Case Information
*1
[Cite as
State v. Palmer,
T HE S TATE OF , A PPELLEE ,
v
. P ALMER , A PPELLANT .
[Cite as
State v. Palmer,
2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E)—Dismissal of indictment when statute cannot apply to accused.
(No. 2010-1660—Submitted November 1, 2011—Decided February 21, 2012.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
Nos. 09AP-956 and 09AP-957,
__________________ YLLABUS OF THE C OURT
1.
State v. Bodyke
, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
not invalidate the petition process for challenging a sex-offender classification under R.C. 2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E).
2. A trial court may dismiss an indictment for violations of R.C. Chapter 2950
when it determines that the chapter’s regulations do not apply to the accused.
__________________
M G EE B ROWN J.
This appeal draws us to two procedural questions that linger after
our decisions in
State v. Bodyke
, 126 Ohio St.3d 266,
{¶ 3} Second, we address whether a trial court may dismiss an indictment alleging violations of the Adam Walsh Act. Crim.R. 12 authorizes pretrial dismissal of defective indictments, and after Williams , duties under the Adam Walsh Act may not be imposed retroactively. When a trial court faces an indictment based on the retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act, the law not only allows but indeed demands dismissal.
{¶ 4} Because the decision below is inconsistent with these holdings, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History Paul Palmer pleaded guilty to sexual battery in 1995. Upon
conviction, he served an 18-month prison sentence for that offense. Since Palmer’s conviction, Ohio’s sex-offender laws have changed
dramatically.
See Bodyke
sweepingly applied to sex offenders regardless of when their offenses occurred. 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10; scope language appears in multiple provisions, e.g. , R.C. 2950.04(A)(2). Based on Palmer’s 1995 sexual-battery conviction, the Adam Walsh Act automatically imposed a Tier III sex-offender classification.
January Term, 2012
R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a). Tier III is the most restrictive category of R.C. Chapter 2950. It requires registration with authorities every 90 days for life as well as a number of community-notification obligations under R.C. 2950.11. R.C. 2950.07(B)(1) and 2950.06(B)(3). The instant appeal stems from two related actions below. First,
after Palmer learned about his classification under the Adam Walsh Act, he petitioned the trial court under R.C. 2950.031(E) (entitling classified sex offenders to “a court hearing to contest the application to the offender * * * of the new registration requirements under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code”). At the same time, Palmer moved to stay enforcement of the community-notification provisions of R.C. 2950.11 while the court reviewed his petition. The trial court granted the stay of community-notification requirements. It also stayed Palmer’s petition pending this court’s review of the constitutionality of the Adam Walsh Act. Second, before the trial court ruled on the petition, a Franklin
County grand jury indicted Palmer for violating his registration requirements under the Adam Walsh Act. The indictment alleged that Palmer had failed to provide notice of a change of address under R.C. 2950.05 and that he had failed to verify his current address under R.C. 2950.06. Based on Palmer’s original conviction, these offenses constituted third-degree felonies. R.C. 2950.99(A)(1)(a)(ii). Palmer moved to dismiss the indictment. He also moved for
immediate disposition of his petition challenging the classification. The trial court ruled that Ohio’s sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer and granted his motion to dismiss the indictment. Additionally, the trial court ordered the removal of Palmer’s name from any “local, state or federal” lists of sex offenders.
3
{¶ 11}
On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed. As a
preliminary matter, the Tenth District concluded that the trial court exceeded its
authority when it dismissed the indictment because it looked to “evidence outside
the face of the indictment” and “address[ed] the very issue to be determined at
trial.”
{¶ 12}
We accepted discretionary jurisdiction to hear Palmer’s appeal.
Petition Process The first issue for our review is whether Bodyke invalidated the petition process of R.C. Chapter 2950. This controversy began when Palmer petitioned the trial court under R.C. 2950.031(E). Palmer asks us to reinstate the disposition of his petition below, in which the trial court ruled that the Adam Walsh Act does not apply to Palmer’s conviction. The state, however, argues that the ruling was a nullity because Bodyke abolished the petition process . The Tenth District did not review the viability of the petition
process. Upon the state’s request, however, we address the issue now to resolve
disagreement among the courts of appeals.
