State v. StanfordState v. Stanford
Mollie B. Hojnicki-Mathieson, for appellant.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher Stanford, appeals the August 2, 2017 judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas which, following a jury trial finding him guilty of two counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in oxycodone and one
{¶ 2} On April 7, 2017, appellant was indicted on two counts of aiding and abetting in the trafficking of oxycodone in violation of
{¶ 3} A jury trial commenced on July 19, 2017, and the following relevant evidence was presented. Count 1, aiding and abetting in the trafficking of oxycodone, arises from events on January 18, 2017. Detectives Daniels and Fulton of the Norwalk Police Department preрared the informant, K.M., and surveilled appellant’s residence while the controlled purchase took place. Appellant and his girlfriend, Michelle Irby, were present and interacted with K.M. during the transaction. K.M. waited outside the residence for appellant and Irby to arrive and followed them into the house. Appellant spoke conversationally with K.M. while Irby exchanged the money for the pills. The transmitter worn by K.M. recorded appellant saying “seventy-five for three” in response to a comment by Irby. Detectives gave K.M. $75 to purchаse three oxycodone pills.
{¶ 4} By means of a transmitter carried on K.M.’s person, detectives listened and recorded the transaction. Detective Daniels, Detective Fulton, and K.M. all testified at
{¶ 5} Count 2, trafficking in oxycodone, arose from events of January 20, 2017. K.M. testified that appellant apprised him of five, five-milligram oxycodone pills available for sale prior to the transaction. Detectives Daniels and Fulton prepared K.M. and surveilled appellant’s vehicle during the transaction from approximately 75 feet away. During debriefing, K.M. stated that he purchased pills in a hand-to-hand exchange with appellant inside appellant’s vehicle. Appellant was alone in his vehicle when K.M. entered to make the purchase. Appellant then left the vehicle, entered his residence, and returned to the car before the sale’s completion. Detectives listened to audio of the transaction as it occurred; however, due to malfunctioning equipment no recording exists. From the detectives’ position, appellant was visible during the purchase, but the hand-to-hand exchange was not. Both the detectives and K.M. testified at trial as to the events of the transaction.
{¶ 6} Count 3, aiding and abetting in trafficking оf oxycodone, arose from events of January 25, 2017. Detectives Daniels and Fulton were present and again prepared K.M. prior to the transaction taking place in appellant’s home. K.M. called beforehand and spoke with appellant who greeted him at the door and let him inside the residence;
{¶ 7} In preparation for all three controlled purchases, K.M. was searched, wired, and provided documented buy money. At trial, K.M. testified that the controlled sales were arranged with appellant “through the phone,” but could not recall whether it was by call or text. Detective Fulton’s testimony later clarified that none of the buys were arranged by controlled phone call; rather, K.M. independently arranged all three buys. Copies of texts exchanged between K.M. and appellant were not surrendered to Detective Fulton and were never before the jury
{¶ 8} On July 20, 2017, thе jury returned a verdict finding appellant guilty of all charges. This appeal followed with appellant raising three assignments of errors for review:
I. The evidence at appellant’s trial was insufficient to support the convictions and appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
II. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
III. The trial court erred when it prevented appellant from introducing into evidence prior bad acts of the confidential informant, and allowed the admission of improper hearsay evidence.
{¶ 9} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support convictions on Counts 1 and 3, and that all three convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant asserts that evidence supporting his aiding and abetting convictions merely establish appellant’s presence at or around the time of the controlled purchases.
{¶ 10} The Supreme Court of Ohiо has held that “mere presence of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove, in and of itself, that the accused was an aider and abettor.” State v. Widner, 69 Ohio St.2d 267, 269, 431 N.E.2d 1025 (1982); compare Smith v. State, 41 Ohio App. 64, 67-68, 179 N.E. 696 (9th Dist.1931). Nevertheless, evidence of aiding and abetting may be either direct or circumstantial; consequently, criminal intent may be inferred from “‘presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.‘” State v. Cartellone, 3 Ohio App.3d 145, 150, 444 N.E.2d 68 (8th Dist.1981), quoting State v. Pruett, 28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 273 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist.1971).
{¶ 11} Sufficiency of the evidence is “‘that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979], 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, followed.) Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 12}
[T]o support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to
R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) , the evidence must show that the defendantsupported, assisted, encouragеd, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime. Id. at 245-246.
{¶ 13} From appellant’s presence, companionship, and conduct preceding and following the January 18 purchase, it may reasonably be inferred that appellant acted knowingly. Cartellone at 150. Appellant’s interjection as to price is audible on the recording of the transaction. Coupled with consistent testimony оn this point from all three witnesses, there is adequate evidence to support a reasonable jury’s conclusion that by advising on the price of the pills, appellant aided and abetted in the trafficking of oxycodone by facilitating the commission of the offense. Johnson at 243. As such, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to conclude that appellant knowingly aided and abetted Irby in the sale of oxycodone on January 18, 2017.
{¶ 14} On January 25, appellant communicated with K.M. prior to the transaction and upon returning to the residence, he again advised Irby of the agreed price. Like Count 1, appellant’s conduct preceding and following the purchase on January 25, raises the reasonable inference that appellant acted knowingly. Cartellone at 150. In this instance, the audio recording of the transaction references the text message, further substantiating the conclusion that communications were exchanged and appellant was the contact person. The reference to a text message, with which both K.M. and appellant
{¶ 15} As before, there is adequate evidence to support the conclusion that appellant advised Irby as to the price of the pills, thereby aiding and abetting in the traffic of oxycodone. Irby appears unaware of any specifics regarding the sale, while appellant appears to have set a price via text which was ultimately adhered to. A reasonable jury could conclude that this support and assistance constitutes aiding and abetting. Hence on Count 3, sufficient evidence exists in the record for the jury to reasonably conclude that appellant knowingly aided and abetted Irby in the sale of oxycodone on January 25, 2017.
{¶ 16} As to the remaining count of trafficking in oxycodone, there is evidence on the record which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support appellant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Count 2 arose from a controlled buy on January 20, which took place in appellant’s vehicle parked outside his residence. Due to an equipment malfunction, audio from K.M.’s transmitter failed to record; however, detectives heard the transaction as it occurred and testified to that firsthand knowledge at trial.
{¶ 17} The elements of
{¶ 18} In reviewing a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as the “thirteenth juror” and “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶ 19} Appellant’s manifest weight argument asserts, first that the state merely established appellant’s presence at or around the time of the controlled buys, and second that the state’s case rested entirely upon K.M.’s credibility. In the first case, the record includes the testimony of detectives Fulton and Daniels, and K.M., all of whom were involved in each of the controlled buys and have firsthand knowledge of the transactions. As discussed above there are numerous facts suggesting appellant’s involvement, not just
{¶ 20} As to the second part of appellant’s argument, both Detective Fulton and K.M. testified regarding K.M.’s qualification as a confidential informant. At another officer’s suggestion, Deteсtive Fulton approached K.M. following his arrest for petty theft. Prior to enlisting K.M., Detective Fulton received information from several confidential informants pointing to appellant’s residence as a place where pills were sold; K.M. had known appellant for approximately two years. In exchange for helping the Norwalk Police Department conduct controlled buys with appellant, K.M. received no jail time for his pending charges and was paid for participating in two of the three buys.
{¶ 21} During his trial testimony, Detective Fultоn explained that a criminal record or warrant does not necessarily preclude an individual from use as a confidential informant. He stated: “We are using people that are not the top notch layer of society here— because we are buying drugs” and explained: “That’s why we search people before and after buys. That’s why conduct surveillance. That’s why we put a recording device on them, for their protection and to tell what the hell they are doing.” For each controlled buy, detectives searched K.M. before and after the purchase, listened to audio of the purchase via transmitter, and provided documented buy money.
{¶ 23} An appellate court weighs all evidence and reasonable infеrences and considers witness credibility to determine whether the jury clearly lost its way. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. Whatever the credibility of K.M.’s testimony, adherence to police procedure in each controlled buy limited the opportunity for K.M.’s participation in the purchases to corrupt the integrity of the buys themselves. The jury evaluated the body of testimony presented and relative witness credibility and found appellant guilty on all three counts. A reviewing court will interfere with a factual finding of the trier of fact only if a reasonable juror could not have found the witness credible. The facts of this case do not suggest a finding of guilt was unreasonable given
{¶ 24} In his second assignment of error appellant alleges denial of effective assistance of counsel. Absent proof to the contrary, there exists a presumption that counsel competently and properly represented the accused during trial. State v. Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153, 155-156, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Reversal of a conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 445-446, 751 N.E.2d 946 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396-397, 358 N.E.2d 623 (1976).
