these issues in an en banc proceeding puts us in conflict with the Tenth Appellate District in Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (Feb. 25, 1982), Franklin App. No. 81-AP-158, 1982 WL 3997, which is cited by Judge Karpinski. It is unclear, however, whether the Tenth District had an en banc procedure in place when it decided the Schwan case. The question in that case arose only after the filing of a motion to reconsider an earlier ruling.
{¶ 56} This is not to suggest that every case or issue, or every aggrieved litigant, requires or is entitled to an en banc review. The decision to consider a case or issue en banc is left to the exclusive determination of the majority of judges in a multicourt district.9
{¶ 57} For too long, trial court judges and litigants in this district have endured the prospect of having inconsistent decisions on similar issues affect determinations of law. Further, limiting the decision-making process on critical legal issues to three judges flies in the face of the long-established and significant principle of stare decisis. As a result, I believe the en banc process is constitutional and is supported by Ohio's long judicial history. Last, consistency in our district is of paramount concern and is long overdue. For these reasons, I support the en banc process and agree to abide by the majority decision on the issues decided here in this and all future cases.
{¶ 59} As the majority has noted, according to Apprendi v.New Jersey (2000),
{¶ 60} Although the state of Washington and the federal system employed a "presumptive" guideline sentencing format, Ohio, like several other states, is a "presumptive" nonguideline sentencing state. The distinction, for Apprendi, Blakely, andBooker purposes, in my view, is immaterial.11
{¶ 61} In Ohio, a trial court may impose consecutive sentences on a defendant only after making specific findings outlined under R.C.
{¶ 62} In addition, R.C.
{¶ 63} Thus, a trial court is required to make at least three findings under R.C.
{¶ 64} Although I concur with the majority's decision to affirm the consecutive sentences imposed, I respectfully disagree with the view that the language requiring "findings and reasons" to support imposing consecutive sentences in R.C.
{¶ 65} I believe that Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker are applicable to R.C.
{¶ 66} The
{¶ 67} Because the findings used to impose consecutive sentences here were not admitted by Lett nor made by the jury, I would find the language in the statutes mandating the "findings" and "reasons" to deviate from the required sentence unconstitutional.
{¶ 68} R.C.
{¶ 69} Under a determination that it is unconstitutional for a judge to make findings of fact that increase the sentence beyond the mandatory minimum, the offending statutory provisions, including the interrelated rebuttable presumption, must be severed. Nevertheless, the court has an obligation to preserve as much *294
of the legislation as is constitutionally permissible. See Stateex. rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991),
{¶ 70} The result is not to require the trial court to impose concurrent sentences in such instances. As the majority has already noted, this was not the intent of the legislature, which provided a method for the imposition of consecutive sentences. Thus, only the offending mandatory language of the legislation must be severed from the statutory scheme. See R.C.
{¶ 71} If Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker are the illness, then the United States Supreme Court's decision in Booker is the medicine. Under the Booker analysis, with the removal of the offending statutory provisions, a determination must be made as to whether the defendant's consecutive prison sentences were reasonable in light of the record and the remaining provisions of the sentencing statutes.13 In my view, as the majority has already noted, the trial court clearly addressed the underlying original purpose and the legislative intent of the statute by the discussion on the record by the trial court summarized in the majority opinion. This determination by the trial court satisfies the "reasonableness" standard outlined inBooker.14
{¶ 72} I believe that the provisions of R.C.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 73} I respectfully dissent, first, because I find unconstitutional the en banc process this court used to arrive at a decision in this case.
{¶ 75} In Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp. (Feb. 25, 1982), Franklin App. No. 81-AP-158, 1982 WL 3997, the Tenth Appellate District overruled a motion for rehearing en banc because such a hearing is "precluded" by this provision in the Constitution. I agree with this reading of Ohio's Constitution.
