State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcus L. Taylor, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19AP-795 (C.P.C. No. 18CR-3268)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 24, 2020
[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-4581.]
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
On brief: Marcus L. Taylor, pro se.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 24, 2020
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Marcus L. Taylor, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On July 9, 2018, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant on one count of aggravated arson, in violation of
{¶ 3} On August 30, 2018, appellant, represented by counsel, entered guilty pleas to: (1) a stipulated lesser-included offense of Count 1 of the indictment, inducing panic, in
{¶ 4} On January 8, 2019, appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to
{¶ 5} On April 29, 2019, appellant filed a second
{¶ 7} In a timely appeal, appellant assigns the following as trial court error:
[I.] Trial court abused it‘s [sic] discretion by finding no manifest injustice occured [sic] during plea hearing.
[II.] The trial court violated appellant‘s Fifth Amendment right to grand jury when it amended the indictment under
Crim.R. 7(D) without giving notice to the appellant, nor did the trial court grant prosecution permission to amend, nor did the prosecution request to amend the charge changing Count 1 and Count 2.[III.] Trial court abused it‘s [sic] discretion when it accepted the appellant‘s negotiated plea of inducing panic (
2917.31(A)(1)(C)(5) ) as a lesser offense of aggravated arson (2909.02 ) when inducing panic of the second degree is not, as a matter of law, a lesser offense of aggravated arson, thus causing a miscarriage of justice to occur and making plea agreement void.
{¶ 8} Appellant‘s assignments of error are interrelated and will be considered together. Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his May 6 and September 11, 2019 motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant argues that the trial court‘s acceptance of his guilty plea to inducing panic resulted in manifest injustice because (1) inducing panic “does not have the same elements as the facts in the case,” (2) inducing panic is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson, and (3) he was never indicted for inducing panic.2 (Appellant‘s Brief at 8.)
{¶ 9} “Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by
{¶ 10} “Manifest injustice relates to some fundamental flaw in the proceedings which results in a miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent with the demands of due process.” State v. Mobley, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-23, 2018-Ohio-3880, ¶ 13, citing Spivakov at ¶ 10, citing State v. Williams, 10th Dist. No 03AP-1214, 2004-Ohio-6123, ¶ 5. Under the manifest injustice standard, a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances. Id.
{¶ 11} A
{¶ 12} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on appeal from that judgment.” (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. This court has consistently applied res judicata to bar a defendant from raising issues in a post-sentence
{¶ 13} The arguments appellant raised in support of his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas are based upon matters contained in the record of the trial court proceedings and could have been raised in a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. Accordingly, res judicata barred appellant from raising these arguments in his subsequent
{¶ 14} Moreover, even if res judicata did not bar appellant from raising these arguments in support of his
{¶ 15} We construe appellant‘s assertion that his guilty plea to inducing panic is invalid because that offense “does not have the same elements as the facts in the case,” as a claim that he entered the plea without an understanding of the nature of the charge of inducing panic. Thus, appellant‘s claim requires a review of the trial court‘s acceptance of appellant‘s guilty plea.
{¶ 16} ” ’ “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” ’ ” State v. Draughn, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-632, 2016-Ohio-1240, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Triplett, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-30, 2011-Ohio-4480, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St. 3d 525, 527 (1996).
{¶ 17} While the trial court must strictly comply with
{¶ 18} ” ’ “In determining whether a defendant understood the charge a court should examine the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” Id., quoting Enyart at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St. 3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 56. ” ‘For a trial court to determine whether a defendant is making a plea with understanding of the nature of the charge, “it is not always necessary that the trial court advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, or to specifically ask the defendant if he understands the charge, so long as the totality of the circumstances are such that the trial court is warranted in making a determination that the defendant understands the charge.” ’ ” Id., quoting Enyart at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Rainey, 3 Ohio App. 3d 441, 442 (10th Dist.1982). ” ‘Where a defendant indicates that he understands the nature of the charge, in the absence of evidence to the contrary or anything in the record that indicates confusion, it is typically presumed that the defendant actually understood the nature of the charge against him.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Wangul, 8th Dist. No. 84698, 2005-Ohio-1175, ¶ 10, citing State v. Dickey, 7th Dist. No. 03 CA 794, 2004-Ohio-3198, ¶ 11.
{¶ 19} In this case, the plea form documents the agreement between appellant and the state regarding resolution of the case. Appellant was represented by counsel during the plea proceedings, and both appellant and his counsel signed the written agreement. The plea form specifically states that appellant was pleading guilty to “the stipulated lesser included offense of count one Inducing Panic a felony of the 2nd degree pursuant to
{¶ 20} In addition, at the plea hearing, appellant acknowledged that he participated in the plea negotiations that resulted in the plea agreement. Indeed, appellant asserted that “we were able to work out a deal with the prosecutor.” (Emphasis added.) (Aug. 30, 2018
{¶ 21} Appellant also contends that his guilty plea to inducing panic is invalid because that offense is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated arson and he was never indicted on that charge. At the plea hearing, appellant stated that he was entering a guilty plea to the offenses stated in the entry of guilty plea form, i.e., inducing panic as a stipulated lesser-included offense of first-degree aggravated arson, and arson as a stipulated lesser-included offense of second-degree aggravated arson. He further averred that he understood that by pleading guilty to such offenses, he was admitting that he committed them. In addition, the following colloquy occurred:
The Court: All right. Mr. Taylor, in this case, you‘re pleading guilty to one count of inducing panic and another count of arson. Are you guilty of having committed these offenses?
The Defendant: Could you repeat that question?
The Court: Yes. I‘m just - - you understand that you‘re pleading guilty here today to inducing panic and to arson?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: All right. You‘re changing your plea here today knowingly and voluntarily, correct?
The Defendant: Yes.
(Tr. at 14-15.)
{¶ 22} Thus, appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to the offense of inducing panic as a second-degree felony as stipulated. Furthermore, in the entry of guilty plea, appellant stated that “I understand that my guilty plea(s) to the crime(s) specified constitute(s) both an admission of guilt and a waiver of any and all constitutional, statutory, or factual defenses with respect to such crime(s) and this case.” (Entry of Guilty Plea at 1.)
{¶ 23} Appellant‘s actions in knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a plea to inducing panic as a second-degree felony while represented by counsel constituted a waiver of his constitutional right to an indictment on that offense. State v. Bruce, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-31, 2016-Ohio-7132 (“appellant‘s actions in knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a plea to two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor while represented by counsel constituted a waiver of his constitutional right to an indictment on the offenses to which he pled“). Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 24} For the reasons outlined above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‘s
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.