State v. WilliamsState v. Williams
Paul A. Mancino
Mancino Mancino & Mancino
75 Public Square Bldg.
Suite 1016
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Katherine Mullin
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Manuelle Williams, appeals his conviction and sentence rendered after he pleaded guilty to attempted murder and felonious assault. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Procedural History
{¶2} In 2012, Williams was charged with one count each of attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault. He was charged along with three codefendants in the severe beating of an autistic man. Williams entered into a plea agreement with the state in which he agreed to plead guilty to attempted murder and felonious assault. The state asked the court to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge.
{¶3} At the plea hearing, the trial court informed Williams that his attempted murder and felonious assault convictions would merge for sentencing purposes. But at the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Williams to seven years for attempted murder and a separate seven-year sentence for felonious assault.
{¶4} Williams filed a notice of delayed appeal, which we granted, and raised the following assignments of error for our review:
[I.] Defendant was denied due process of law when the court multiply [sic] sentenced defendant for attempted murder and felonious assault after advising defendant that these offenses would be merged.
[II.] Defendant was denied due process of law when his plea was induced by improper promises by the court.
[III.] Defendant was denied due process of law and his right to a fair and impartial tribunal when the court relied on facts from a [trial] or pleas by a co-defendant.
[IV.] Defendant was denied due process of law when the court failed to inform defendant concerning the effect of a plea of guilty.
[V.] Defendant was denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment when the court, at sentencing, relied upon facts neither alleged in the indictment nor admitted by defendant at his plea.
[VI.] Defendant was denied due process of law and equal protection of the law when he was sentenced to a greater sentence than the other three co-defendants.
{¶5} The assignments of error will be combined for purposes of review into two categories: plea and sentencing hearing.
II. Law and Analysis
Plea
{¶6} In the second and fourth assignments of error, Williams challenges his guilty pleas. He claims that he was induced to plead guilty because he thought by the court‘s statements at the plea hearing he would get less than seven years in prison, and the trial court failed to inform him of the effect of a guilty plea.
{¶7} Pursuant to
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved * * *.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea * * *, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶8} The underlying purpose of
{¶9} A trial court must strictly comply with the
{¶10} With respect to the nonconstitutional requirements of
{¶11} In the case at bar, our review of the record shows that the trial court adhered to the requirements of
{¶12} Williams claims that he was induced to plead guilty because the court made him think he would receive less than seven years in prison, but the record belies that claim. The trial court told Williams that it would make no promises as to the length of his sentence but that it would consider giving him “the mid to higher end range for a felony of the first degree.” The court then indicated that the range it would consider would be from six to nine years in prison and it would make its final determination after it reviewed his presentence investigation report. Three times the court asked Williams if he understood the range in sentencing and each time Williams responded, “Yes.” Moreover, Williams told the trial court he understood his rights and the possible penalties associated with his plea.
{¶13} Williams also argues that he did not understand the effect of pleading guilty. But a
{¶14} Based on the record, we find no fault with the plea colloquy, or that Williams did not understand the rights that he waived, or that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently made.
{¶15} The second and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
Sentencing
{¶16} In the remaining assignments of error, Williams challenges the sentence the trial court imposed. In the first assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred in failing to merge the felonious assault and attempted murder convictions. The state concedes the assignment of error, and we agree.
{¶17}
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant‘s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶18} In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, the Ohio Supreme Court established, through a two-tier test, that the conduct of the accused must be considered when determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger. The first inquiry focuses on whether it is possible to commit multiple offenses with the same conduct. Id. at ¶ 48. If the offenses “correspond to such a degree that the conduct of the defendant constituting commission of one offense constitutes commission of the other, then the offenses are of similar import.” Id. It is not necessary that both crimes are always committed by the same conduct, only whether it is possible for the defendant‘s conduct to result in the commission of both offenses. Id. If it is possible to commit both offenses with the same conduct, then courts must look at the “state of mind” of the offender to determine if the offender acted with a separate animus or purpose in committing two or more offenses. Id.
{¶19} Under Johnson, the facts of the criminal conduct must be evaluated to determine whether the offenses are allied offenses subject to merger.
Post Johnson, courts must undertake a case-by-case inquiry as to whether the defendant‘s conduct can constitute the commission of more than one charged offense.
State v. Hicks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95169, 2011-Ohio-2780, ¶ 10.
{¶21} In the third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error, Williams challenges the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court relied on improper evidence when sentencing him and that he should have received a sentence commensurate with his codefendants. However, because we are remanding the case for resentencing under the first assignment of error, these arguments are now moot. See
{¶22} Accordingly, judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part; case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee split the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE