State v. WaltersState v. Walters
APPEARANCES:
Ian A. Weber for Appellant
Carson L. Slade for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dustin Mark Walters (“Walters”), appeals the August 17, 2016 judgment entry of the Defiance Municipal Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On July 28, 2016, Walters was charged with willful or wanton disregard of safety on highways, a violation of
{¶3} Walters, with the assistance of counsel, filed his notice of appeal on September 16, 2016. (Doc. No. 3). Walters raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Finding Of The Court That The Defendant/Appellant Was Guilty Of Reckless Operation Pursuant To ORC 4511.20 Was Not Supported And Was Against the Manifest Weight Of The Evidence.
{¶4} In his assignment of error, Walters asserts that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence and based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, Walters argues there is insufficient evidence that he acted willfully or
{¶5} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). We address each concept individually.
{¶6} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19
{¶7} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{¶8}
{¶9} At the hearing, the State recounted the statement of Trooper Matthew Gardner (“Trooper Gardner”) of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, who issued the citation at issue in the case. (Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 3). The State’s recounting of Trooper Gardner’s statement can be summarized as follows: On July 28, 2016, at approximately 6:51 p.m., Trooper Gardner received a traffic complaint indicating that, on U.S. 24 at approximately mile marker 53, a motorcycle was traveling at an excessive speed. (Id.). Trooper Gardner spoke with a law enforcement officer from the Henry County Sheriff’s Office, who indicated that the motorcycle was black in color. (Id.). That officer also described the individual that the Henry County Sheriff’s Office had seen. (Id.). Soon after, the Henry County Sheriff’s Office indicated to Trooper Gardner that it observed a motorcycle near Napoleon, but the motorcycle was traveling so fast that officers were unable to catch it. (Id.). At
{¶10} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that Walters’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. A rational trier of fact could have found that Walters acted willfully or wantonly.
{¶11} As an initial matter, we note that Walters did not dispute the underlying facts alleged in the complaint because he pled no contest to the charge. (Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 2). As such, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have believed the evidence the State offered and, if it did, he could have believed that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Erskine, 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA17, 2015-Ohio-710, ¶ 11, citing City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 9 Ohio St.3d 148, 150 (1984).
{¶12} We now review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Walters’s conviction. State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10, 2014-Ohio-1788, ¶ 68, citing State v. Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999 WL 355190, *1 (Mar. 26, 1999). Because it is the only element Walters challenges on appeal, we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting only whether he acted willfully or wantonly.
{¶13} First, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, that Walters’s passing improperly between the semi and the passenger car constituted the operation of a vehicle on the highway in willful disregard for the safety of persons or property without a justifiable excuse. See State of Ohio v. Williams, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2011CA18, 2012-Ohio-725 ¶ 29. Trooper Gardner observed Walters pass between a semi truck and a passenger car in such a way as to essentially create a third lane on a two-lane road. (Aug 17, 2016 Tr. at 3). This is to say that, for a time, two vehicles parallel to one another occupied the same lane of travel, with each going at least as fast as one would expect on a highway, possibly faster. (See id.). One vehicle need not be close to another at such high rates of speed for this situation to be quite dangerous; even if both vehicles in the same lane were traveling at the posted speed limit, distances between the vehicles could be closed quickly, and a crash might well ensue. Even greater peril is involved here, as there were three vehicles—Walters’s motorcycle, the passenger car, and the semi truck. (Id.). This passing between the car and the semi truck could be found to be willful—Walters was in control of his motorcycle when it occurred, suggesting that
{¶14} Second, we conclude that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have concluded that Walters operated a vehicle on the highway in wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property because the facts suggest that Walters substantially exceeded the speed limit on a highway occupied by other motorists and that he passed improperly between two fellow motorists while traveling at a high rate of speed. See State v. Hitchcock, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 16-COA-021, 2017-Ohio-126, ¶¶ 16-17. Such dangerous conduct could be found to indicate a reckless disregard for the rights of those other motorists, as well as a reckless indifference to the life, limb, health, and property thereof. (Id.).
{¶15} Walters further argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. When considering the sufficiency of evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259
{¶16} However, when determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{¶17} We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Briefly summarized, the evidence was as follows: Trooper Gardner observed Walters traveling at, by his estimation, eighty miles per hour on a highway occupied by other motorists while Walters himself, because he was on a
{¶18} We are cognizant of the fact that, despite our conclusion, the trial court heard evidence weighing against Walters’s conviction. Walters asserted that he did not exceed the speed limit, and he claimed that the semi truck and passenger car were separated by approximately fifteen or twenty feet. (Aug. 17, 2016 Tr. at 3-4). Walters further claimed that he did not create a third lane of travel but that, because he was on a motorcycle, he did not need a great deal of space to pass other vehicles.
{¶19} Walters’s assignment of error is overruled. Having found no error in the trial court’s proceedings in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur.
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