STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee -vs- DAVID WHITE, Defendant-Appellant
Case No. 2010-CA-60
COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 1, 2011
2011-Ohio-4526
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.; Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.; Hon. John W. Wise, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2010CR488. JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded.
For Plaintiff-Appellee: GREGG MARX, Assistant Prosecutor, 239 W. Main Street, Ste. 101, Lancaster, OH 43130
For Defendant-Appellant: AARON R. CONRAD, 120 1/2 E. Main Street, Lancaster, OH 43130
O P I N I O N
{¶1} Appellant David L. White appeals the July 19, 2010 Judgment Entry of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas overruling his motion to suppress. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1
{¶2} In January 2010 law enforcement officers from Franklin County, Ohio were investigating a series of home break-ins in the area. Detectives learned that all of the home invasion robberies had similarities. Each robbery involved firearms and some with the discharge of the firearms. Each robbery was a home invasion. Each robbery occurred in a suburban or rural area. The robberies occurred in a relatively short time span. Although the robberies occurred in three counties, the counties are contiguous and the robberies occurred in the same region. Victims and/or witnesses described the persons committing the robberies as two African-American males in a white car.
{¶3} The American Automobile Association (AAA) was called to service a disabled white Honda Civic. AAA furnished the make, model and year of the white vehicle. The tow truck driver believed that he was going to service a white Honda Accord; however, when the tow truck driver arrived he found a stolen green Toyota Camry with the engine running crashed into another vehicle. The AAA tow truck driver alerted law enforcement. Upon investigation it was discovered that the car had been stolen in a home invasion robbery and the AAA card that had been used to make the service call had been stolen in a different home invasion robbery. Law
{¶4} Corporal Richard Minerd of the Franklin County Sheriff‘s Office used a database of “associates” and determined that Montie E. Sullivan had used an address, 2399 Hudson Bay Way, Columbus, Franklin County. Corporal Minerd further learned through the use of the database of “associates” that the appellant was also associated with the Hudson Bay Way address. Corporal Minerd also knew that appellant had received a traffic citation while operating the white Honda Civic in December 2009 or January 2010.
{¶5} Corporal Minerd set up surveillance on the Hudson Bay Way address and the white Honda Civic which was located at that address. Beginning January 11, 2010, detectives monitored and followed the vehicle when it was driven by appellant and/or co-defendant Montie E. Sullivan, who is a relative of appellant2. Detectives continued to monitor the vehicle for three days, and no criminal activity was observed. Monitoring and tracking the vehicle was a difficult task due to the mobility of the vehicle.
{¶6} On January 14, 2010, Corporal Minerd sought the assistance of the Franklin County Sheriff‘s Department‘s undercover unit to employ electronics as a surveillance tool. Corporal Minerd and an undercover officer went to an address of an associate of appellant where they observed the white Honda Civic parked in the parking lot of an apartment complex. Corporal Minerd and the undercover officer drove up to the white Honda Civic, and the undercover officer went to the white Honda Civic and placed a GPS unit under a bumper of the white Honda Civic. The GPS unit attached to the white
{¶7} In the early afternoon of January 23, 2010, Corporal Minerd was at home when he decided to observe the location and movement of the white Honda Civic with the laptop computer. While following these movements, Corporal Minerd consulted with the Fairfield County Sheriff‘s Department and he learned that a home invasion robbery burglary had been committed on Bickel Church Road which was in the vicinity where the appellant‘s car had been tracked. Appellant‘s car was subsequently tracked until it arrived back at his Hudson Bay Way home. When law enforcement arrived, appellant and co-defendant Montie E. Sullivan ran out the back door. The property taken during the Bickel Church Road home invasion robbery was recovered.
{¶8} Appellant was subsequently arrested and then indicted on one count of Improperly Discharging Firearm at or into Habitation, in violation of
{¶9} Subsequently, appellant filed a Motion to Suppress arguing, among other things, that the placement of a GPS device without a warrant on the vehicle that appellant was driving and/or was a passenger constituted a search and/or seizure and is per se unreasonable and is a violation of appellant‘s constitutional protections, and any and all evidence obtained from the GPS monitoring device amounts to an unlawful search and seizure.
{¶10} On April 23, 2010, an oral hearing was held on appellant‘s Motion to Suppress. After the presentation of the evidence, the trial court requested post hearing briefs to address the suppression issues. On July 19, 2010, the Court filed its Journal Entry overruling appellant‘s motion to suppress.
