{1} In this appeal, we are presented with the recurring issue of how our six-month rules should be administered when the State dismisses charges in magistrate court and subsequently refiles the same charges in district court. On separate occasions, Defendants Savedra, Lozano, and Yates were charged with misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) in magistrate court, and did not reach a plea agreement. In each case, the State dismissed the charges in magistrate court and refiled the cases in district court pursuant to a prosecutorial policy of the district attorney in the Fifth Judicial District, the purpose of which is to avoid duplicative trials. After more than six months had elapsed from the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court, each of the Defendants moved to dismiss their cases on the basis of a six-month rule violation. The district court granted each of the motions. The State appealed the dismissals, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a consolidated case. State v. Yates,
DISCUSSION
{2} The six-month rules that we have established for our trial courts “provide the courts and parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise.” State v. Garza,
{3} Because of this gap in the rules, a long line of appellate court opinions have sought to preserve the protections of the six-month rule by requiring the State to demonstrate that its decision to dismiss and refile was not done in bad faith to circumvent the protections of the six-month rule. See Carreon,
{4} As in Carreon, the State in these eases dismissed Defendants’ magistrate charges and refiled the same charges in district court pursuant to a policy in which the prosecutor would dismiss a case in magistrate court once it became apparent that there would be no plea agreement and then refile the same charges in district court. The State offered no other reason for the dismissals and subsequent refilings. The facts in these eases are such that the Carreon holding — that the mere existence of such a policy is insufficient to meet the State’s burden — directly applies to Defendants’ cases. Since the State did not meet its burden to show why its dismissal and refiling was done for reasons other than to circumvent the six-month rule, Defendants’ six-month rule time periods commenced with either the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and continued to run until they expired; a new six-month rule time period did not commence once the cases were refiled in district court.
{5} We agree with the Court of Appeals that a literal application of Rule 5-604(B)(1), which would grant the State a new six-month time period in which to bring the case to trial upon refiling in district court, “violatefs] the spirit of the six-month rule[.]” Yates,
{6} While affirmance is warranted in these eases, we do take note of Judge Castillo’s special concurrence in these appeals, suggesting that we re-examine the six-month rules for district and magistrate courts. In particular, Judge Castillo suggested that:
Perhaps it would be helpful for the Supreme Court to consider amending the Rules of Criminal Procedure for district courts and magistrate courts in order to explain under what circumstances the arraignment in magistrate court would remain the triggering event for application ofthe district court six-month rule and under what circumstances a new six-month rule would begin.
Yates,
{7} The Court of Appeals also expressed concerns
that [the classifications of the State’s reasons for dismissing a ease as “good” or “bad”] has unnecessarily judgmental connotations, suggesting that the focus of our analysis is whether the State has acted with a culpable state of mind and that six-month rule consequences attach only when the State has acted in bad faith or engaged in gamesmanship.
Yates,
{8} As we have previously stated, the right protected by the six-month rules is a criminal defendant’s right, not that of the State, the courts, or any other party; it is not a tool to punish the State for dismissing and refiling cases in bad faith, nor should its diminution be a reward for the State’s good behavior. Viewed in that light, the cases in which courts have conducted a “good faith-bad faith” analysis regarding the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling a case in order to determine if a new six-month time period should be granted are misguided. Instead, any inquiry into the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling in district court should be done within the context of any speedy trial challenge the defendant may raise after the ease is refiled in district court. See Garza,
{9} In light of the foregoing, we recognize the need to revise our six-month rules to incorporate our decision set forth in this Opinion. Within the context of criminal proceedings in our courts of limited jurisdiction, our six-month rules continue to serve a useful purpose. But in our district courts, the six-month rule has become an unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, effective for all cases pending as of the date this Opinion is filed, we withdraw the six-month rule provisions set forth in Rule 5-604(B)-(E). See State v. Pieri,
CONCLUSION
{10} The State failed to meet its burden to show why its dismissals and refilings were not done to circumvent the six-month rule. Thus, Defendants’ six-month rule time periods commenced with either the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and continued to run until they expired; new six-month time periods were not given to the State once the cases were refiled in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants’ cases are affirmed.
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.