State v. WallaceState v. Wallace
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Dorrian, Brown, Luper Schuster
Rendered on March 21, 2019
DORRIAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Deandre D. Wallace, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him pursuant to guilty pleas and imposing sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Wallace was indicted in March 2016 on one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of rape, one count of gross sexual imposition, and one count of tampering with evidence. Each of the charges carried a firearm specification. He filed a plea of not guilty to the charges. Wallace‘s appointed counsel filed a suggestion of incompetence and requested the court order an evaluation of Wallace‘s mental condition. The trial court ordered a mental examination of Wallace. Pursuant to that order, an examination was conducted and a report was filed
{¶ 3} On May 8, 2017, the court convened for trial, and Wallace‘s counsel explained that a plea offer had been made and discussed with Wallace. The prosecutor for the state of Ohio, plaintiff-appellee, indicated the offer was a recommendation for a 20-year prison sentence for guilty pleas on charges of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and rape, with firearm specifications on each charge, and that Wallace would have to testify against his co-defendants. Wallace indicated he did not want to plead guilty or serve 20 years, but indicated he would plead to some other charge. The trial court explained that Wallace‘s options were to accept the plea offer, make a counteroffer, or proceed with a jury trial. When Wallace indicated he did not know what to do, the trial court advised Wallace to discuss the matter further with his counsel. Later the same day, the court reconvened and Wallace entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated burglary with a firearm specification, one count of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, and one count of rape with a firearm specification. The court accepted Wallace‘s pleas and found him guilty of those charges. The court entered a nolle prosequi on the other charges in the indictment.
{¶ 4} The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on June 28, 2017. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted Wallace‘s counsel had stipulated to the competency evaluation report at the prior hearings. The trial court accepted the joint recommendation and sentenced Wallace to 11 years imprisonment on each of the convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and rape, with those sentences to run concurrently. The trial court also sentenced Wallace to 3 years on each of the firearm specifications, with those sentences to run consecutively to each other and to the 11 year terms, for a total term of imprisonment of 20 years. The trial court found that prison time was mandatory on all the convictions. The court notified Wallace he would be subject to post-release control upon release and that he was classified as a Tier III sex offender, with lifetime registration and verification requirements. On June 28, 2017, the trial court issued
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 5} Wallace assigns the following two assignments of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred by entering a judgment of conviction for a sex offense based upon a guilty plea that was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
[II.] The trial court erred in failing to make a finding as to whether or not the defendant-appellant was competent to plead guilty.
III. Analysis
A. Failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)
{¶ 6} Wallace asserts in his first assignment of error that his guilty plea to the charge of rape was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court did not inform him at the plea hearing that the rape conviction would result in him being classified as Tier III sex offender, with corresponding registration, community notification, and verification requirements for life.
{¶ 7} ” ‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’ ” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996).
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges
and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 8} A trial court must strictly comply with
{¶ 9} Wallace argues the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 10} Wallace pled guilty to rape, in violation of
{¶ 11} The General Assembly has significantly modified Ohio‘s sex offender registration laws during the past quarter century, first with the enactment of Ohio‘s version of the federal “Megan‘s Law” in 1996, and then with the enactment of Ohio‘s version of the federal “Adam Walsh Act” in 2007. State v. Hartley, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-192, 2016-Ohio-2854, ¶ 9. Under Megan‘s Law, this court held that a trial court‘s failure to advise a defendant of the registration and notification requirements resulting from a guilty plea to a sex offense before accepting that plea did not render the plea invalid because Megan‘s Law was not punitive and the registration and notification requirements were collateral consequences of the guilty plea. State v. Sansone, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-799, 2012-Ohio-2736, ¶ 18. Following enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
{¶ 12} With respect to the penalties for the charges to which he was pleading guilty, the trial court conducted the following colloquy with Wallace at the plea hearing:
THE COURT: The maximum penalty here on Counts One, Five, and Eight, the felonies of the first degree, would be 11 years on each count plus three years on each count for the firearm specification, so the maximum penalty here would be 42 years in prison and/or up to a $60,000 fine; do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: And do you understand that the attorney acting on behalf [of] the State of Ohio as well as the attorneys acting on your behalf are recommending to me that you be sentenced to 20 years in prison?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: And do you understand that when you were released, the Adult Parole Authority would definitely monitor you for five years when you got out; and then if you didn‘t do what they told you to do, you could [be] sent back to prison for up to half of your original sentence?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: And so do you also understand, Mr. Wallace -- I understand that you singed a defense agreement; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: And do you understand that part of that agreement requires you to testify against others?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: And do you understand what happens if you do not follow that agreement? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: And so now that you know your rights and the rights that you are giving by pleading guilty and the consequences of pleading guilty, do you want me to accept your guilty plea today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
THE COURT: Let the record reflect the defendant was present in open court and represented by counsel. The defendant was advised of all his [of] constitutional rights and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. I find the defendant understands the nature of the charges, the effects of the guilty plea, as well as the maximum penalties that could be imposed. Finding the plea to be voluntary, the court accepts the defendant‘s guilty plea. I find the defendant guilty of Count One, aggravated burglary, a violation of Ohio Revised Code 2911.11, a felony of the first degree with a firearm specification; Count Five, aggravated robbery, a violation of revised code 2911.01, felony of first degree with firearm specifications; Count Eight, rape, a violation of Ohio Revised Code, 2911.02, a felony of the first degree with firearm specifications.
Also, Mr. Wallace, do you understand that those gun specifications are mandatory time?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‘am.
(May 8, 2017 Tr. at 22-24.)
{¶ 13} The state asserts imprisonment, rather than sex offender classification, registration, and notification, was the maximum penalty for the rape conviction. The court advised Wallace he could be sentenced up to 11 years of imprisonment for each of the first-degree felonies, including the rape charge. Therefore, the state argues, the trial court complied with
{¶ 14} In Johnson, the defendant pled guilty to three felony charges. At the plea hearing, the trial court informed him of the potential maximum term of imprisonment for each of the three felony convictions. Johnson at 131. The trial court subsequently imposed sentences on each of the convictions pursuant to the guilty pleas and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Johnson appealed, arguing the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 15} Although the state argues that the reasoning in Johnson applies to the present case, we find it to be distinguishable. In Johnson, the defendant complained the trial court did not warn him the sentences for his felony convictions could be imposed consecutively—i.e., that the trial court did not advise him of the potential cumulative maximum penalty for all convictions. In the present case, by contrast, Wallace asserts the trial court failed to comply with
{¶ 16} The state further asserts that
{¶ 17} This court has frequently referred to the maximum penalty as one of the non-constitutional protections that the trial court must inform a defendant of at the plea hearing. See State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1135, 2011-Ohio-6231, ¶ 36 (“The non-constitutional rights of which a defendant must be informed include the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty.“); State v. Simpson, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-929, 2008-Ohio-2460, ¶ 5 (“The non-constitutional rights that a defendant must be informed of are the nature of the charges with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts; the maximum penalty; and that, after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed to judgment and sentence.“); State v. Marcum, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-905, 2008-Ohio-2292, ¶ 6 (“The non-constitutional rights that a defendant must be informed of are the nature of the charges with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts; the maximum penalty; and that, after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed to judgment and sentence.“); State v. Page, 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1191 (June 30, 1999) (”
{¶ 18} In the present appeal, however, we need not reach the question of whether a trial court must directly inform a defendant of the maximum penalty before accepting a plea. Assuming for purposes of analysis that the trial court is only required to determine
{¶ 19} Under the substantial compliance standard for notification of non-constitutional protections under
{¶ 20} Accordingly, we sustain Wallace‘s first assignment of error.
B. Failure to make a formal finding of competency
{¶ 21} Wallace asserts in his second assignment of error the trial court erred by failing to make a finding on the record that he was competent to plead guilty. Wallace concedes he failed to raise an objection at trial and our review of this issue is limited to plain error. ” ‘Plain error consists of an obvious error or defect in the trial proceedings that affects a substantial right.’ ” State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-540, 2017-Ohio-5598, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 482 (2000). Pursuant to
{¶ 22} “A criminal defendant is presumed to be mentally competent and bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” State v. Grant, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-650, 2013-Ohio-2981, ¶ 10. Wallace‘s appointed counsel filed a suggestion of incompetence and the trial court ordered an examination of Wallace‘s mental condition. Pursuant to the trial court‘s order, an examination was conducted and a report was filed opining Wallace was capable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against him and assisting in his defense. After the report was filed, Wallace‘s counsel stipulated to the report at two separate hearings conducted before the plea hearing. Nevertheless, Wallace argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to make a formal entry on the docket finding that Wallace was competent to enter a plea.
{¶ 23} This court has previously held that where a defendant stipulates to a psychologist‘s report determining the defendant is competent, the trial court cannot be said to have erred in relying on that report to find the defendant competent. State v. Miller, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-420, 2010-Ohio-5876, ¶ 12. See also State v. O‘Neill, 7th Dist. No. 03 MA 188, 2004-Ohio-6805, ¶ 21 (“Where the parties stipulate to the contents of the competency reports which opine that the defendant is competent, the parties stipulate to competency and waive the competency hearing.“). The Supreme Court has also held that “the failure to hold a mandatory competency hearing is harmless error where the record fails to reveal sufficient indicia of incompetency.” State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1986). In the present case, Wallace‘s counsel raised the issue of competency and the trial court ordered an evaluation; the evaluation found Wallace to be competent. Wallace‘s counsel stipulated to the report of the evaluation on two separate occasions prior to the plea hearing. We find no other indicia of incompetency in the record and Wallace fails to point to any such indicia in his appeal. Thus, there is no indication there would have been any basis for the trial court to find Wallace incompetent to enter guilty pleas if it had made a formal entry on the record regarding his competency. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court‘s failure to make a competency finding on the record constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice such that the court would find plain error.
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we overrule Wallace‘s second assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part;
remanded for further proceedings.
BROWN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.