State v. WalkerState v. Walker
The defendant, who had been convicted in 2001 of the crimes of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm, kidnapping in the first degree, threatening, criminal possession of a weapon, credit card theft, illegal use of a credit card, fraudulent use of an automatic teller machine and larceny in the sixth degree, appealed to this court from the trial court’s dismissal in part and denial in part of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant was sentenced for his 2001 convictions on the basis of a presentence investigation report that contained, inter alia, detailed information concerning his past criminal history, including facts underlying certain previous convictions in 1991. In his motion to correct an illegal sentence, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the facts referenced in the 2001 presentence investigation report and in the supplemental material concerning his 1991 convictions were inaccurate and prejudicial. Held:
1. The trial court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner due to the failure of the sentencing court to canvass him or his counsel as to their review and the accuracy of the 2001 presentence investigation report; our Supreme Court has determined previously that our statutes and rules of practice do not require a court to make an affirmative inquiry as to the accuracy of the information contained in a presentence investigation report and that, consequently, such a claim does not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court.
2. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant’s claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner due to the sentencing court’s reliance on inaccurate facts regarding his 1991 convictions contained in the presentence investigation report, as it was not plausible that the defendant sought to challenge the manner in which his sentence was imposed, as opposed to the underlying convictions: because the defendant’s challenge to his 2001 sentence was predicated on his claim that the presentence investigation report contained inaccurate facts regarding his 1991 convictions, which he alleged were unconstitutional due to the ineffective assistance of his then defense counsel in failing to point out to the court contradictions in the assertions of the complaining witness, failing to do an adequate investigation and advising the defendant to plead guilty, his claim clearly challenged his 1991 convictions and not the sentencing proceeding for his 2001 convictions, and although the defendant’s 2001 sentencing proceeding may have been different had his 1991 convictions been set aside, he could not use that theoretical possibility as the basis to launch a wholesale attack on the performance of his then defense counsel through a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed twenty-four years after he pleaded guilty and long after his sentence for the 1991 convictions had been served; accordingly, the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence as to this claim.
BRIGHT, J. The defendant, Robert L. Walker, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court dismissing in part and denying in part his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his claim that the sentencing court failed to canvass him or his counsel regarding their review and the accuracy of the presentence investigation report, and (2) denied on the merits, without first providing him with an adequate hearing before the sentencing court, his claim that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate facts contained in the presentence investigation report. We conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider both of the defendant’s claims raised by the motion to correct an illegal sentence. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims. On February 14, 1991, the defendant entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970),2 to one count of robbery in the first degree in violation of
Between late 1999 and early 2000, the defendant engaged in further criminal misconduct. On January 23, 2001, the defendant was convicted in absentia,3 following a jury trial, of two counts of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
Thereafter, the Office of Adult Probation prepared a presentence investigation report (2001 PSI report) in advance of the defendant’s sentencing for the 2001 convictions. The 2001 PSI report contained detailed information concerning the defendant’s past criminal history, including the facts underlying his 1991 convictions. Also attached to the 2001 PSI report was a ‘‘Synopsis of Facts’’ provided by the Office of the State’s Attorney that detailed the facts underlying the 2001 convictions.
On April 27, 2001, the sentencing court conducted the defendant’s sentencing hearing at which it heard statements from the state, the victim, the victim’s mother, defense counsel, and the defendant.4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of fifty years incarceration, execution suspended after thirty-two years, followed by twenty years probation. The defendant’s 2001 convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by this court. See State v. Walker, 80 Conn. App. 542, 835 A.2d 1058 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 902, 845 A.2d 406 (2004).
