State v. RomeroState v. Romero
Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
OPINION
CHÁVEZ, Justice.
{1} This case is on appeal solely to determine whether it is a “pending” case for purposes of the procedural rule change announced in State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20. Savedra eliminated portions of
BACKGROUND
{2} Defendant Leonard Romero was charged with an open count of murder, contrary to
{3} On March 19, 2009, the State filed a
{4} On October 15, 2009, the State failed to appear for a pretrial conference. The State subsequently filed another
{5} Romero subsequently filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice under the six-month rule. During the hearing, Romero argued that under the six-month rule and existing case law at the time of the hearing he was not required to establish prejudice, because in his view his motion was not a speedy trial motion. Nevertheless, Romero did attempt to show prejudice, largely at the district judge‘s request. Romero pointed out that he had been kept in segregation for the past year due to the severity of the alleged crime and also argued that he had been unable to pursue a plea deal due to discovery delays and the State‘s failure to diligently pursue his case. At the conсlusion of the hearing, the district court explained that under
{6} The State appealed the order of dismissal to this Court pursuant to
THE SIX-MONTH RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO ROMERO‘S CASE BECAUSE IT WAS PENDING ON APPEAL ON MAY 12, 2010
{7} In Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, ¶¶ 2-3, this Court recently had the opportunity to clarify what we meant in Savedra, which stated that “effective for all cases pending as of the date this Opinion is filed, we withdraw the six-month rule provisions set forth in Rule 5-604(B)-(E).” Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 9. After detailing numerous policy
WITHDRAWAL OF THE SIX-MONTH RULE FOR ROMERO‘S CASE DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS AS AN EX POST FACTO LAW
{8} Romero also argues that application of Savedra to his case would deprive him of his due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions. See
{9} In Dobbert, the State of Florida pursued the death penalty against Dobbert for committing a capital felony. 432 U.S. at 287. Between the time he committed the offenses with which he was сharged and the time of his trial, Florida had changed the functions of the judge and the jury in the imposition of a death sentence. Id. at 287-88. At the time Dobbert was alleged to have committed first-degree murder, a person convicted of a capital felony was to be sеntenced to death unless a majority of the jury recommended mercy. Id. at 288. By the time of his trial the jury‘s function had changed: the jury was only authorized to recommend a sentence, leaving the ultimate decision to the judge. Id. at 290-91. Dobbert was found guilty of a capital crime. Id. at 287. The jury recommended a life sentence. Id. The judge, however, overruled the jury recommendation and sentenced him to death. Id.
{10} Dobbert contended that depriving him of the procedure in effect at the time the crime was committed would be unconstitutional because applying the new procedure would be an ex post facto law. Id. The United Stаtes Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with Dobbert, concluding that the changes in the law were procedural and that applying the new procedure in Dobbert‘s case did not constitute an ex post facto violation. Id. at 293-94. The Court reasoned that the constitutiоnal proscription against the passage of ex post facto laws did not mean that the legislature could not alter the method of procedure that does not affect
{11} In this case, the crimes for which Romero was indicted, the prescribed punishment, and the quantity and quality of proof required to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remained unaffected by our withdrawal of the six-month rule. Our retroactive withdrawal оf the six-month rule, a procedural rule, is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law under the United States Constitution.
{12} Romero next argues that the due process clause of the New Mexico Constitution, Article II, Section 18, should be interpreted more broadly than its federal counterpart because “New Mexico has expressed a much stronger distrust of retroactivity than the United States Supreme Court,” citing Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 395-97, 881 P.2d 1376, 1380-82 (1994). Romero also cites
{13} The State asserts thаt Romero still retains his right to a speedy trial, and his ability to raise the speedy trial issue in the future is sufficient to afford him due process. We agree with the State. The six-month rule was implemented to “provide the courts and the parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise.” State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 46, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The rule was not intended to supplement or supplant a defendant‘s speedy trial rights.
{14} We carefully analyzed the rationale for applying Savedra retroactively and prospectively in both Martinez and Savedra. Because we were concerned that as our jurisprudence evolved, “the six-month rule became increasingly unmoored from its constitutional and proactive origins,” we exercised our inherent power to apply the rule change in Savedra retroactively. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, ¶ 8; see also Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 632, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (1982) (“It is within the inherent power of a state‘s
{15} As the State points out, Romero has not been denied the opportunity to defend his case by pursuing dismissal on the basis that his speedy trial rights have been violated. In Savedra, although we abolished the six-month rule for cases that originated in district court, we madе it clear that a defendant could still assert that his or her right to a speedy trial was violated. In this case there was not argument, analysis, nor weighing of the speedy trial factors at the district court level as suggested by the ad hoc balancing test set forth in Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13. This balancing test includes the four factors identified in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): length of delay, reasons for delay, the defendant‘s assertion of his or her right, and any prejudice to the defendant. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13. Therefore, Romero may assert his right to a speedy trial on remand.
CONCLUSION
{16} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
{17} IT IS SO ORDERED.
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
WE CONCUR:
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
Topic Index for State v. Romero, Docket No. 32,283
AL Administrative Law and Procedure
AL-DU Due Process
AL-RU Rules
CT-DP Due Process
CT-EX Ex Post Facto
CT-ST Speedy Trial
CA Criminal Procedure
CA-DU Due Process
CA-RD Right to Speedy Trial
CA-TL Time Limitations
ST Statutes
ST-CN Constitutionality
ST-RE Retroactivity