State v. SimoneauState v. Simoneau
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Paul Simoneau appeals his convictions following a guilty plea, contending that he did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and intеlligent plea because the trial court mentioned the possibility of community
{¶ 2} Finding some merit to the appeal, we affirm the trial court‘s findings of guilt and imposition of the individual prison sentences on each count, but reverse the imposition of postrelease control and remand for a limited resentencing for the trial court to properly advise Simoneau of postrelease control and to providе all the Reagan Tokes notifications required by
I. Procedural Background
{¶ 3} In June 2025, the State named Simoneau in a 19-count indictment, charging him with sexually related offenses and specifications committed between September 2014 until December 2024, relative to four different victims.
{¶ 4} The State charged Simoneau with nine first-degree felony counts of rape, in violation of
{¶ 5} The State and Simoneau entered into a plea agreement. The State made the following amendments to the indictment: Counts 1 and 17 by deleting the sexually violent predator specification attendant to each count; Count 7 by amending the strangulation offense to a fifth-degree felony; Count 10 by deleting all specifications; Count 12 by deleting the three-year firearm specification; Count 16 by amending the offense to attempted rаpe, in violation of
{¶ 6} At the sentencing hearing, Simoneau‘s victims provided impact statements, the trial court reviewed the State‘s sentencing memorandum, and Simoneau and counsel offered mitigation statements. The trial court imposed the
II. The Appeal
{¶ 7} Simoneau now appeals, raising three assignments of error.
A. Maximum Penalty — Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Simoneau contends that he did not enter a knowing, vоluntary, or intelligent plea because the trial court advised him that it could impose a period of community control when in fact he was subject to a mandatory prison term.
{¶ 9} A guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights; thus, a defendant‘s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10, citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1992); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. “If the plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is unconstitutional.” Id.
{¶ 11} However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that there are two instances in which a defendant is excused from the burden of demonstrating prejudiсe: (1) when a trial court “fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in
{¶ 12} Thus, the questions that need to be addressed are (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden? Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 17.
{¶ 13} Simoneau contends that he did not understand the maximum penalty involved because the trial court misled him into believing that he was eligible for
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} We find that Simoneau affirmatively stated that he understood the potential penalties involved regarding each individual count, including a one-year mandatory prison sentence for the firearm specification. At no time during the court‘s explanation of the individual sentences did the court mention community control. Accordingly, we agree with Simoneau that the trial court did not make any actual statement to him that he was ineligible for community-control sanctions.
{¶ 16} But the record also does not support Simoneau‘s assertion that the trial court made explicit advisements that Simoneau was eligible for community control. Although the trial cоurt subsequently used boilerplate conditional language after discussing the individual counts and maximum penalties — “if prison terms are imposed,” “if you receive any community control sanctions,” “if you‘re sentenced consecutively” (tr. 24-26) — this “conditional language should not be deemed
{¶ 17} The record is devoid of any confusion or doubt. Neither Simoneau nor his counsel ever suggested that he was eligible for community control; rather the record demonstrates that Simoneau affirmatively acknowledged the maximum sentences on each count, the maximum sentence if all sentences were imposed consecutively, and that his one-year firearm specification required mandatory prison time. As such, the trial court did not completely fail to comply with the nonconstitutional mandates of
{¶ 18} Simoneau contends he was prejudiced because he was not represented by his assigned counsel and he subjectively believed he could receive a community-control sentence based on the court‘s assertions, which he claims induced him into pleading guilty rather than going to trial. As it will be discussed in addressing his second assignment of error, Simoneau did not object to or express
{¶ 19} In evaluating prejudice, the Supreme Court considers “‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.‘” Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 16, quoting Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108. A guilty plea is not reversible in a direct appeal after a partially compliant nonconstitutional advisement unless the “face of the record” shows the defendant would not have entered the plea but for the issue raised. Dangler at ¶ 23-24 (upholding the plea where there was nothing in the record indicating that the defendant would not have entered his plea had he been more thoroughly informed of the sex-offender registry details).
{¶ 20} Nothing on the face of the record before this court indicates that Simoneau would not have entered his plea had he been advised he was ineligible for community control. Simoneau faced 11 first-degree felony charges — rape and kidnapping offenses — that all carried sexually violent predator specifications. As part of the plea agreement, the State amended each count to remove the specification; thus, he accepted a plea that significantly reduced his exposure to a potential stated life sentence. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that Simoneau‘s decision to plead guilty was induced by the court‘s boilerplate, conditional statements about community control. Simoneau has not demonstrated prejudice that would require this court to vacate his plea based on a finding that he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, Simoneau contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his plea involuntary because his counsel failed to ensure his rights were properly protected when substitute defense counsel failed to correct the trial court‘s erroneous advisements regarding mandatory prison time and his еligibility for community control.