{¶ 76} There is no authority for an appellate panel of more than three judges. Nor is there any authority for an entire court sitting en banc to overrule a majority decision of a three-judge panel. It would be similarly improper for an administrative judge to assign a new member to a panel for the sole purpose of writing an opinion reflective of the entire court or of providing a vote necessary to create a majority consistent with an en banc court.
{¶ 77} The basis for an en banc court in the federal judicial system sharply highlights the absence of any similar authority in Ohio. Section 46(c), Title 28, U.S. Code expressly provides for hearing or rehearing before an appellate court "in banc." That provision was first codified in 1948. So the idea of an en banc procedure was certainly known to Ohio and to the Ohio legislature during all its amendments to the Code since 1948. No such comparable authority exists in Ohio, under either the Ohio Constitution or its statutes.
{¶ 78} Congress enacted an en banc provision in response to a decision of the United States Supreme Court: Textile MillsSecurities Corp. v. Commr. (1941),
The Judicial Code abolished the existing circuit courts. § 297. It carried over into § 117 without substantial change the provision of § 2 of the Act of March 3, 1891 that there should be a circuit court of appeals in each circuit "which shall consist of three judges." Though this section was said merely to represent existing law, § 118 of the Judicial Code provided for four circuit judges in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, two in the Fourth Circuit, and three in each of the others. An anomalous situation was presented if § 117 were to be taken at that juncture as meaning that the circuit court of appeals would continue to be composed of only three, in face of the fact that there were more than three circuit judges in some circuits.
Textile Mills,
{¶ 79} No such anomaly occurs in the Ohio Constitution, which says, "The state shall be divided by law into compact appellate districts in each of which there shall be a court of appeals consisting of three judges. Laws may be passed increasing the number of judges in any district wherein the volume of business may require such additional judge or judges. Indistricts having additional judges, three judges shallparticipate in the hearing and disposition of each case." (Emphasis added.) Section
{¶ 80} Judge Gallagher argues that the number "three" in the Ohio Constitution "historically" had more to do with the minimum requirement of a "quorum." Since the word "quorum" was deleted from both the Constitution and the statute, however, we must accord special significance to that change. Its deletion implies that the number three no longer describes a minimum as in a quorum. The replacement for "quorum" was "shall participate in."15
{¶ 81} Currently, the Revised Code specifies, "In the eighth district, any three judges shall comprise the court of appeals in the hearing and disposition of cases in accordance with any local rules of practice and procedure that may be adopted by the judges of the court." (Emphasis added.) R.C.
{¶ 82} "In the construction of a statute the primary duty of the court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature enacting it." Cochrel v. Robinson (1925),
{¶ 83} The history of R.C.
{¶ 84} Later, the district was specifically named. This statute was repeatedly amended in 1976, 1980, 1984, 1986, and 1990. Each time, the legislature specifically addressed the particular district: "In the eighth district, any three judges shall comprise the court of appeals in the hearing and disposition of cases * * *." (Emphasis added.) These amendments from 1976 through 1990 often added judges to the court. In 1976, the number of judges on the Eighth District Court of Appeals changed from six to nine. In 1990, the number changed from nine to twelve. Each time the number of judges changed, the legislature retained the sentence specifying the number of judges as three for comprising the panel to hear and dispose of a case.
{¶ 85} Over the years, additional judges were also added to some of the other districts. With each change, the legislature retained the language specifying a three-judge panel. Currently, the statute specifies a three-judge panel and reiterates this for each specific district in which additional judges have been added. There is a separate and identical provision for nine different districts: R.C.
{¶ 86} The Ohio Legislature cannot be presumed to have been unaware of the en banc procedure in the federal courts — a procedure codified in 1948 for federal courts. Ohio has no such statute. Indeed, the language of the Ohio Revised Code appears to have been crafted to avoid the anomaly that the United States Supreme Court addressed.
