STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TY ERSKINE, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 14CA17
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT HIGHLAND COUNTY
RELEASED: 02/24/2015
[Cite as State v. Erskine, 2015-Ohio-710.]
Harsha, J.
APPEARANCES:
James T. Boulger, Jr., Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecutor, and Ross Greer, Highland County Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Ty Erskine appeared with counsel and pleaded “no contest” to driving under suspension in violation of
{¶2} Erskine claims that the trial court erred when it found him guilty of a violation of
{¶3} Next Erskine claims that his vehicle was not subject to forfeiture absent a valid conviction under
I. FACTS
{¶4} The Greenfield police department responded to a report that a white pick-up truck with no license plates was “messing with two tractors that belonged to the state of Ohio or Madison township.” The caller had identified the driver of the truck as Ty Erskine. When the police arrived the white pick-up truck was gone, but a fuel transfer pump remained in the fuel tank of one of the tractors and a hose lay on the ground in a small puddle of fuel. The police quickly located the white pick-up truck without license plates and determined that Erskine was operating the truck under a license suspension. The police sergeant issued a ticket charging Erskine with operating a vehicle under a suspended driver license in violation of
{¶5} Erskine appeared with counsel and entered a plea of no contest to driving under suspension in violation of
{¶6} After the trial court found Erskine guilty of driving under suspension in violation of
{¶7} Erskine appealed his conviction of driving under suspension under
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶8} Erskine assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant when, upon his plea of no contest, it found him guilty of a violation of
R.C. 4510.11 on an explanation of circumstances which did not establish the essential elements of the offense.II. The trial court was without authority to order as a sentencing sanction under
4510.11(D)(2)(c) the forfeiture of the defendant‘s vehicle in the absence of a valid conviction for a violation of4510.11 R.C. and statutory preconditions for forfeiture.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. First Assignment of Error
{¶9} Erskine contends that the trial court erred when it found him guilty on his plea of no contest to the charge of driving under suspension because the explanation of circumstances did not establish the essential elements of the offense.
{¶10} Appellate review of a trial court‘s finding of guilt on a no contest plea to a misdemeanor is de novo: We review the explanation of circumstances to determine if there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish all of the elements of the offense. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 9 Ohio St.3d 148, 150, 459 N.E.2d 532, 535 (1984).
{¶11} A defendant who enters a plea of no contest to a misdemeanor admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and a judge may make a finding of guilty or not
{¶12} The state charged Erskine with a violation of
4510.11 Driving under suspension or in violation of license restriction
(A) * * * no person whose driver‘s or commercial driver‘s license or permit or nonresident operating privilege has been suspended under any provision of the Revised Code, other than Chapter 4509. of the Revised Code, * * * shall operate any motor vehicle upon the public roads and highways or upon any public or private property used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking within this state during the period of suspension unless the person is granted limited driving privileges and is operating the vehicle in accordance with the terms of the limited driving privileges.
Thus, the explanation of circumstances must provide sufficient evidence that Erskine‘s driver‘s license was suspended under any provision of the Ohio Revised Code other than Chapter 4509 and that he was operating the vehicle during the period of suspension.
{¶13} Erskine concedes that he was operating the vehicle while under a license suspension. But he argues that the LEADS report, which the parties stipulated was part of the explanation of circumstances, does not provide sufficient evidence that his license was “suspended under any provision of the Revised Code other than Chapter 4509.” He argues that at the time he was operating the vehicle, his license was suspended under
{¶15} Our review of the LEADS report reveals that Erskine‘s driving record was subject to thirty license suspensions dating back to 1996. They are noted as “non-compliance” suspensions, “court” suspensions, “drug offense” suspensions, and “administrative license” suspensions, to name but a few. The relevant suspension for our purposes is the one that he was driving under at the time of his offense on October 13, 2013.
{¶16} The LEADS report shows that there were three different suspensions whose terms were in effect at the time Erskine committed the offense. A suspension effective September 20, 2013 to September 20, 2015 was imposed for a conviction in Highland County Court Case No. TRD1300123A and was in effect on October 13, 2013, the date of the latest offense. The LEADS report shows that the conviction in that case was a result of a guilty plea to the offense of driving under suspension in violation of
{¶17} The conviction in Highland County Court Case No. TRD1300123A is sufficient evidence to establish the element that his license was suspended for a provision other than Chapter 4509. Erskine does not contest the remaining elements of
{¶18} We find no evidence in the record, nor has Erskine pointed to any statutory or case law, that supports his argument that the “non-compliance” suspensions on the LEADS report are all exclusively for violations of
The essence of the “no contest” plea is that the accused cannot be heard in defense. . . . Although the trial court retains discretion to consider a defendant‘s contention that the admitted facts do not constitute the charged offense, the defendant who pleads no contest waives the right to present additional affirmative factual allegations to prove that he is not guilty of the charged offense. By pleading no contest, the defendant waives his right to present an affirmative defense.
State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 75 Ohio St.3d 422, 424, 662 N.E.2d 370, 372-373 (1996)(citations omitted).
{¶19} The stipulated explanation of the circumstances establishes the essential elements of the offense set forth in
B. Second Assignment of Error
{¶21} Second, he argues alternatively that even if we determine that his conviction under
{¶22} We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See In the Matter of O.H., 4th Dist. Washington App. No. 09CA38, 2010-Ohio-1244, ¶8 (“We examine questions of statutory interpretation de novo.“)
{¶23} Erskine‘s argument on statutory interpretation focuses on
(c) If the vehicle is registered in the offender‘s name and if, within three years of the offense, the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more violations of this section, or any combination of three or more violations of this section or section 4510.111 or 4510.16 of the Revised Code, or of a substantially similar municipal ordinance, the court, in addition to any other sentence that it imposes on the offender, may order the criminal forfeiture of the vehicle involved in the offense to the state.
{¶24} Erskine notes that this subsection requires that the vehicle be “registered” in the offender‘s name as a precondition to any criminal forfeiture. And he argues that
{¶25} In its motion to forfeit the vehicle the state argued that Erskine‘s failure to register the vehicle with the registrar of motor vehicles constituted an additional offense in violation of
{¶26} A court‘s goal when interpreting and applying a statute is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent when enacting the statute. We give meaning to each word, neither adding nor removing words from the statute. Terms that the legislature intended to have a specialized or technical meaning and are specifically defined in the statute are given their technical meanings. Otherwise, terms are given their plain, ordinary, common meanings. In the Matter of O.H., 2010-Ohio-1244, ¶8. If a statute‘s meaning is unambiguous and definite, we must apply it as written as no further interpretation is necessary. In re Adoption of B.M.W., 4th Dist. No. 10CA899, 2010-Ohio-5214, ¶13 citing State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶9. A term is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513, 668 N.E.2d 498 (1996). For an interpretation to be reasonable it must give effect to
{¶27}
{¶28}
{¶29} Under the common and ordinary meaning of “registered,” a vehicle is “registered” in the offender‘s name if it is recorded on the official title or listed with the registrar of motor vehicles. Under the ordinary and common meaning, Erskine‘s listing as the owner on the title is sufficient to show the vehicle was “registered” in his name within the context and meaning of the statute.
{¶30} When we give the term “registered” this ordinary and common meaning we do not frustrate or create inconsistencies with the legislative intent. The statutory provision is a penalty intended to punish the offender by taking away the offender‘s vehicle. The legislature did not provide for criminal forfeiture if the vehicle belongs to someone else and was stolen or borrowed by the offender. That would punish an innocent third party. Instead, the legislature intended to punish the multiple offender by making the offender‘s vehicle subject to criminal forfeiture. Hence, if the vehicle is listed on an official record in the offender‘s name, it is subject to forfeiture.
{¶31} However, Erskine argues that one reasonable interpretation of the term “registered” means only those instances where the offender has complied with the
{¶32} Because his proposed interpretation is not reasonable within the context of the overall legislative scheme, we are not required to apply the rule of lenity to obtain an absurd result. “The canon in favor of strict construction of criminal statutes is not an obstinate rule which overrides common sense and evident statutory purpose. The canon is satisfied if the statutory language is given fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the General Assembly.” State v. White, 132 Ohio St.3d 344, 2012-Ohio-2583, 972 N.E.2d 534, ¶20 (“although criminal statutes are strictly construed against the state,
{¶33} Because there is only one reasonable interpretation of the term “registered” as used in
{¶34} Erskine‘s proposed meaning is unreasonable as it would give an artificially narrow interpretation that would defeat the apparent legislative intent. The term “registered” is unambiguous and has the common meaning, “to be listed in the offender‘s name on an official record.” We overrule Erskine‘s second assignment of error and affirm the trial court‘s order of criminal forfeiture.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶35} The trial court properly entered a guilty finding on Erskine‘s plea of no contest to a violation of
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hoover, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.