{¶11} On November 22, 2010 appellant changed his plea from “not guilty” to “no contest” to counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment in Case number 2010 CR 488. On that same day, appellant was sentenced by the trial court.
{¶12} It is from the trial court‘s July 19, 2010 Judgment Entry overruling his motion to suppress that appellant has timely appealed raising as his sole Assignment of Error:
{¶13} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶14} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 797 N.E.2d 71, 74, 2003-Ohio-5372 at ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583. Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to the trial court‘s factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1; State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268. However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539; See, generally, United States v. Arvizu (2002), 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744; Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657. That is, the application of the law to the trial court‘s findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.
I.
{¶15} Appellant‘s sole Assignment of Error relates to the propriety of the trial court‘s overruling of his motion to suppress. Specifically appellant maintains that it was unlawful for law enforcement officers to attach a GPS tracking device to the exterior of his car in the absence of exigent circumstances without first obtaining a warrant.
A. BACKGROUND
{¶16} We begin our analysis by reviewing the decision which has been accepted for review by the Ohio Supreme Court. In State v. Johnson, 190 Ohio App.3d 750, 944 N.E.2d 270, 2010-Ohio-5808, appeal allowed 128 Ohio St.3d 1425, 943 N.E.2d 572, 2011-Ohio-1049 (Table) over a number of months law enforcement had received information Johnson might be involved in the trafficking of cocaine. The person told police he believed Johnson would acquire more cocaine in the future. Without a warrant, Hackney surreptitiously placed a GPS tracking device underneath the van. 190 Ohio App.3d at 753, 944 N.E.2d at 272, 2010-Ohio-5808 at ¶ 2-3.
{¶17} Six days after placing the device on Johnson‘s van, police discovered from GPS records the van had traveled from Ohio to Illinois. Id. at ¶5. While the van was in Chicago officers conducted visual surveillance in addition to monitoring its location with the tracking device. Id. at ¶ 6-7.
{¶18} The van was followed from a shopping center to a private residence in suburban Chicago. Johnson and another man, Otis Kelly, were observed leaving the private residence in the van and in a car respectively. The agent followed Johnson and Kelly from the private residence in suburban Chicago into Ohio.
{¶20} The investigating officers ordered a patrol car to conduct a “probable cause” stop of the van driven by Johnson. Following the order, a patrol car pulled in behind Johnson and in short time conducted a stop of the van. The basis for the stop was reportedly for an “improper change of course.” The van was physically searched. The van was then driven to a second location. Johnson was placed in the back seat of a police car and eventually moved from the “traffic stop” location to a new location for additional investigation. No contraband was ever located in the van.
{¶21} Otis Kelly was driving the car traveling from Illinois to Ohio. He was the subject of a “traffic stop” at another location. Johnson was taken from the place where he “committed the traffic violation” to where Kelly and the police were located. It was then the police searched Kelly‘s car and found cocaine hidden in a secret location in Kelly‘s car.
{¶22} However, during the search, Johnson made incriminating statement to the officers while seated in the back seat of the police car. Id. at ¶13. After being transported to the station and re-Mirandized Johnson again confessed his involvement in the cocaine trafficking scheme. He was subsequently indicted on single counts of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, and having weapons while under disability.
{¶24} On appeal Johnson first argued that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to suppress regarding the placement of the GPS device without first obtaining a warrant. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument finding that placing the GPS on the van and monitoring its movement did not constitute a search or seizure under either the federal or Ohio constitutions. The court based this ruling upon finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of a car. The court found Johnson did not produce any evidence that demonstrated his intention to guard the undercarriage of his van from inspection or manipulation by others. 190 Ohio App.3d at 757, 944 N.E.2d at 274, 2010-Ohio-5808 at ¶25.
{¶25} Johnson next argued a search and seizure also occurred because law enforcement was able to track the van‘s movement and collect information regarding where Johnson traveled and where his van was located on any given occasion. Id. at ¶27. The court rejected this argument in part because more importantly, the information gathered from the GPS device shows no more information than what detectives could have obtained by visual surveillance. Id. at ¶34. The court rejected Johnson‘s arguments that other courts have found the surveillance to be a search which requires a warrant prior to initiation by finding “each relied on a state constitution that differed from
{¶26} Next we begin our analysis of the case at bar by first observing, a “search” occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A “seizure” of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual‘s possessory interests in that property. United States v. Jacobsen (1984), 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656. In assessing when a search is not a search, the Court has adapted a principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, A “search” does not occur—even when its object is a house explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment—unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the searched object, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Kyllo v. United States (2001), 533 U.S. 27, 32-33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2042. (Citing Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507. (Harlan, Justice concurring).