{¶ 23} At the outset, we reject Simoneau‘s argument that he was per se prejudiced by stand-in counsel because the trial court did not confirm that Simoneau approved of the representation. After the State set forth the plea agreement, stand-in counsel stated that the State‘s recitation of the plea offer mirrored his understanding and further advised the court that both he and Simoneau‘s assigned counsel discussed the plea offer with him and that Simoneau was “prepared to enter a guilty plea today knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (Tr. 20.) When asked whether he was satisfied “with your attorneys’ representation,” Simoneau stated “yes.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Accordingly, contrary to Simoneau‘s assertion on appeal, the record reflects that Simoneau was satisfied with both stand-in and assigned counsel. He did not object to or express confusion about stand-in counsel representing him.
{¶ 24} A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is waived by a guilty plea unless counsel‘s deficient representation caused the guilty plea to be involuntary. State v. Hudson, 2011-Ohio-6272, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). The two-part Strickland test
{¶ 25} This demonstration requires more than “‘post hoc assertions . . . about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney‘s deficiencies.‘” Romero at ¶ 28, quoting Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). “When a defendant claims that he would not have entered a guilty plea but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, the prejudice inquiry ‘focuses on a defendant‘s decisionmaking.‘” State v. Bozso, 2020-Ohio-3779, ¶ 29, quoting Lee at 367, citing Hill. Courts must look to сontemporaneous evidence substantiating the defendant‘s assertion. Romero at ¶ 28, citing Lee at 369. In Romero, the Ohio Supreme Court viewed and considered the defendant‘s affidavit in support of his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea as contemporaneous evidence to substantiate his assertion that his counsel did not advise him of the possibility of deportation if he pleaded guilty. Id.
{¶ 26} Here, no such evidence exists in the record before this court. Simoneau presents no contemporaneous evidence proving that but for counsel‘s
C. Sentence
{¶ 27} In his third assignment of error, Simoneau challenges his sentenсe. Specifically, he raises three issues: (1) the trial court erred by imposing maximum, consecutive sentences without articulating on the record the statutory sentencing factors; (2) the trial court failed to verbally advise him of the Reagan Tokes notifications; and (3) the trial court issued a journal entry inconsistent with the verbal advisements regarding postrelease control.
1. Maximum Individual Sentences
{¶ 28} We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in
{¶ 29} Simoneau contends his sentence is contrary to law because the record affirmatively demonstrates that the trial court did not comprehensively consider or actively weigh the statutory guidelines and mitigating factors as required by
{¶ 30} A trial court‘s imposition of a maximum prison term for a felony conviction is not contrary to law provided that “the sentence is within the statutory range for the offense, and the court considers both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in
{¶ 32} Under
{¶ 33}
{¶ 34} Our review of the record reveals that the trial court properly considered
{¶ 35} In imposing sentence, the court focused on the gravity of the crimes, the impact on each victim, and Simoneau‘s extensive criminal history, including prior sexually related offenses. The court specifically noted that it could not “really
{¶ 36} Based on the record before this court, we find no merit to Simoneau‘s argument that the trial court failed to consider
2. Reagan Tokes Advisements
{¶ 37} Simoneau claims that the trial court failed to verbally advise him at sentencing of the Reagan Tokes notifications contained in
{¶ 38} When the trial court fails to provide all of the advisements required under
{¶ 39} Simoneu claims that the trial court also failed to accurately advise him at sentencing that postrelease control on Counts 1 and 10 was for a mandatory period of five years. The record reflects that the trial court advised Simoneau that postrelease control on those counts was for a “mandatory two years up to five years.” (Tr. 65.) The trial court‘s judgment entry, however, provided that Simoneau would bе “subject to a period of post-release [sic] control of: a mandatory 5 years.”
{¶ 40} The State concedes this error, asserting that although the trial court accurately advised Simoneau regarding postrelease control during the plea hearing, the trial court‘s sentencing journal entry is inconsistent with the verbal advisements given during sentencing.
{¶ 41} A trial court “is duty-bound to notify [the] offender at the sentencing hearing about postrelease control and to incorporate postrelease control into its sentencing entry.” State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 11, citing State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 22. Pursuant to
III. Conclusion
{¶ 43} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a limited resentencing for the trial court to accurately impose postrelease control and verbally notify Simoneau of the Reagan Tokes advisements as provided for and required by
It is ordered that the рarties share equally the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, in part, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for a limited resentencing hearing.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR