STATE OF OHIO, Appellee, - vs - WINTON B. SIZEMORE, Appellant.
CASE NO. CA2019-01-006
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
10/28/2019
2019-Ohio-4400
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 18CR34236
Kidd & Urling LLC, Thomas W. Kidd, Jr., James P. Urling, 8913 Cincinnati-Dayton Road, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for appellant
OPINION
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Winton B. Sizemore, appeals from his conviction in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for felonious assault with a deadly weapon, domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and using weapons while intoxicated. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm appellant‘s conviction.
{¶ 3} Appellant pled not guilty to the charges and a jury trial commenced in December 2018. At trial, the state presented testimony from Logeman and from Warren County Sheriff‘s Deputy Steven Ritchie. Logeman testified that in November 2017, she and appellant were married and were renting a home in Franklin Township. The two were both home on November 15, 2017. Appellant, who “religiously” took prescription pain medication for a back injury, started drinking wine in the early afternoon. Although she did not know exactly how much alcohol appellant had to drink that day, Logeman knew it was more than one bottle of wine. Logeman was also drinking, but “not nearly as heavily as [appellant] was [drinking].” Logeman could tell appellant was “feeling the effects of the wine.”
{¶ 4} Logeman testified appellant fell asleep on the couch around 7:00 p.m. When he woke up about an hour and half later, he had to use the restroom. Rather than using a nearby toilet, appellant urinated in a decorative pumpkin. Logeman yelled at appellant for his actions and the two got into an argument. The argument continued when appellant went into
{¶ 5} Appellant left the kitchen and went into the master bedroom. Logeman went into another room to collect her phone. She decided she would sleep on the couch and went to the master bedroom to collect some pillows. Upon entering the bedroom, Logeman walked towards her side of the bed. As she did, she noticed that appellant was “crouched down” on the other side of the bed, approximately seven feet away from her, holding a gun that was pointed at her. Logeman recognized the gun as a Glock 43, 9 mm semi-automatic pistol. Logeman testified that this was one of many guns appellant owned and kept in the house.
{¶ 6} Appellant racked a bullet into the chamber and, with the gun pointed at her, stated, “Don‘t think I fucking wont. Get the fuck out of here.” Logeman testified she was terrified and froze, not knowing what to do. Appellant then shot the gun at her, hitting the wall “less than a foot” from where she was standing. Logeman testified the bullet went through the bedroom wall and into the next room.
{¶ 7} After shooting the gun, appellant shouted at Logeman, “Get out of here.” When Logeman begged appellant to stop, he threatened, “Don‘t think I fucking won‘t shoot you in the fucking face. Last chance.” Logeman left the bedroom and appellant followed behind her. Logeman did not know where the gun was at that time. Appellant eventually stopped arguing with Logeman and went back into the bedroom.
{¶ 8} Logeman testified that the incident was captured on an audio recording. She explained that after appellant woke up from his nap on the couch and was “not acting right,” she “knew it was going to be one of those nights” and started an audio recording on her
{¶ 9} Despite being shot at, Logeman did not leave the house that night or call the police. She explained that she was too “scared of the repercussions” if she did. Logeman testified that when appellant woke up the following morning, he did not recall shooting the gun at her the night before. In the weeks that followed the shooting, Logeman and appellant repaired the bullet hole in the wall with spackle and paint.
{¶ 10} Subsequently, on January 12, 2018, Logeman left appellant and obtained an emergency civil protection order against him. Then, on April 2, 2018, after she “felt strong enough to face [appellant] in court,” Logeman spoke to law enforcement. She provided a statement about the November 15, 2017 incident to Deputy Ritchie and gave him the audio recording of the shooting.
{¶ 11} Deputy Ritchie testified that he was one of the officers who served the protection order on appellant at his home in Franklin Township in January 2018. At that time, Deputy Ritchie was directed to a patched bedroom wall by Logeman‘s mother, who was present to collect some of Logeman‘s personal belongings. Subsequently, on April 2, 2018, Deputy Ritchie took a statement from Logeman about the November 15, 2017 shooting incident.
{¶ 12} Deputy Ritchie returned to appellant‘s home with a search warrant on May 16, 2018. He located the patched area of the wall and removed pieces of the drywall and the insulation between the bedroom and living room wall. The insulation had a hole through it that was consistent with a bullet hole.
{¶ 14} Appellant testified the next thing he remembered was “standing downstairs in the living room * * * [with Logeman] yelling at [him]” because he was “urinating in the pumpkin bowl.” He testified he started crying, cleaned out the bowl, apologized to Logeman, and went back into the master bedroom feeling like he “didn‘t want to continue to live [his] life like this.” Appellant stated he intended to take his own life and when Logeman walked into the bedroom, he had a gun under his chin. Appellant admitted yelling at Logeman to get out of the room and firing the gun, but he claimed his actions were done to make Logeman understand that he had a loaded gun in his hand and wanted her to leave the room. He denied that he aimed the gun at Logeman or shot at her, claiming Logeman was six or seven feet away from where the bullet struck the wall. Furthermore, he claimed that after shooting the gun, when he threatened Logeman by stating, “[d]on‘t think I fucking won‘t shoot you in the fucking face. Last chance,” he was only making the threat to get Logeman out of the room. He denied that he intended to really shoot her.
{¶ 15} After Logeman left the bedroom, appellant stated he went to sleep. Appellant claims that he woke up the next morning and did not remember the events that transpired the night before. He only learned about what had happened after speaking to Logeman. After
{¶ 16} Following appellant‘s testimony, the defense rested. The matter was submitted to the jury, who returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate prison term of seven years, of which three years were mandatory.