{¶ 87} A major difference between Ohio's Article IV and Section 117 of the Judicial Code, Section 43, Title 28, U.S. Code, is that Article IV specifies three judges in the explicit context of "the hearing and disposition of each case." In contrast, the United States Supreme Court, in Textile Mills,
{¶ 88} With this history of amendments and increases in the number of judges sitting on district courts, as well as the relatively new changes in the relevant statute, and the explicit language of the statute assigning three judges to hear and dispose of a case, there can be no doubt as to the intent of the legislature. Therefore, this court is obliged to follow the plain language of the Ohio Constitution and corresponding statutes.
{¶ 89} "It is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See, e.g., Katz v. Department of LiquorControl (1957),
{¶ 90} While I see no authority for an Ohio court of appeals to hear a case en banc, I also see much reason not to. Professor Banks observed that "Frank M. Coffin, a veteran judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, once remarked that courts sitting en banc `resemble a small legislature more than a court.'" The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-Supreme Court," 13 J.L. Politics at 388. He reports that "critics typically argue * * * that en banc review is counterproductive because it: promotes judicial inefficiency,16 undermines the finality of panel decision-making, threatens court collegiality, and compromises judicial integrity." Id. at 388. See Judge Edwards's concurring opinion in Bartlett v. Bowen
(C.A.D.C. 1987),
{¶ 91} An en banc procedure is even more superfluous, to use the word of Judge Laurence Silberman, Bartlett, supra, concurring opinion, at 1246, when the Ohio Supreme Court has already accepted the same issues and both sides have submitted briefs.
{¶ 92} I also find it improvident to hear en banc a matter currently in such flux nationally. In her dissent in Apprendi,
Justice O'Connor exposed a conflict in *299
the various analyses provided in Jones v. United States (1999),
{¶ 93} This subtle shift from "increase or alter the minimum penalty" to "increase the congressionally prescribed range of penalties" or "alter" them is only one of many indications that members of the United States Supreme Court are in the process of evolving and more precisely carving out the principles upon which Ohio's sentencing system will be judged. Indeed, the makeup of the majority that voted on recent cases is also in motion.
{¶ 94} Finally, I object to the specific procedure this court has followed. In using an en banc procedure, this court has been operating under an amendment to Article 8(b) of standing resolution en banc conference, found in Appendix C of the local rules. This rule authorizes the Administrative Judge of this court to convene the court to sit en banc to resolve the issues involved in the manner described below.
(ii) In the event the assigned panel hearing an appeal determines that it is necessary to overrule a previous decision of this Court, reported or unreported, or to issue a decision in conflict therewith, any judge on the panel shall request the Chief Justice to call an en banc conference of the Court to consider the issue. The parties will be requested to file supplemental briefs on the *300 conflicting issues. * * * Oral rehearing en banc will not be allowed except by majority vote of the en banc court.
(iii) Following receipt of the supplemental briefs, if any, the Chief Justice shall call an en banc conference * * *.
{¶ 95} This rule requires that a previous decision be identified for purposes of determining whether it is necessary to overrule it or, at the very least, to issue a decision in conflict with it. In the case at bar, the majority opinion does not expressly identify any such case. Since such a case is a necessary condition to commence the en banc process, it should be identified in the en banc decision.
{¶ 96} More important is the next stage: requesting parties to file supplemental briefs on the issues in conflict. Whereas the rule goes on to clearly specify that an oral rehearing is solely at the option of the majority, the rule does not describe the request for supplemental briefs as optional. Nor would a party sua sponte file a supplemental brief, since the parties have not yet been advised that their case is in an en banc process. The rule specifies the sequence to be followed: the en banc conference follows receipt of the supplemental briefs. While the rule allows for the possibility that parties might not submit briefs, it is clear that "[t]he parties will be requested to." In the case at bar, however, this court did not request supplemental briefs. Because of the significant impact to the Ohio sentencing system if it is found to be unconstitutional, there is even greater reason for this court to seek out all possible arguments.