Compare Lyttle v. State
, 191 Ohio
App.3d 487,
the Ohio attorney general, an officer of the executive branch, to reopen final
January Term, 2012
judgments of the judicial branch.
Bodyke
,
petition process was invalidated lacks merit. The petition process of R.C. 2950.031(E) and 2950.032(E) does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The petition process does not require another branch of government to intrude upon the province of the judiciary. The invalidated reclassification provisions created an unconstitutional relationship between two branches of government. By contrast, the petition process involves only one branch of government, the judiciary. Therefore, Bodyke ’s severance of the unconstitutional
reclassification process left intact the petition process, which “can be given effect
without the invalid” reclassification provisions. R.C. 1.50.
See also State v.
Bloomer
, 122 Ohio St.3d 200,
5
was unenforceable. Therefore, issues regarding the appealability of the order arising in Chojnacki’s petition were moot. Chojnacki did not speak to the viability of the petition process itself. That process remains alive and well.
{¶ 19} The Adam Walsh Act entitled Palmer to contest his classification. We find no error in the trial court’s compliance with R.C. 2950.031(E). Accordingly, we reject the state’s argument that the trial court lacked power to review Palmer’s claims after Bodyke .
Dismissal of Indictment
We now turn to the second issue for our review, which is whether a
trial court may dismiss an indictment under R.C. Chapter 2950 if Ohio’s sex-
offender regulations do not apply to the accused. The trial court dismissed
Palmer’s indictment because he was “not under any statutory duty to verify his
current address or to register as required by Revised Code Chapter 2950.”
The Tenth District, however, reversed. The appellate court held
that Palmer’s “arguments not only draw upon evidence outside the face of the
indictment but address the very issue to be determined at trial.”
January Term, 2012
determine if R.C. Chapter 2950 applies to an offender, without embracing the general issue for trial. The answer is clear. Under Crim.R. 12(C)(2), trial courts may
judge before trial whether an indictment is defective. Without a doubt, an indictment is defective if it alleges violations of R.C. Chapter 2950 by a person who is not subject to that chapter. There is no set of circumstances under which such a person can violate the law’s requirements. This is especially so where, as in Palmer’s case, an indictment depends on the unconstitutional application of law. Therefore, dismissal is appropriate. Contrary to the Tenth District’s analysis below, such a
determination does not embrace the general issue for trial. The general issue for
trial in this context is whether the accused violated the law as set forth in the
indictment. Where the law simply does not apply, the trial court is well within its
authority to dismiss the indictment before trial. In reaching that determination,
the trial court may look beyond the four corners of the indictment.
Brady
at ¶ 18.
Nor did the trial court err when it ruled that the Adam Walsh Act
does not apply to Palmer. The prohibition on retroactivity of the Ohio
Constitution, Article II, Section 28 forbids the application of the Adam Walsh Act
to any offense committed before the law’s enactment.
Williams
, 129 Ohio St.3d
344,
7
S The trial court did not prematurely embrace the general issue for trial when it ruled that Ohio’s sex-offender regulations did not apply to Palmer.
Order Dismissing Indictment The state also asks us to review the trial court’s order that Palmer’s “name be removed from all sexually oriented [offender] lists maintained by the local, state or federal government.” R.C. 2950.031(E) required the trial court, after ruling on Palmer’s petition, to notify the sheriff and the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation of its decision. It is not clear which other agencies or lists, if any, were contemplated by the trial court’s order. On remand, we direct the trial court to clarify its order in this respect.
Conclusion We reverse the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas for an order consistent with our decision in Williams as well as with R.C. 2950.031(E).
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , L UNDBERG TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER and C UPP , JJ., concur.
__________________
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L.
Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, for appellee.
Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and David L. Strait and Shayla L. Werner, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
______________________