{¶27} The central issue of this appeal is thus whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant issued with judicial approval is required before governmental agents may attach to a privately owned vehicle, without consent of one entitled to give it, a GPS or electronic tracking device.
{¶28} To resolve this conundrum, “[t]wo main questions need to be asked: (1) Did the Government violate the defendant‘s legitimate expectation of privacy when it installed the [GPS tracking device]? (2) Did monitoring the [GPS tracking device] violate the defendant‘s legitimate expectation of privacy?” United States v. Bailey (6th Cir 1980), 628 F.2d 938, 941. (Citations omitted).
B. ATTACHMENT OF THE GPS TRACKING DEVICE TO THE EXTERIOR OF THE SUSPECT VEHICLE.
{¶31} In the case at bar, a single police officer after conducting visual surveillance for approximately three days and observing no suspicious activity unilaterally decided to attach a GPS tracking device to a suspect‘s vehicle. The purpose of installing this device was to catch the suspect in the act of committing a home invasion type burglary. The officer candidly testified that his department does not have a written protocol governing the attachment of wireless tracking devices to a suspect‘s motor vehicle. (T. April 23, 2010 at 30). Rather, he had been informed by members of the undercover drug team that because the device is not hardwired to the suspect‘s vehicle he was not required to justify his decision by presenting facts sufficient to show probable cause to a neutral and detached magistrate. (Id. at 30-31; T. May 27, 2010 at 53). The officer conceded during his testimony that he did not request a warrant before placing the device on the suspect‘s vehicle because he did not believe he had probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant. He further admitted that no exigent circumstances were present that would prevent him from obtaining a warrant. (T. April 23, 2010 at 76).
{¶33} The
{¶34} The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has cogently summarized the cases dealing with the warrantless installation and tracking of a GPS-type device by law enforcement officers. United States v. Bailey (6th Cir 1980), 628 F.2d 938.
{¶35} In the first group are cases where the courts have upheld the installation of a tracking device on the exteriors of cars and airplanes parked in areas lawfully
{¶36} We find the case at bar does not so neatly fall into either one of the categories identified by the Bailey court. This is because we find, unlike the court in State v. Johnson, supra that the initial placement of the device onto the underside bumper of the suspect vehicle was more than simply a momentary trespass which one could expect from any member of the public.
{¶37} “The effect of the
{¶38} “The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court (1967), 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 17306. The security of one‘s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. Wolf v. People of State of Colorado (1949), 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361.
{¶39} In Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, the Court recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. See also, California v. Carney (1985), 471 U.S. 386, 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068. The reasons for the vehicle exception are twofold. South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096. “Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one‘s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one‘s home or office.” Id.; California v. Carney, supra at 391, 105 S.Ct. at 2069. However, a lesser expectation of privacy does not mean that a citizen has no expectation of privacy in his or her vehicle.
{¶40} There is a right of privacy guaranteed to the citizens of this nation. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678; Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243; and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029. “The Court said in full about this right of privacy: ‘The principles laid down in this opinion (by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029) affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach further than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man‘s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden‘s judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man‘s own testimony, or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each other.’ 116 U.S., at 630, 6 S.Ct. at 532.” Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, n. *.
{¶41} Over forty years ago the court cautioned against whittling away the privacy of the citizenry in favor of more technologically efficient police investigation techniques, “We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from government. The aggressive breaches of privacy by the government increase by geometric proportions. Wiretapping and ‘bugging’ run rampant, without effective judicial or legislative control.
{¶43} “Polygraph tests of government employees and of employees in industry are rampant. The dossiers on all citizens mount in number and increase in size. Now they are being put on computers so that by pressing one button all the miserable, the sick, the suspect, the unpopular, the offbeat people of the Nation can be instantly identified.
{¶44} “These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen in society in which government may intrude into the secret regions of man‘s life at
{¶45} The initial placement of the GPS tracking device but also its attachment during the entire period of its use implicates Fourth Amendment interests of the privacy rights of persons.