{¶ 97} Thus I include in my dissent my objection to this court's failure to comply not only with the limitations imposed by the Ohio Constitution and the Ohio Revised Code but also with its own stated procedure.
Our precedents make clear, however, that the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. See Ring [v. Arizona (2002)], supra [
536 U.S. 584 ], at 602,122 S.Ct. 2428 [153 L.Ed.2d 556 ] ("`the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone'"), quoting Apprendi, supra, at 483, *301120 S.Ct. 2348 [147 L.Ed.2d 435 ]; Harris v. United States,536 U.S. 545 ,563 ,122 S.Ct. 2406 ,153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (plurality opinion) (same); cf. Apprendi, supra, at 488,120 S.Ct. 2348 [147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] (facts admitted by the defendant). In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punishment," Bishop, supra, § 87, at 55, and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
(Emphasis sic.) Id.,
{¶ 99} In the case at bar, the court could order that the sentences be consecutive only by making judicial findings beyond those either determined by a jury or stipulated to by the defendant. Applying Blakely to Ohio sentencing law, I must conclude, therefore, that a judge has no authority to impose a consecutive sentence, because to do so requires additional findings other than simply a prior conviction.
{¶ 100} Blakely has not only provided a very restrictive definition of statutory maximum, it also has limited the role of the court in all "exceptional" sentences, that is, whenever state law requires additional findings (other than a prior conviction) to which a defendant has not stipulated.
{¶ 101} As the Supreme Court explained in Blakely: "When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts `which the law makes essential to the punishment,' [1] Bishop [Criminal Procedure (2d Ed. 1872)] § 87, at 55, and the judge exceeds his proper authority." Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 102} In saying that "[n]o findings made by the trial court can enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum," the majority ignores the definition of "statutory maximum" specifically stated in Blakely:
In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punishment," Bishop, supra, § 87, at 55, and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 103} The majority apparently discounts this explicit definition because of its context: Ohio's hybrid sentencing scheme "imposes determinate sentences from an indeterminate range of possible terms," whereas the sentencing system in *302 Blakely was a grid. This comparison does not focus, however, on what the United States Supreme Court saw as the key in constitutional analysis: required judicial findings.
{¶ 104} Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of its sentencing scheme, which is also a hybrid with major features similar to Ohio's. Smylie v. Indiana
(2005),
{¶ 105} The Supreme Court of Indiana provided this analysis: "Because the judge has to find additional facts to impose a sentence higher than the presumptive sentence, the presumptive sentence is the `relevant statutory maximum.'" Id. at 684. Applying Blakely's definition of "statutory maximum," the Indiana Supreme Court decided that Indiana's "fixed terms" were "much like Washington's presumptive ranges." The court explained:
Indiana's sentencing scheme provides a "fixed term" presumptive sentence for each class of felonies. * * * These statutes also create upper and lower boundaries for each felony sentence. In deciding on whether to depart from the presumptive sentence, the trial judge must consider seven enumerated factors and may consider various other aggravating and mitigating factors. * * *
* * *
For Blakely purposes, Indiana's "fixed term" is the functional equivalent of Washington's "standard sentencing range." Both establish a mandatory starting point for sentencing criminals based on the elements of proof necessary to prove a particular offense and the sentencing class into which the offense falls. The trial court judge then must engage in judicial fact-finding during sentencing if a sentence greater than the presumptive fixed term is to be imposed. (Emphasis added.)
Smylie,
{¶ 106} The court emphasized:
It is this type of judicial fact-finding that concerned the Court in Blakely. "When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, *303 the jury has not found all the facts `which the law makes essential to the punishment.'" Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___,
124 S.Ct. at 2537 ,159 L.Ed.2d 403 (quoting 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87 (2d ed. 1872)).
{¶ 107} The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that it saw "little daylight between the Blakely holding and the Indiana system." Smylie, supra,
{¶ 108} Like Indiana's system, Ohio's system has presumptions: the presumption of the minimum, of less than the maximum, and of concurrent sentences.17 These presumptions can be overcome if the judge makes additional findings. For example, in Ohio the aggravating factor for more than the minimum is the finding that the offender has served a prison term or that the minimum term would "demean the seriousness of the offense" or "will not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender or others."
{¶ 109} A comparison with McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986),
{¶ 110} The majority also observes that Ohio's sentencing scheme specifies possible terms and, therefore, defendants know what the possible maximum term will be for their crimes. This specificity is also in Indiana's scheme. The Indiana Supreme Court observed that the "unexpected increase" that Justice Scalia discussed did not arise in Indiana, because defendants were "aware of the maximum sentence that can be imposed for any given felony, namely, the range listed in the sentencing statutes." The Indiana court noted that "Washington's system gave similar notification"; that is, "a sentence may be increased to a statutory upper limit if `substantial and compelling reasons justify an exceptional sentence.'" The court further observed, however, that the "increase was `unexpected' in one important sense, namely that the aggravators used to support a *304
departure from the presumptive are not charged in the indictment." Smylie,
{¶ 111} The majority further distinguishes Booker andBlakely on the basis that the facts the court relied upon for sentencing could "easily have been charged as elements of the offense because they were objective findings and thus readily amenable to disposition at trial." I appreciate this distinction and it might some day be the basis of a new direction for the Supreme Court. However the court has not enunciated this distinction, at least not in its most emphatic statements explaining the underlying principles of the recent sentencing cases. Rather, it focuses on what can be derived from the jury verdict alone, not on what could be derived from a jury verdict if the facts were amenable to and had been specified in the indictment.
{¶ 112} Since Blakely was issued, the United States Supreme Court has again enunciated this principle and explicitly reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi. "Any fact (other than aprior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) United States v. Booker (2005), 543 U.S. ___, ___,
{¶ 113} In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court has further clarified just how far even a prior conviction can be used. Shepard v. United States (2005), ___ U.S. ___,
{¶ 114} It does not matter for purposes of
{¶ 115} I agree with Judge Gallagher's dissent in his conclusion that under Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker the Ohio statutes requiring findings for consecutive sentences are unconstitutional. I disagree, however, with the remedy he *305 presents. Eliminating reasons, as well as findings, as a requirement will leave reviewing courts with no clear explanation of a sentence. Appellate courts will then be given the burden of searching for reasons. Because trial courts are more familiar with the facts of a case, the explanation for a sentence is best begun at that stage.
{¶ 116} This shift from requiring statutory findings and supporting reasons to a test for reasonableness belies the underlying question: whether the imposition of a particular sentence removes from the jury the "assessment of facts" that alter or increase "the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." To add the requirement of "reasonableness" does not resolve this question, although I acknowledge that this is the criterion that the United States Supreme Court adopted for the federal guidelines.
{¶ 117} Booker expressly grounds its reasonableness criterion in a section of the pre-2003 text of the U.S. Code — a section that
directed appellate courts to review sentences that reflected an applicable Guidelines range for correctness, but to review other sentences — those that fell "outside the applicable Guideline range" with a view toward determining whether such a sentence "is unreasonable, having regard for * * * the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in Chapter 227 of this title; and * * * the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c)."
18 U.S.C § 3742 (e)(3) (1994 ed.) (emphasis added).
Booker, 543 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 118} The court noted that Section 3553(a), which "sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing," "remains in effect." Booker, 543 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 119} The standard by which sentences in Ohio may be reviewed, therefore, must arise fundamentally from Ohio's statutes, not solely from Booker, which derived the basis of its review from federal statutes. Ohio's statutes do not articulate a reasonableness standard. Nor was this standard the previous statutory basis for appeal. Booker, on the other hand, does provide one way to *306 view the "sound administration of justice."18 It is doubtful that adding the nebulous standard of "reasonableness," however, will honor the goal of consistency and proportionality, especially if judges are not required to explain their decisions.
{¶ 120} By forcing a certain intellectual framework on a judge's sentencing decision, Ohio's sentencing system provided a basis for comparison and imposed a certain analytical rigor upon trial judges — often not to their liking, but usually propaedeutic. We should not abandon the fundamental principle in Ohio's sentencing statutes that trial judges explain the basis of their sentences.
{¶ 121} Nor do I find in Booker any indication that the federal district courts no longer have to provide a "[s]tatement of reasons for imposing a sentence," as required under Section 3553(c), Title 18, U.S.Code. Booker expressly excised Sections 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e); it did not excise Section 3553(c), which reads: "The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence * * *."
{¶ 122} If this court excises the requirement of making findings, it need not also excise the requirement of providing reasons, even though they serve a different end than originally intended. This court may direct the court to provide an explanation consistent with the general purposes, that is, consistency and proportionality, and consistent with statutory factors, that is, the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C.
{¶ 123} If the trial court is freed from providing any explanations, I believe the burden will fall on appellate courts to provide the rationale. That was never the intent of the legislature. Nor is it wise to turn a reviewing court into mice scurrying about through a transcript without a clear focus. Thus I would not remove the requirement that the trial court provide an explanation. I therefore additionally dissent for this separate reason.
{¶ 124} I also join Judge Sweeney's dissent from the majority opinion on the maximum-sentence issue.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 125} I concur with the majority position that Blakely
does not impact much of S.B. 2, including the imposition of consecutive sentences pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 126} I disagree with the majority as to what constitutes the "statutory maximum"19 under Ohio law. The majority defines the term solely in reference to the basic sentencing ranges set forth in R.C.
{¶ 127} Although R.C.
{¶ 128} A trial judge may impose maximum prison terms upon certain major drug offenders and upon certain repeat violent offenders. R.C.
{¶ 129} The trial court must follow Ohio's sentencing guidelines. Comer, supra,
{¶ 130} In Blakely, Washington state law provided a maximum term of ten years for Blakely's Class-B offense but provided a recommended range of 49 to 53 months. Other provisions in Washington's law permitted, but did not require, a trial judge to enhance a sentence beyond the recommended range if he or she determined that certain facts existed. However, if the trial judge wished to enhance the sentence based on a finding, he or she could only do so if that finding was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge in Blakely
increased the sentence upon a finding that Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty." The United States Supreme Court held that this postconviction judicial finding violated the
{¶ 131} The majority attempts to distinguish the R.C.
{¶ 132} The majority suggests that the judicial fact-finding at issue in Blakely (i.e., whether the offender acted with deliberate cruelty) and Booker (amount of controlled substance) could have easily been charged as elements of the offenses because they were "objective" facts. Conversely, the majority considers the findings required by R.C.
{¶ 133} It is not disputed that trial judges have traditionally enjoyed discretion in sentencing. For the most part, S.B. 2 provides this very discretion. However, the Ohio legislature clearly limited that discretion in terms of imposing maximum sentences pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 134} The "`statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum the judge may impose without any additional findings."Blakely, 542 U.S. at ___,
{¶ 135} Second, the fact that the trial judge may exercise his or her discretion to not impose a maximum sentence is immaterial to the
{¶ 136} Unless certain statutory provisions are ignored,Blakely unavoidably applies to portions of S.B. 2, including the imposition of maximum sentences on those who commit the "worst form of the offense" or "pose the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes." The Ohio Supreme Court has already declared that a jury may not make those determinations and has directed courts to either "(1) apply the statutes as if Blakely
did not render them unconstitutional and conduct a sentencing hearing without a jury or (2) find the statutes unconstitutional under Blakely and refuse to impose those enhancement provisions * * * deem[ed] unconstitutional." State ex Rel. Mason v.Griffin,