{¶ 25} Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. Strickland at 689. Therefore, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances of the case, counsel’s challenged acts or omissions were outside the range of professionally competent assistance at the time of counsel’s conduct. Id. at 690. Counsel must be afforded wide latitude when making tactical decisions and the court will not second-guess trial strategy. State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 166, 749 N.E.2d 226 (2001).
{¶ 26} In this case, appellant contends that counsel failed to object when witness testimony referenced a prior investigation of appellant by the police. It is well-settled
{¶ 27} Here, appellant claims the state sought to depict him as “a bad person, who law enforcement believed was selling drugs.” However, the mere mention of prior investigations by police, in light of other evidence of appellant’s past interactions with police presented at trial, does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the case. Accordingly, counsel’s failure to object was not a substantial violation of defense counsel’s essential duties and no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different exists to support appellant’s claim.
{¶ 28} Appellant also challenges counsel’s conduct in eliciting testimony regarding his prior incarceration when attempting to ascertain K.M.’s motivation. Eliciting disadvantageous testimony in the process of impeaching a witness’s motivation may be considered trial strategy. As to prejudice, “inadmissible evidence about a prior crime is prejudicial, unless the reviewing court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that it
{¶ 29} Appellant’s third assignment of error challenges evidentiary rulings made by the lower court during trial. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by preventing appellant from introducing into evidence prior bad acts of the confidential informant, while allowing admission of improper hearsay evidence. It is well-established that the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial сourt such that a decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion materially prejudicing the defendant. State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128, 224 N.E.2d 126 (1967).
{¶ 30} Appellant contends that defense questioning of K.M. regarding prior bad acts was permissible impeachment under
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in
Evid.R. 609 , may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
{¶ 31} During defense’s cross-examination of K.M., counsel asked: “As at least three other separate felony cases have been dismissed over the years, perhaps, on the basis of your name?” The state objected and the cоurt sustained the objection.
{¶ 32} Here, the defense went beyond an inquiry into K.M.’s propensity for truthfulness as evidenced by the dismissed felony charges. Rather, the implication of the question was that K.M. repeatedly received consideration based on his family name. The remark does nothing to impugn the truthfulness of K.M.’s testimony at trial; rather it aims to disparage K.M. himself withоut any evidence in the record to support the innuendo. Inquiry into K.M.’s family ties was tangential to the relevant inquiry into K.M.’s truthfulness; as such, it was within the trial judge’s discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination and exclude the evidence.
Attorney Longo: All right. I guess this is the bottom line question that I really -- His Honor did not want me to ask in front of the jury. This is -- his circumstances being a little unusual, were you aware that on four completely separаte occasions he’s had four completely separate clusters of felony charges that just got dismissed and never got picked back up?
Detective Fulton: No, not at all.
Attorney Longo: All right. Thank you. That’s really – that’s it for the proffer, Your Honor.
{¶ 34} Considering defense’s question as restated, the issue remains as to whether K.M.’s dismissed theft charges are probative of his character for truthfulness as required by
{¶ 36} Appellant also contends that testimony given by the detectives was impermissible hearsay evidence. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Prosecutor: Okay. And based on what you heard in the three incidents, and the recordings from both the 18th and the 25th, is what you know about that match [K.M.’s] description of what had happened?
Mr. Longo: Your Honor, I’m going to object. [K.M.] has, obviously, not testified yet. I think this calls for a conclusion based on hearsay.
The Court: The objection is overruled. You may answer if you know.
{¶ 37} In this instance, Detective Daniels was asked to state his firsthand knowledge of what he heard during the controlled buys and what he knew from K.M.’s debriefing of what occurred during the controlled purchases. A statement offered to prove knowledge is excluded from the definition of hearsay, as it is not offered to prоve the truth of the matter asserted. Accordingly, Detective Daniels statement was admissible non-hearsay. The second instance of alleged hearsay reads:
Prosecutor: Okay. How did you and Mr. Fulton know to provide him $75?
Detective Daniels: [K.M.] said that, that’s what he was told by Mr. Stanford that he needed to purchase the three pills.
Attorney Longo: Object. Clearly hearsay.
The Court: Objection overruled.
Attorney Longo: Move to strike.
The Court: Motion to strike is overruled.
{¶ 38} Detective Daniels’ statement is potential double hearsay under
{¶ 39} On consideration whereof, we find that appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from having a fair proceeding, and the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.