STATE OF OHIO v. THOMAS K. SPELLACY
No. 106909
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
March 7, 2019
[Cite as State v. Spellacy, 2019-Ohio-785.]
BEFORE: Keough, J., Boyle, P.J., and Jones, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2019
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-17-623580-A
Michael C. O‘Malley Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: Frank Romeo Zeleznikar Andrew T. Gatti Assistant County Prosecutors The Justice Center, 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
John L. Reulbach 14701 Detroit Avenue, Suite 575 Lakewood, Ohio 44107
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals the trial court‘s decision granting defendant-appellee, Thomas K. Spellacy‘s, motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
{2} In November 2017, Olmsted Falls Police Officer Dennis McDonald initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Spellacy after Spellacy twice flashed his high-beam headlights while stopped at a traffic light. As a result of the stop, Spellacy was named in a one-count indictment charging him with operating a vehicle while under the influence (“OVI“), in violation of
{4} Officer McDonald was the sole witness at the suppression hearing but the facts are not in dispute. On November 23, 2017, at approximately 7:51 p.m., Officer McDonald was seated in his parked police cruiser at a Sunoco gas station parking lot at the intersection of Columbia and Cook Roads. Officer McDonald testified that he was observing northbound and southbound traffic on Columbia Road and traffic entering the intersection from Cook Road.
{5} While observing traffic, Officer McDonald noticed four or five cars traveling southbound on Columbia Road stop at the red light at the intersection. He also observed traffic approaching northbound on Columbia Road stop at the traffic light. One of the northbound vehicles pulled into the left turn lane, while a second northbound vehicle pulled into the northbound curb lane. A few seconds after traffic had stopped in the southbound lane, Officer McDonald observed the second vehicle back activate its high-beam lights momentarily and then dim them. The traffic light changed, and traffic from Cook Road began to move through the intersection. The same vehicle once again activated its high-beam lights and turned them off. The time frame between the two flashes of high-beam lights was approximately 14 seconds. The driver of the vehicle in question was later identified as Spellacy.
{6} Thereafter, the light for the north and southbound traffic changed to green and traffic proceeded through the intersection. Spellacy turned right onto Cook Road, heading westbound. At this time, Officer McDonald activated his overhead lights in order to initiate a traffic stop. The officer‘s dash-cam video corroborated his testimony.
{8} However, when Officer McDonald approached the driver of the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and the driver had glassy eyes. After Spellacy refused to submit to any alcohol-detection tests, he was arrested and cited for OVI, in violation of
{9} On cross-examination, Officer McDonald admitted that Spellacy‘s vehicle was not in motion when he activated his high-beam lights, and that the vehicles facing toward Spellacy‘s vehicle were also stationary when he flashed his high-beam headlights. He further admitted that the flicker of the high beams lasted only for a second each time.
{10} In granting Spellacy‘s motion to suppress, the trial court specifically found that Spellacy was stopped at the traffic light when he flashed his high beams; thus he was “not approaching” oncoming traffic. Additionally, the trial court found that Spellacy did not continue to use his high beams upon proceeding through the intersection. Accordingly, the trial court, in its written opinion that was read in open court, found that “the facts relied upon by the officer were insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the [law] occurred.” (Tr. 73.)
{12} Appellate review of a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, 8. During a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial judge acts as the trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve factual questions and assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress is bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact where they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 594, 621 N.E.2d 726 (4th Dist.1993). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court independently reviews the trial court‘s legal determinations de novo. State v. Djisheff, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0001, 2006-Ohio-6201, ¶ 19.
{13} It is well established that an officer may stop a motorist upon his or her observation that the vehicle in question violated a traffic law. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). “[E]ven a de minimis traffic violation provides probable cause for a traffic stop.” Id. at 9. ““Trial courts determine whether any violation occurred, not the extent of the violation.“” Cleveland v. Martin, 2018-Ohio-740, 107 N.E.3d 809 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550, 2002-Ohio-3053, 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). Moreover, an officer is not required to prove the suspect committed an offense beyond a reasonable doubt or even satisfy the lesser standard of probable cause to believe that the defendant violated the law. Westlake v. Kaplysh, 118 Ohio App.3d 18, 20, 691 N.E.2d 1074 (8th Dist.1997).
{15} In this case, Officer McDonald initiated a traffic stop and issued a citation for violating
(A) Whenever a motor vehicle is being operated on a roadway or shoulder adjacent thereto during the times specified in
section 4513.03 of the Revised Code , the driver shall use a distribution of light, or composite beam, directed high enough and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons, vehicles, and substantial objects at a safe distance in advance of the vehicle, subject to the following requirements;(1) Whenever the driver of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle, such driver shall use a distribution of light, or composite beam, so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver.