{¶46} When a person parks his car on a public way, he does not thereby give up all expectations of privacy in his vehicle. There is no way to lock a door or place the car under a protective cloak as a signal to the police that one considers the car private. United States v. Holmes (5th Cir. 1975), 521 F.2d 859, 865. Checking vehicle identification numbers, taking paint scrapings or observing objects in plain view of the car are minimal and momentary intrusions which can be distinguished from the installation of the GPS tracking device in the case at bar. In addition, the attachment of the GPS tracking device in the case at bar was accomplished by an actual trespass.
{¶47} Upon observing a stranger underneath one‘s automobile, it is reasonable to believe that most citizens would sound an alarm. A response to the effect of, “Well, you have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of your car so any stranger can crawl under there and attach a GPS tracking device” would be met with righteous anger and disbelief. A citizen would justifiably feel that his or her property has been defiled; her privacy breached and his personal security compromised.
{¶48} We are unwilling to hold that every citizen runs the risk that the government will plant a GPS tracking device in his car in order to track his movements, merely because he drives his car in areas accessible to the public. A person has a right to expect that when he drives his car into the street, the police will not attach a GPS
{¶49} The placement of the GPS tracking device makes possible the continuous and indefinite tracing of the individual‘s movements, wherever he goes. It permits surveillance far beyond any ordinary powers of observation about which citizens may reasonably know, as the government inferentially admits when it contends that placement of the device was necessary in order to effectuate continuous surveillance. United States v. Michael (5th Cir 1980), 622 F.2d 744, 7527, rehearing United States v. Michael (1981), 645 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir.)(En banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 489, 70 L.Ed.2d 257. The argument that the device only augments that which can admittedly be done by visual surveillance is feckless. “If this be true, and the facts contradict the position, then there is no need for the device in the first place. Its value lies in its ability to convey information not otherwise available to the government.” United States v. Holmes, supra at n. 13. The warrantless and unauthorized installation of GPS tracking device intensifies the degree of surveillance following the vehicle indefinitely and even indiscriminately into closed precincts (e. g., a garage, a fenced estate) not visually observable which may have Fourth Amendment protection against governmental intrusion to such an extent that it constitutes a violation of Fourth Amendment rights of privacy. United States v. Michael supra 622 F.2d 744, 752.
{¶50} We find that the GPS tracking device, remaining constantly in place, performs a search of much more substantial and therefore unreasonable duration and scope. The installation of the device without consent upon private property is a “search” subject to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements, in the sense that it is an unreasonable governmental intrusion upon the individual‘s constitutionally guaranteed right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
C. WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT‘S LEGITIMATE PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS BY MONITORING THE GPS TRACKING DEVICE‘S SIGNAL AFTER THE DEVICE WAS ATTACHED TO THE SUSPECT VEHICLE.
{¶53} In U.S. v. Maynard, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue reserved by Knotts and considered whether 24 hour a day tracking of the whole movements of a person who is suspected of being part of a drug distribution ring over 28 days was constitutional. The Maynard court found that the likelihood that someone would observe “the whole” of another person‘s movements over a month is “not just remote, it is essentially nil“; that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in movements over the course of a month; and that the automobile exception to the
{¶54} In United States v. Bailey, supra the court found that the cases concerning the monitoring of a GPS-like device‘s signal fall into two broad categories. 628 F.2d at 942. With respect to the question whether monitoring the beeper constitutes a search, courts have held that defendants exhibited no subjective expectation of privacy in information, such as a vehicle‘s course through public air space or over public roads, which is inherently public8. The court in Bailey pointed out that several other courts have recognized a defendant has a reduced expectation of privacy in the location of a vehicle he is operating, but have found it unnecessary to decide whether the tracking device surveillance in those cases constituted a search because probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless monitoring. Id. (Citations omitted).
{¶55} A second group consists of cases in which the defendants exhibited subjective privacy expectations that the government violated by monitoring the beepers, but in which the courts found no fourth amendment violations because those subjective privacy expectations were not legally justified. The contraband cases fall into this category. 628 F.2d at 942-43. (Footnotes and citations omitted).
{¶56} “GPS technology is growing increasingly more sophisticated, concealable, inexpensive and pervasive. Law enforcement can use GPS far more widely than they were ever able to use visual surveillance, thereby significantly increasing the number of
{¶57} Courts have distinguished the monitoring of a single trip as far different from constant prolonged surveillance. “GPS and wireless telephone tracking systems allow authorities to surreptitiously monitor and record people‘s movements in a systematic and detailed manner over an indefinite period of time.” State v. Holden, supra. (Quoting Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, at 1377 (2004)). See also, People v. Weaver (2004), 12 N.Y. 3d 433, 882 N.Y.S. 2d 357, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1201. (Construing right to privacy under the New York State Constitution); State v. Jackson (2003), 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217, 224. (Construing right to privacy under Washington State Constitution). States have also enacted legislation prohibiting the private use of GPS tracking devices and requiring exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of GPS tracking without a warrant. See Holden, supra at 10. (Citing Legislation in California, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Hawaii, Minnesota and Utah).
{¶58} The tremendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques. GPS provides law enforcement with access to areas it could not get into otherwise without a warrant.
{¶59} “The primary reason for the warrant requirement is to interpose a ‘neutral and detached magistrate’ between the citizen and ‘the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.‘” United States v. Karo (1984), 468 U.S. 705, 717, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3304-3305 (quoting Johnson v. United States, (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 14 68 S.Ct. 367, 369). However, the procedure employed in the case at bar allows a single government agent without judicial or legislative authorization to decide which citizens will be tracked, for how long the tracking will continue and to whom to divulge the results of the citizen‘s movements. See, United States v. Michael (1981), 645 F.2d 252, 257 (5th Cir. En banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 489, 70 L.Ed.2d 257. (Tate, J. dissenting).
{¶60} The GPS tracking device employed in the case at bar permits the continuous and indefinite tracing of the individual‘s movements, wherever he goes. It permits surveillance far beyond any ordinary powers of observation about which citizens may reasonably know, as the government inferentially admits when it contends that placement of the device was necessary in order to effectuate continuous surveillance.
{¶61} The GPS tracking device and its associated technology intensifies the degree of surveillance following the vehicle indefinitely and even indiscriminately into closed precincts (e. g., a garage, a fenced estate) not visually observable which may have Fourth Amendment protection against governmental intrusion to such an extent that it constitutes a violation of Fourth Amendment rights of privacy. United States v. Michael, supra 622 F.2d at 752.
{¶62} In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), the Supreme Court invalidated the New York wiretap statute because the statute, among other things, authorized a two-month surveillance period based on a single showing of probable cause; permitted extensions of two months of the initial surveillance without requiring a new showing of probable cause; and placed no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought had been seized. 388 U.S. at 59-60, 87 S.Ct. at 1883-1884. These procedures were held to offend the fourth amendment because they authorized “the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable cause.” 388 U.S. at 59, 87 S.Ct. at 1883. Berger indicates the fourth amendment requires a showing not only of probable cause, but of present probable cause. See 388 U.S. at 59-60, 87 S.Ct. at 1883-1884.
{¶63} The indiscriminate use of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement is of great concern,
{¶64} “I also share the opinion of Mr. Justice BRENNAN that the fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great danger to the privacy of the individual; that indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; and that these considerations impose a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures in the federal court system...” Lopez v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 427, 441, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 1389. (Concurring opinion of The Chief Justice). See also, Osborn v. United States (1966), 385 U.S. 323, 329, 87 S.Ct. 429, 432-433.
{¶65} In the present case there was never any showing of probable cause required. Accordingly in the case at bar there is no time limitation upon the ability of law enforcement to track the suspect vehicle. There is no assurance that the Government will not continue to monitor the device‘s signals long after its justification for initially placing the device upon the vehicle has ceased to exist. Indeed, nothing other than technological problems would prevent the GPS tracking device from revealing its location forever.
{¶67} Because the procedure employed permitted surveillance of the movements of the appellant constantly for an indefinite period of time without any exigent circumstances or showing of probable cause, it authorized an unreasonable search, and, therefore, was invalid.9
{¶68} Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons appellant‘s First Assignment of Error is sustained.
By Gwin, P.J., and
Wise, J., concur;
Hoffman, J., dissents
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. JOHN W. WISE
WSG:clw 0812
STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee -vs- DAVID WHITE, Defendant-Appellant
CASE NO. 2010-CA-60
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Hoffman, J., dissenting
{¶70} I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Sullivan, Fairfield App. No. 10-52, 2011-Ohio-_____.
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, For the forgoing reasons the judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County, Ohio is reversed and this matter is remanded for proceedings in accordance with our opinion and the law. Costs to appellee.
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. JOHN W. WISE