On August 25, 2015, the defendant, pursuant to
On October 23, 2015, the state filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it. In its memorandum of law in support of the motion, the state argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s claim that the sentencing court failed to canvass him
On May 23, 2016, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it dismissed in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. In particular, the court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the defendant’s first claim that the sentencing court failed to canvass the defendant or his counsel because ‘‘such a claim is untenable’’ pursuant to State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 825. The court denied on the merits the defendant’s second claim that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate information because it concluded that ‘‘the sentencing court did not rely on materially false or prejudicial information. The defendant was in fact convicted in 1991 of the crimes referenced in the [2001 PSI report]. . . . The record before this court does not support the defendant’s claim that the information regarding the 1991 convictions was materially false.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
We begin with our standard of review and relevant legal principles. ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that [t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner . . . .
‘‘In Connecticut, [
‘‘Although [our Supreme Court] had not defined the parameters of an invalid sentence prior to the adoption of
‘‘[T]he claims that may be raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence are strictly limited to improprieties that may have occurred at the sentencing stage of the proceeding. . . . Thus . . . for the trial court to have jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s claim of an illegal sentence, the claim must fall into one of [several specific] categories of claims that, under the common law, the court has jurisdiction to review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis, supra, 322 Conn. 264. A determination of whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider a motion to correct an illegal sentence presents a question of law, and, therefore, our review is plenary. State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770, 776–77, 189 A.3d 1184 (2018).
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the sentencing court failed to canvass him or his counsel ‘‘as to their review and the accuracy of the [2001 PSI] report . . . .’’ The state argues that the court properly determined that State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 825, is dispositive of this claim.8 We agree with the state.
In Parker, the defendant entered a plea under the Alford doctrine to the charge of murder. Id., 828. After the defendant unsuccessfully pursued an appeal challenging his conviction and plea, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence claiming that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Id., 830–31. In his motion, the defendant asserted that his right not to be sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information was violated because ‘‘(1) he had been deprived of an opportunity to review his presentence report and to address inaccuracies therein; and (2) [defense counsel] had failed to review the presentence report with him or to bring any inaccuracies in the report to the court’s attention.’’ Id., 840. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 833.
On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘the defendant’s claims [did] not fall within the limited circumstances under which the trial court has jurisdiction to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner . . . .’’ Id., 828. It first outlined that our statutes and rules of practice, particularly
In the present case, the defendant’s first claim is that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the sentencing court, allegedly in violation of
II
The defendant also claims that the court improperly denied on the merits his claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the sentencing court relied on inaccurate facts regarding his 1991 convictions that were contained in the 2001 PSI report. In particular, the defendant argues on appeal that the court improperly ruled on the merits of his amended motion to correct without first conducting an ‘‘adequate hearing,’’ and that his motion to correct should have been heard and decided by the 2001 sentencing court. The state argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider this claim because ‘‘the defendant’s attempt to use a motion to correct to challenge the legal validity of . . . his [1991] convictions did not constitute a challenge to the sentencing proceeding itself, but instead, constituted a challenge to a long final prior conviction.’’11 The defendant argues that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because his claim did ‘‘not attempt to attack the underlying conviction. By its very nature it is attacking the manner in which the sentence was imposed because of the court’s actions, or lack thereof, during the sentencing proceeding.’’ We agree with the state.
Our Supreme Court repeatedly has held that ‘‘a challenge to the legality of a sentence focuses not on what transpired during the trial or on the underlying conviction. In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the trial leading to the conviction, must be the subject of the attack.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Evans, supra, 329 Conn. 779; see State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 158, 913 A.2d 428 (2007) (same); see also State v. Francis, supra, 322 Conn. 264 (‘‘the claims that may be raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence are strictly limited to improprieties that may have occurred at the sentencing stage of the proceeding’’). ‘‘In determining whether it is plausible that the defendant’s motion challenged the sentence, rather than the underlying trial or conviction, we consider the nature of the specific legal claim raised therein.’’ State v. Evans, supra, 784–85; see State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 810, 816, 151 A.3d 345 (2016) (if defendant fails to allege claim that, if proven, would require resentencing, sentencing court has no jurisdiction to consider motion to correct).
In the present case, the defendant alleged in his motion to correct an illegal sentence that the facts ‘‘referenced in [the 2001 PSI] report and in the supplemental
In determining whether it is plausible that the defendant’s second claim challenges the sentencing proceeding, as opposed to an underlying conviction, we first examine our decisions that have confronted the same issue. For example, in the relevant instances in which this court has concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the defendant claimed either that the sentencing proceeding violated our rules of practice, or that the presentence investigation report contained purported inaccuracies that did not stem from the underlying conviction. See State v. Fairchild, 155 Conn. App. 196, 202–203, 208–209, 108 A.3d 1162 (trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant’s motion to correct illegal sentence that claimed sentencing court, in violation of
Consistent with the foregoing, in the relevant instances in which this court has concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the defendant challenged either the facts or the viability of the underlying conviction. See State v. Meikle, 146 Conn. App. 660, 662, 663, 79 A.3d 129 (2013) (trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over motion to correct illegal sentence that claimed that ‘‘the shotgun introduced at [his] trial was not in fact the murder weapon and . . . the state fraudulently concealed this fact from his trial counsel’’ because defendant ‘‘improperly [sought] to address a trial-related claim through a motion to correct an illegal sentence’’); State v. Mollo, 63 Conn. App. 487, 489, 491, 776 A.2d 1176 (trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over motion to correct illegal sentence in that ‘‘a latent defect existed as to the factual basis for [the defendant’s] guilty plea’’ because ‘‘[t]he purpose of
Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant’s second claim because it is not plausible that he sought to challenge the manner in which his sentence was imposed, as opposed to an underlying conviction. The defendant’s second claim, unlike that in State v. Fairchild, supra, 155 Conn. App. 202–203, 208–209, does not challenge the sentencing proceeding for his 2001 convictions as violating our rules of practice.12 Rather, the defendant claims that his sentence for the 2001 convictions was imposed illegally because the sentencing court relied on inaccurate facts contained in the 2001 PSI report regarding his 1991 convictions, which he alleged were unconstitutional because they were based on contradictory assertions of the complaining witness
The basis for the defendant’s claim that his 1991 convictions were unconstitutional—contradictory assertions of the complaining witness and defense counsel rendering ineffective assistance—further demonstrates that his challenge is to an underlying conviction. A challenge to whether his 1991 convictions were based on contradictory statements by the complaining witness does not provide a basis for jurisdiction because, as in State v. Meikle, supra, 146 Conn. App. 662–63, and State v. Mollo, supra, 63 Conn. App. 488–90, it seeks to dispute the factual basis of his prior convictions. Indeed, the defendant’s claim in the present case transcends the claims asserted in Meikle and Mollo in that it calls into question the factual basis for his 1991 convictions to which he pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine, as opposed to the 2001 convictions for which he was being sentenced. Unlike the claims of factual inaccuracies stemming from the presentence investigation reports at issue in State v. Bozelko, supra, 154 Conn. App. 750, 752, 757–58, State v. Charles F., supra, 133 Conn. App. 700–701, and State v. Osuch, supra, 124 Conn. App. 576–77, the defendant’s claim in the present case directly challenges his 1991 convictions.
Likewise, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim also is directed at the viability of his 1991 convictions. In Parker, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the claim that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing because ‘‘[t]here is no specific rule authorizing a defendant to bring his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by way of a motion to correct . . . [and] the conduct by [defense counsel] of which the defendant complains cannot be construed as a violation by the court of the defendant’s rights at sentencing.’’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 852; see State v. Evans, supra, 329 Conn. 781 (‘‘the motion to correct is not another bite at the apple in place of challenges that are more properly brought on direct appeal or in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus’’).13 In addition, as compared to the claim in Parker, the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim in the present case is further attenuated from the sentencing proceeding because it is directed at the defense counsel who represented him in connection with his Alford plea leading to his 1991 convictions, not the defense counsel who represented him at the sentencing hearing stemming from his 2001 convictions.
We are unpersuaded by the defendant’s attempt to
The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment is reversed only with respect to the denial of the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence as to the claim that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate facts, and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment of dismissal; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.