{16} On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress because Officer McDonald had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Spellacy violated a traffic offense to warrant the traffic stop. Specifically, the state contends that under the totality of the circumstances, Spellacy‘s two separate acts of briefly activating his high-beam lights were sufficient to justify the traffic stop. Alternatively, the state contends that even if Spellacy did not violate
{17} Spellacy contends that no traffic violation occurred because (1) his vehicle was stationary; (2) there were no oncoming vehicles; and (3) no testimony was presented that the headlights glared into the eyes of an oncoming driver. In support, Spellacy cites to State v. Woods, 86 Ohio App.3d 423, 621 N.E.2d 523 (4th Dist.1993), and Kaplysh, 118 Ohio App.3d at 20, for the proposition that a momentary flicker of high-beam headlights does not constitute a violation of
{18} In Woods, the Fourth District held that the officers lacked a legal justification for a traffic stop when Woods was operating her vehicle with its high beams on while rounding a curve, but immediately activated her low beams when the oncoming vehicle came in view. The court determined that Woods‘s high beams, as with any driver‘s, would be activated for a moment when the approaching car came into view before she could activate her low beams. The court determined that the “momentary flick onto high beam followed immediately by a return to low beam cannot be elevated to a violation of
{20} In a split decision, this court concluded that “a driver violates the ordinance by continuing to use the high-beam headlights of his vehicle ‘upon approaching’ such traffic. The ordinance requires the driver to shift to the low beam lights at the latest when the glaring rays project into the eyes of an oncoming driver.” Id. at 20.
{21} However, this court specifically rejected the argument that the officer‘s stationary car was not “oncoming,” finding that “[t]his argument ignores the fact that [the officer], as well as the vehicle in front of his, was moving immediately prior to stopping at the traffic light as defendant approached from the opposite direction.” Id. at 21. This court found that “the evidence was sufficient to establish, at a minimum, a reasonable suspicion that the defendant drove with his high beams illuminated in violation of the ordinance.”
The purpose of the ordinance is to promote safety by preventing any unnecessary visual impairment resulting from the glare of high beams - an impairment that could affect a driver whether he be moving at a high speed on a country road or about to stop or start up at an intersection, where pedestrians are likely to cross. The trial court was mistaken when it interpreted the ordinance as not requiring lights to be dimmed until a car passes an oncoming vehicle. As Woods correctly saw, that glare occurs much earlier and so does the obligation to lower one‘s beams.
Id. at 21.
{22} In further addressing the notion of an “oncoming driver,” the First District held that the use of high-beams, although continuously, did not violate
{23} Despite the First District‘s finding that the headlight statute is clear and unambiguous, the Second District in State v. Fickert, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-15, 2018-Ohio-4349, addressed the same headlight statute and found that the officer‘s mistake of law was reasonable. In Fickert, the officer initiated a traffic stop after Fickert flashed her “brights” at him shortly before passing him while traveling in the opposite direction. The traffic stop resulted in Fickert‘s arrest for OVI. The trial court granted Fickert‘s motion to suppress, finding that the flicker of high beams lasted approximately a second and did not appear to create any
{24} The Second District concluded that it did not need to reconcile the competing case law or determine whether Fickert actually violated
{25} In Heien, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the propriety of a traffic stop where the officer stopped a vehicle because one of the vehicle‘s two brake lights was not working. The officer believed that the law in North Carolina required both brake lights to be operable. This belief turned out to be a mistake of law by the officer, because a single working brake light was all that the law required. After reviewing the language of the relevant statute,
{26} The United States Supreme Court stated:
We have repeatedly affirmed, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.“” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. [373], [381], 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (some internal quotation marks omitted). To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them “fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community‘s protection.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). We have recognized that searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable. The warrantless search of a home, for instance, is reasonable if undertaken with the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a resident. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). By the same token, if officers with probable cause to arrest a suspect mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect‘s description, neither the seizure nor an accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-805, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971). The limit is that “the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.” Brinegar, supra, at 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302.
But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer‘s understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.
{27} In this case, Spellacy readily admits in his appellate brief that “McDonald was simply mistaken in his belief that two momentary flicks of one‘s bright lights, particularly under the facts described, was a violation of the law.” (Appellant‘s brief at 6.) Nevertheless, Spellacy contends that Officer McDonald‘s mistake of law was not objectively reasonable under Heien because, unlike the law at issue in Heien, the headlight law here is clear, unambiguous, and has been interpreted by reviewing courts that momentary flickers of high-beam headlights followed immediately by a return to low beam does not constitute a violation of
{28} The case law in Ohio interpreting
{29} Moreover, the cases interpreting
{30} We also find that the Heien “objectively reasonable” test has been applied by Ohio courts that involve statutes or ordinances that had also previously been interpreted on appellate review. See Kirkpatrick, 2017-Ohio-7629, 97 N.E.3d 871 (officer‘s belief that a driver‘s wide left turn violated
{31} Accordingly, based on Heien, we agree with the state‘s position that even if Spellacy‘s two momentary flickers of his high-beam headlights spanning 14 seconds apart were not sufficient to constitute a violation of
{33} In this case, Officer McDonald testified that he observed Spellacy activate his high beams on two different occasions while stopped behind another vehicle at a red light. The dash-cam video shows that the two flashes occurred briefly, approximately for one second, and approximately 14 seconds apart. Officer McDonald testified that he initiated the traffic stop to “determine why he was using his bright lights” and that he believed Spellacy violated the traffic law because “you can‘t drive with your bright lights on.”
{34} When reviewing the language of
{35} Based on the totality of the circumstances, even if Officer McDonald was mistaken that Spellacy violated
{36} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR