State v. SkrzynskiState v. Skrzynski
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Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and Melissa A. Freeman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Kurt W. Bruderly, for appellant.
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COSME, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Justin Skrzynski, was found guilty by a jury of felonious assault of a police officer, a first degree felony. The Wood County Common Pleas Court rejected appellant‘s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to five years of incarceration. Appellant asserts that he should have been grantеd a new trial because a juror changed her vote to “guilty” after being threatened with violence by another juror
I. BACKGROUND
{¶2} Bowling Green Police Officer Brian Houser was on routine patrol at 2:30 a.m. when he was flagged down by an employee of Kamikaze‘s Bar because of a fight inside. While attempting to quell the disturbance, Officer Houser was knocked unconscious by a blow to the head. Although Officer Houser did not see who struck him, appellant was identified by witnesses as the person striking Officer Houser. Appellant was arrested for the assault.
{¶3} Appellant was convicted following a jury trial. After the trial, Ms. Beth Ramey, a juror, told appellant‘s cоunsel - “I feel sorry for your client, as I had reasonable doubt.” The next day, Ramey met with appellant‘s counsel and his private investigator, Mr. Sturgill. She told them that she believed appellant was not guilty, and that she had voted that way until threatened with physical harm by another juror.
{¶4} According to Ramey, after several hours of deliberations, another juror became visibly agitated and stated “I am so angry that I could slug someone - and I have
{¶5} Ms. Ramey signed a sworn affidavit which was submitted to the trial court with appellant‘s motion for new trial. The trial court determined that Ramey‘s affidavit was inadmissible under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶6} As a reviewing court, we show deference to the trial judge, who sees and hears the events and thus is in a better position to accurately evaluate the situation and determine the appropriate scope of inquiry. State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 29. Therefore, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard and will not reverse the trial court unless it handled the alleged juror misconduct or ruled upon the post-trial motion in an “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable” manner. State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157.
III. JUROR MISCONDUCT
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that:
{¶8} “The trial court erred in denying appellant‘s motion for a new trial, violating his right to a fair and impartial jury.”
{¶9} Appellant contends that the aliunde rule encompassed within
{¶10} “It is a longstanding rule that ‘the verdict of a jury may not be impeached by the evidence of a member of the jury unless foundation for the introduction of such evidence is first laid by competent evidence aliunde, i.e., by evidence from some other source.‘” State v. Reiner (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 342, 349-350, reversed on other grounds by Ohio v. Reiner (2001), 532 U.S. 17, quoting State v. Adams (1943), 141 Ohio St. 423, 427. See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 123; State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 79.
{¶11} Appellant suggests thаt we create an exception to the aliunde rule to combat the most egregious forms of juror misconduct - specifically that violence or credible threats of violence in the jury room are overt acts to which a juror may testify with no reference to the effects on the jury. However, in this case, we find the trial court correctly ruled the juror‘s affidavit was inadmissible. We also find that appellаnt was not denied his due process rights or his right to an impartial jury.
A. Ohio Evid.R. 606(B)
{¶12} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, “The [aliunde] rule is intended to preserve the integrity of the jury process and the privacy of deliberations, to protect the finality of the verdict, and to insulate jurors from harassment by dissatisfied or defeated parties by prohibiting a court from questioning a juror about what occurred during
{¶13} This restriction upon impeaching a jury verdict is codified in
{¶14} “Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury‘s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror‘s mind or emotions as influencing him to assеnt to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith. A juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury‘s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror, only after some outside evidence of that act or event has been presented. However a juror mаy testify without the presentation of any outside evidence concerning any threat, any bribe, any attempted threat or bribe, or any improprieties of any officer of the court. A juror‘s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying will not be received for these purposes.”
{¶15} Appellant asks the court to make an exсeption to the second sentence of this subdivision, which conforms to the aliunde rule, in order to protect his rights to a fair trial. We find that the juror affidavit presented on behalf of appellant does not justify such an exception.
{¶16} Appellant also argues the aliunde rule should not apply in this case because the juror‘s misconduct must be construed as being external to the proper deliberative рrocess. In other words, appellant argues that
{¶17} The Staff Notes to
{¶18} Further, a strict grammatical reading of that third sentence may also allow for expanded possible exceptions.1 This court, however, is not prepared to reach the conclusion contrary to case law that all threats form an exception to the aliunde rule. Importantly, the facts of this case do not require a finding on this specific issue.
B. The Ramey Affidavit
{¶19} Appellant asks this court to consider the affidavit by juror Ramey. In her affidavit, Ramey states that she felt threatened. However, the offending juror did not
{¶20} In addition, Ramey did not make the court aware of her concerns until after the verdict. She did not make the judge, the bailiff, or any of the participants in the trial, aware that she felt threatened. She did not do anything at the time of juror deliberation that wоuld suggest to others that she feared for her safety, or felt unfairly coerced, harassed, intimidated, or in physical danger. Nor did any other juror step forward with an account of a stated or perceived threat, attempted threat, internal impropriety, or jury coercion. Thus, the affidavit from Ramey does not document a justification for an exception to the aliunde rule in either the second or third sentences of
C. Constitutional Violations
{¶21} Appellant also argues that
{¶22} Appellant relies on Doan v. Brigano (C.A.6, 2001), 237 F.3d 722, abrogated on other grounds, Wiggins v. Smith (2003), 539 U.S. 510, to support his proposition that Ohio‘s application of the aliunde rule effectively denied him the opportunity to show a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have a jury consider only the evidence before it, as well as appellant‘s constitutional right to a fair trial.
{¶23} In Doan, a juror conducted an experiment outside of court and presented the results to the jury. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that failure to exclude evidence of an еxperiment that might have been flawed in its methodology substantially impaired the defendant‘s credibility. Doan, 237 F.3d at 732. The court in Doan found that application of
{¶24} The Doan court was careful to stress the decision did not call the verdict into question by reviewing the private deliberations of the jury: “A review of this misconduct stands in stark contrast to an examination of internal factors affecting the jury. Whether the jury understoоd the evidence presented at trial or the judge‘s instructions following the presentation of the evidence, whether a juror was pressured into arriving at a particular conclusion, and even whether jurors were intoxicated during deliberations, are all internal matters for which juror testimony may not be used to
{¶25} Unlike Doan, this case does not involve a juror conducting an outside experiment or bringing in outside evidence which the defendant had no opportunity to refute or challenge. Everything that occurred took place in the jury room. The only witnesses to what took place were the jurors. Ramey‘s affidavit concerns her interpretation of another juror‘s emotional statement.
{¶26} Here, the trial court properly refused to consider the Ramey affidavit because it relies in substantial part on her mental and emotional state and conjecture about the mental and emotional state of other jurors during the deliberation process instead of objective facts. This is precisely what
{¶27} Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‘s motion for new trial. Appellant‘s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
IV. DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE
{¶28} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that:
{¶29} “The trial court erred by ordering Appеllant to provide Appellee with privileged work-product not discoverable under Criminal Rule 16(C)(2).”
{¶30} Appellant argues the trial court erred in ordering him to produce tape-recorded witness statements of Mr. Hodgson and Mr. Lucious for in camera inspection. The tapes were made by appellant‘s investigator, Mr. Sturgill. Appellant contends these statements were not discoverable under
{¶31} During the trial, appellant called Hodgson and Lucious to shоw that appellant did not strike Officer Houser. During Hodgson‘s testimony, it became evident that appellant‘s investigator, Mr. Sturgill, had audio-taped the interviews. The interviews had not been disclosed to the state. Following Hodgson‘s direct testimony, the state asked that the trial court conduct in camera inspection to determine whether any inconsistencies in Hodgson‘s testimony existed.
{¶32} The trial court conducted an in camera inspection of Hodgson‘s statement, with counsel for the state and appellant present, and concluded that no inconsistencies existed. The trial court declined to find the state was entitled to the statements under
{¶33} Following Lucious’ direct testimony, the state asked that the trial court conduct an in camera inspection to determine whether any inconsistencies in Lucious’ testimony existed.
{¶34} The triаl court conducted an in camera inspection of Lucious’ statement, with counsel for the state and appellant present, and concluded that no inconsistencies existed. The trial court declined to find the state was entitled to the statement under
{¶35} We first note that “the allowance or overruling of various discovery motions in a criminal case rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and only in сases of clear abuse will that discretion be disturbed upon review.” State v. Laskey (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 187, 192, judgment vacated in part, (1972), 408 U.S. 936. Accordingly, only when a trial court‘s ruling on a discovery motion is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable will we reverse that ruling. Berk v. Matthews (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169.
{¶36}
{¶37} “In camera inspection of witness’ statement. Upon completion of the direct examination, at trial, of a witness other than the defеndant, the court on motion of the prosecuting attorney shall conduct an in camera inspection of the witness’ written or recorded statement obtained by the defense attorney or his agents with the defense attorney and prosecuting attorney present and participating, to determine the existence of inconsistencies, if any, between the testimony of such witness and the prior statement.
{¶38} “If the court determines that inconsistencies exist the statement shall be given to the prosecuting attorney for use in cross-examination of the witness as to the inconsistencies.
{¶39} “If the court determines that inconsistencies do not exist the statement shall not be given to the prosecuting attorney, and he shall not be permitted to cross-examine or comment thereon.”
{¶40} The state contends that Hodgson‘s and Lucious’ stаtements were discoverable under
{¶41} “Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as provided in subsections (C)(1)(b) and (d), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal documents made by the defense attorney or his agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of statements made by witnessеs or prospective witnesses to the defense attorney or his agents.”
{¶42} Appellant suggests that because
{¶43} Upon appellate review, however, error must also be prejudicial to the appellant to be reversible. Both
{¶44} In this case, we conclude the trial court‘s order to disclose Hodgson‘s and Lucious’ statements amounts to harmless error under either the test for constitutional or nonconstitutional error. Hodgson‘s and Lucious’ testimony challenged the state‘s position that appellant was the assailant. There is no evidence to show that the state‘s presence during the in camera inspection gave it an advantage at trial. The statements were not given to the state and the state was not permitted to cross-examine either witness as to the audio-tapes or comment on the audio-tapes.
{¶45} Appellant further contends the statements were his counsel‘s work product and that the court committed prejudicial, reversible error in ordering the statements to be produced to the state. We conclude, however, that while the statements constitute work product, an exception existed permitting the trial court to conduct an in camera
V. CONCLUSION
{¶46} The trial court properly refused to consider the Ramey affidavit because her mental and emotional state during the deliberation process may not be considered.
{¶47} The trial court did not err in requiring appellant to disclose the tape-recorded statements of Hodgson and Lucious in camera.
{¶48} On consideration whereof, we find that appellant was not prejudiced or prevented from having a fair trial and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Wood County, is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J.
JUDGE
Keila D. Cosme, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
CONCURS AND WRITES SEPARATELY.
JUDGE
{¶ 49} I concur with the majority opinion as to the second assignment of error. However, I concur in judgment only as to the first assignment of error.
{¶ 50} In an affidavit, one of the jurors averred that she voted for conviction because of a perceived physical threat by another juror. The exclusion of this affidavit fits squarely within the plain meaning of the words and the purpose of Ohio‘s aliunde rule, and is properly excluded. Appellant urges this court to not rely on a strict reading of
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.