{¶ 17} Appellant appealed, raising two assignments of error for review.
Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 19} THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN [APPELLANT‘S] CONVICTIONS.
{¶ 20} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends his convictions for felonious assault, aggravated menacing, and using a weapon while intoxicated were against the manifest weight of the evidence. He does not challenge his conviction for domestic violence.
{¶ 21} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge examines the “inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 14. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Graham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-07-095, 2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66. In reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court “must be mindful that the original trier of fact was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence.” State v. Hilton, 12th Dist. Butler CA2015-03-064, 2015-Ohio-5198, ¶ 18. Thus, an appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence
Using Weapons While Intoxicated
{¶ 22} Appellant was convicted of using weapons while intoxicated in violation of
{¶ 23} After reviewing the record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we find that the jury did not lose its way and that appellant‘s conviction for using weapons while intoxicated is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Logeman testified that appellant began drinking wine in the “early afternoon” on November 15, 2017 and he “religiously” took his prescription pain medication four times daily. Logeman observed appellant drink more than one bottle of wine. She testified appellant was “feeling the effects” of the alcohol, as he was slurring his words and urinated in a decorative pumpkin rather than in a toilet. After drinking wine and taking his prescription pain medication, appellant went into the master bedroom, grabbed one of his guns, and fired the firearm at Logeman.
{¶ 24} Appellant‘s trial testimony disputed that he consumed any alcohol on November 15, 2017. He claimed that rather than drinking all day, he had been at work. He now argues that even if he had been drinking, “whatever unknown quantity of alcohol [he had] alleged[ly] * * * consumed” would have been metabolized by his body as he had fallen sleep for more than two hours before the shooting incident occurred.
{¶ 25} “[W]hen conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the prosecution
Felonious Assault and Aggravated Menacing
{¶ 26} The manifest weight of the evidence also supports appellant‘s convictions for felonious assault and aggravated menacing. Pursuant to
{¶ 27} A criminal attempt occurs when a defendant “purposely does or omits to do something which is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of a crime. To constitute a substantial step, the
{¶ 28} Appellant argues his testimony established that the firearm was not aimed at Logeman at the time it was discharged and that it was not discharged in an attempt to cause Logeman physical harm. Rather, appellant argues, the gun was only fired in an effort to convince Logeman to leave the room. The state, however, presented evidence that allowed the jury to find otherwise. Logeman‘s testimony and the audio recording demonstrated appellant threatened Logeman, telling her “Don‘t think I fucking wont” while aiming the gun at her. Logeman testified she was terrified when appellant pointed the 9-millimeter pistol at her. Appellant shot the gun at Logeman, barely missing her and hitting the wall “less than a foot” from where she was standing. Appellant then threatened Logeman again, stating “Don‘t think I fucking won‘t shoot you in the fucking face. Last chance.”
{¶ 29} As Deputy Ritchie testified, firearms are capable of causing serious physical injury or death. Appellant‘s conduct in pointing a gun at Logeman and firing the weapon at her was a substantial step in a sequence of events that, if successful would have caused Logeman physical harm. The jury was entitled to credit Logeman‘s version of events and conclude that appellant‘s discharge of the weapon towards Logeman was an attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon and that appellant‘s actions
{¶ 30} Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we find that the jury did not lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that appellant‘s convictions for using weapons while intoxicated, felonious assault, and aggravated menacing must be reversed. Appellant‘s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. His first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 32} THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT PROHIBITED THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE THAT DIRECTLY REFLECTED UPON A WITNESSES [SIC] CREDIBILITY.
{¶ 33} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred when it “sustained the State‘s objection to [the] introduction of evidence regarding the alleged victim‘s illicit use of drugs on the date of the alleged offense.” At trial, defense counsel sought to introduce a text message sent by Logeman to appellant on November 15, 2017. In the text message, Logeman stated, “Okay, love, I labest [sic] you. Let me know when you‘re heading out. If you have any spare, I could definitely use a happy. My back is killing me.” Defense counsel argued the message was relevant as he believed Logeman was “going to testify that she was not taking any of his pills that night and that she never does and that this would be an indication that yes, she was asking for them.”
{¶ 34} The text message was ultimately excluded from evidence by the trial court. Appellant now argues that had he been permitted to testify about the text message, he “would have explained that th[e] message was a request from Ms. Logeman for one of [his] opioid-based pain killers for which he had a prescription.” Appellant contends such evidence
{¶ 35} “A trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and unless it clearly abused its discretion and appellant is materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should not disturb the decision of the trial court.” State v. Martin, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-01-022, 2007-Ohio-7073, ¶ 9. An abuse-of-discretion standard of review is a deferential review. State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court‘s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Perkins, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2005-01-002, 2005-Ohio-6557, ¶ 8.
{¶ 36} “[T]he credibility of testimony can be attacked through evidence of a witness‘s intoxication at the time of the matter about which the witness seeks to testify.‘” State v. Gaffin, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1057, 2019-Ohio-291, ¶ 57, quoting Kenney v. Fealko, 75 Ohio App.3d 47, 51 (11th Dist.1991).
{¶ 37} In the present case, Logeman admitted that she had been drinking on the day of the incident. She stated she was not drinking “nearly as heavily as [appellant] was” drinking, but admitted she had “a little bit of a buzz throughout the day.” Although the issue
{¶ 38} Accordingly, we conclude that the exclusion of the text message from evidence was not an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion and that appellant was not prevented from having a fair trial or presenting a meaningful defense. Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 39} Judgement affirmed.
S. POWELL and RINGLAND, JJ., concur.
