STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEVIN E. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 12CA12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
RELEASED 02/28/13
[Cite as State v. Williams, 2013-Ohio-950.]
Harsha, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Kathryn Hapner, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellant.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecutor, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Kevin Williams appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment and argues that he was not brought to trial within the statutorily required 180-day time limit. We agree with the trial court that charges in this case wеre not pending at the time Williams filed his request for disposition and therefore under
{¶2} In May 2011, an officer stopped Kevin Williams for a minor traffic offense. Following a canine sniff of the vehicle’s exterior, the Lynchburg Police Department seized Williams’ vehicle and cash. However, they did not charge Williams with any crime and released him. Subsequently in June 2011, the Highland County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Williams to 11 months incarceration in an unrelated case.
{¶3} On September 26, 2011, Williams sent an “Inmate’s Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Information or Complaints” to the Hillsboro Municipal Court and the Highland County Prosecutor pursuant to
{¶4} On December 6, 2011, the grand jury returned an indictment аgainst Williams for one count of aggravated possession of drugs and a forfeiture specification based on the traffic stop in May 2011. Although the state attempted to serve Williams with a summons and copy of the indictment, both were returned unserved on December 22, 2011, with the notation “in prison.”
{¶5} Upon his release frоm prison on May 2, 2012, Highland County deputies served Williams with a warrant for his arrest and copy of the indictment. He was arraigned the following day. On June 19, 2012, Williams filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the state’s failure to bring him to trial within the required 180-day time limit identified in
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶6} Williams raises one assignment of error for our review:
- “THE TRIAL [SIC] ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS.”
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
{¶7} This case involves the interpretation of a statute, which we review de novo, without deference to the trial court’s determination. In re Adoption of T.G.B., 4th Dist. Nos. 11CA919, 11CA920, 2011-Ohio-6772, ¶ 4. “‘The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute. * * * The court must first look to the plain language оf the statute itself to determine the legislative intent.‘” Id., quoting State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. If the meaning of a statute is unambiguous and definite, we must apply it as written and without further interpretation. Mathews v. Waverly, 4th Dist. No. 08CA787, 2010-Ohio-347, ¶ 23. Only if a statute is unclear and ambiguous, may we interpret it to determine the legislature’s intent. State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16. And because the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
B. Pending Charges
{¶8} Williams argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because at the time he made his request, charges were pending against him based on the May 2011 traffic stop. Therefore, he claims that
{¶9}
When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter * * * .
* * *
If the action is not brought to trial within the time provided, subject to continuance allowed pursuant to this section, no court any longer has jurisdiction thereof, the indictment, information, or complaint is void, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.
{¶10} Looking at the plain language of the statute, it is clear that
{¶11} Moreover, Williams concedes in his brief that he did not list a case for the Highland County Common Pleas Court in his request for disposition because he “could not list a case number for a case which had not yet been formally charged or indicted.” He acknowledges that the case was still under investigation and the Highland County Prosecutor “decided not to formally pursue charges against [him] for nearly a month аnd a half” after receiving his request. Furthermore the record shows that during arguments on the motion to dismiss, defense counsel agreed with the trial court that Williams did not file his request with the Highland County Court of Common Pleas because “there was nothing pending” at the time.
{¶12} Williams cites our recent decision in State v. Miller, 4th Dist. No. 11CA26, 2012-Ohio-1823, and argues that because the case was under investigation when he served the Highland County Prosecutor with his notice of incarceration and request for disposition, the state had a duty to comply with the 180-day time limit in
{¶13} Here, the request for disposition filed by Williams concerned only his municipal court case. And unlike the defendant’s situation in Miller, he concedes that the indictment in this case was unrelated to his municipal court case and based on different facts. Accordingly, our decision in Miller is not applicable. We agree with the trial court that Williams did not have charges pending against him in this case when he filed his request and his motion to dismiss could not be granted on this basis. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow we find that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment.
C. Williams’ Notification of the Indictment
{¶14} Williams also argues that he served the Highland County Prosecutor with his notice of incarceration and request for disposition so that the state would have actual notice of his intent to request disposition of any future charges filed against him as a result of the May 2011 traffic stop. More impоrtantly, he claims his request provided the state with notice of his incarceration and location. Because he notified the state of his location, he contends that when he was subsequently indicted the state had a duty to timely serve him with a copy of the indictment. And because it failed to do so, he had no rеason to file a subsequent request for disposition once charges were pending, as the trial court decided was necessary. Consequently, he argues that
{¶16} In Hairston, the defendant was originally charged by information, but the charges were dismissed in anticipation of a possible indictment. Hairston at ¶ 6. Subsequently, the grand jury returned an indictment against the defendant and his parole was revoked. Id. at ¶ 6-7. While he was in the county jail, the summons sent to his home came back unserved. Id. at ¶ 7. Thereafter, he was returned to the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. Id. When he did not appear for his arraignment, the trial court issued a capias for his arrest. Id. Nearly eight months later and while still incarcerated, he received a detainer notifying him of the indictment filed against him. Id. at ¶ 8. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss and argued that under
{¶17} The Court held that
{¶18} The Court concluded that “[i]n its plainest language,
{¶19} Although the state urges us to find Hairston controlling here, the facts of our case are distinguishable. “‘While in general, the one hundred eighty day time requirement of
{¶20} Unlike the defendant in Hairston, Williams sent a notice of incarceration and request for disposition to the prosecutor in this case pursuant to
{¶21} Because we have determined that Williams met his initial duty under
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED and that the CAUSE IS REMANDED. Appellee shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgmеnt into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of thе Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Hoover, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
McFarland, P.J.: Dissents.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.