State v. ThomasState v. Thomas
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION
{¶ 1} Plаintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio (the “State“), appeals the trial court‘s decision granting defendant-appellee‘s, George Thomas (“Thomas“), motion to dismiss the indictmеnt. We find merit to the appeal and reverse.
{¶ 2} In March 2004, Thomas was indicted on one count of sexual battery, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} In May 2004, Thomas moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that as a security guard, he did not meet the definition of “other person in authority” under the statute. Two months later, Thomas filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute wаs unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, stating:
“Defendant‘s motion to dismiss is granted. The State of Ohio has failed to produce any evidence that the defendant was a person in authority and as such, the statute must be strictly construed against the state. The statute at issue with respect to a person in аuthority is overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.”
{¶ 4} From this order, the State appeals, raising two assignments of error, which we will address out of order.
{¶ 5} In its second assignment of error, the Stаte argues that the trial court erroneously determined that R.C.
{¶ 6} R.C.
“No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender, when * * * [t]he offender is a teacher, administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or serving in a school for which the state board of education prescribes minimum standards рursuant to division (D) of section
{¶ 7} It is well-settled that “an enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, paragraph one of the syllabus; see, also Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 510-511, 2000-Ohio-171. Thus, “any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute will be resolved in favor of its validity.” Defenbacher, supra, at 149, citing State ex rel. Doerfler v. Price (1920), 101 Ohio St. 50. Further, the party challenging the statute bears the burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 560, 1996-Ohio-264; Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396.
{¶ 8} Initially, we find that the trial court‘s reliance on the overbreadth doctrine was misplaced. The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to the First Amendment context. Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski, 85 Ohio St.3d 524, 528, 1999-Ohio-285; State v. Collier (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 272; see, also, Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253, 268, citing New York v. Ferber (1982), 458 U.S. 747 (“outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked as overbroad“). Thus, absent a showing that the statute relates to First Amendment issues, the overbreadth doctrine is inapplicable. Trzebuckowski, supra; State v. Werfel, Lake App. Nos. 2002-L-101 and 2002-L-102, 2003-Ohio-6958; State v. Gorenflo (May 23, 2001), Marion App. No. 9-2000-101.
{¶ 9} Thomas has identified no First Amendment issues at stake in the instant case. R.C.
{¶ 10} As to the trial court‘s determination that the statute is unconstitutionаlly vague, we disagree. Although the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles a defendant to fair notice of illegal conduct, the burden rests with the defendant to demonstrate bеyond a reasonable demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute was so unclear that he could not reasonably understand that it prohibited the acts in whiсh he engaged. State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171. “[A] law will survive a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is written so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is prohibited, and if thе law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 533, 2000-Ohio-428, citing Chicago v. Morales (1999), 527 U.S. 41, 56-57. See, also, State v. Dario (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 232.
{¶ 11} Thomas argued in his motion to dismiss that the language, “other person in authority,” as contained in R.C.
{¶ 12} We also find no support for Thomas’ broad argument that the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Having already found that the statute defines the offense with sufficient clarity so that persons of common intelligence are able to understand what conduct is prohibited, we find that the statute is capable of being applied consistently and fairly. Moreover, in failing to provide any authority or reasoning for his argument, Thomas has failed tо overcome the statute‘s presumption in favor of constitutionality.
{¶ 13} Likewise, we find no merit to Thomas’ contention that the inclusion of a school security guard under R.C.
{¶ 14} Finally, Thomas argues that by virtue of the specific examples contained in R.C.
{¶ 15} Contrary to Thomas’ assertion, we find that a school security guard does necеssarily interact with students. Indeed, a critical aspect of the position is to enforce school rules and regulations as a means to ensure the students’ safety. Further, a seсurity guard, like a teacher, administrator, or coach, could use his or her authority to coerce a student his or her authority to coerce a student to engage in sexual conduct. For example, a security guard might provide special treatment to a student by ignoring student infractions, i.e., leaving school early or roaming the school halls without рermission, and failing to report such conduct to the administration.
{¶ 16} As for the State‘s first assignment of error, we find that the issue of whether the State produced sufficient evidence to satisfy an offense under R.C.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, having found that R.C.
Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee the costs herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Cоurt of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
McMonagle, J. and Corrigan, J. Concur.