{1} Thе dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a statutory amendment to NMSA 1978, Section 30-1-8 (1963, as amended through 2005), which abolished the fifteen-year statute of limitations for all capital felonies and first-degree violent felonies, applies to crimes committed before its effective date of July 1, 1997. See 1997 N.M. Laws, ch. 157, § 1 (hereinafter referred to as the 1997 amendment). Although the extension of a statute of limitations cannot revive a previously time-bаrred prosecution, Stogner v. California,
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} On July 11, 2005, Nicholas Morales (Defendant) was charged by criminal information with five counts of aggravated criminal sexual penetration on a child less than thirteen years of age contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11(0(1) (1975, prior to 1987 amendment), which is classified as a first-degree felony. The charges were based on conduct that occurred “on or between the [first] day of January, 1978, and the [thirtieth] day of December, 1985.” Defendant moved to dismiss the information on the basis of the statute of limitations in effect at the time that the crimes had been committed. Defendant claimed that the ten-year statute of limitations in effect during 1978 and 1979, and the fifteen-year statute of limitations in effect between 1980 and 1982, had expired prior to the effective date of the 1997 amendment and, therefore, the charges based on this conduct must be dismissed. Defendant further argued that the remaining charges must be dismissed because the Legislature had not intended for the 1997 amendment abolishing the statute of limitations to apply retroactively to crimes committed before its effective date. Alternatively, Defendant argued that retroactive application of the 1997
{3} The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss concluding, in relevant part, that
a. The New Mexico State Legislature extended the controlling statute of limitations on all alleged offenses by a series of amendments;
b. The legislative amendments/extensions occurred in every instance before the statute of limitations expired for the Defendant’s alleged criminal conduct;
c. Such amendments do not constitute an Ex Post Facto Law under either the Federal or New Mexico Constitution.
(Footnote omitted.) However, the trial court recognized that its conclusion “involve[d] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion” and that “[a]n immediate appeal ... may materially advance the ultimatе termination of the litigation, as well as [provide] guidance to other courts and districts around the state.” Accordingly, the trial court certified the issue for interlocutory review pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(A)(3) (1972).
{4} The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Morales,
{5} We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B) (1972) and Rule 12-502 NMRA to determine “[w]hether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 1997 elimination of the statute of limitations did not aрply to first-degree-felony charges on which the prior statute of limitations had not yet expired.” State v. Morales,
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the Legislature Intended the 1997 Amendment to Apply to Unexpired Crimes Committed Before Its Effective Date
{6} The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the Legislature intended the 1997 amendment to abolish the statute of limitations applicable to capital felonies and first-degree violent felonies for which the limitations period had not yet expired as of the amendment’s effective date of July 1, 1997. Thus, we are presented with an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. State v. Nozie,
Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In doing so, we examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object аnd purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish. We must take care to avoid adoption of a construction that would render the statute’s application absurd or unreasonable or lead to injustice or contradiction.
State v. Nick R.,
{7} Section 30-1-8, in its original form, imposed a ten-year statute of limitations on all capital felonies and first-degree felonies. 1963 N.M. Laws, ch. 303, §§ 1-8. In 1979, the Legislature extended the limitation period from ten years to fifteen years. 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 5, § 1. In 1997, the Legislature
{8} The language of the 1997 amendment does not indicate whether the Legislaturе intended the statute to apply to crimes committed before its effective date. Cf. State v. Kerby,
{9} “Although the presumption оf prospectivity appears straightforward, confusion often arises as to what retroactivity means in particular contexts.” Gadsden Fed’n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 1996—NMCA-069, ¶ 14,
A statute or regulation is considered retroactive if it impairs vested rights acquired under prior law or requires new obligations, imposes new duties, or affixes new disabilities to past transactions. However, a statute does not operate retroactively merely because some of the facts or conditions which are relied upon existed prior to the enactment.
Howell v. Heim,
the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates “retroactively” comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event____[F]amiliar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance.
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
{10} Criminal statutes of limitation “represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; they are made for the repose of society and the protection of those who may (during the limitation) ... have lost their means of defence.” United States v. Marion,
measures of public policy only. They are entirely subject to the will of the Legislature, and may be changed or repealed altogether in any case where a right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the [original] period of limitation. Such a statute is an act of grace in criminal prosecutions. The State makes no contract with criminals at the time of the passage of acts of limitations that they shall have immunity from punishment if not prosecuted within the statutory period.
People v. Isaacs,
{11} Because a defendant does not have a vested interest in an unexpired statute of limitation, a lеgislative amendment extending or abolishing the limitation period does not impair vested rights, require new obligations, impose new duties, or affix new disabilities to past transactions. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, Defendant’s
acts were not legal when they were committed, he is subject to no greater punishment as a result of the 1997 amendment than he would have been had he been charged earlier, and the statute of limitаtions defense was not yet available in 1997 for any crimes committed after July 1, 1982.
Morales,
{12} Our conclusion is supported by New Mexico case law holding that, in the civil context, statutory amendments to unexpired statutes of limitation generally are not “retroactive because [they do] not apply to any vested or substantive right.” Grygorwicz,
{13} We recognize that criminal statutes of limitation, unlike civil statutes of limitation, are “to be liberally construed in favor of a defendant because their purpose ‘is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certаin fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.’ ” State v. Kerby,
{14} The language and history of the 1997 amendment plainly manifest the Legislature’s intent to ensure that the most serious crimes, i.e., capital felonies and first-degree violent felonies, do not escape prosecution based on a mere lapse of time between the commission of the offense and the commencement of prosecution. Given the object and purpose of the 1997 amendment,
we can conceive of no logical reason why the legislature would not have intended for [the] new limitation period to apply to all offenses that were not previously time barred under the original provision. Put differently, it is unreasonable to presume that the legislature would have intended that the exact same crimes shall be subject to different limitation periods merely because of the fortuity that one defendant committed the crime the day before the enactment of the amendment to the limitation period while another defendant committed the identical crime the day after the enactment of that amendment.
Skakel,
{15} We note that the vast majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question before us likewise have held that statutory amendments to unexpired statutes of limitation dо not affect vested substantive rights and, therefore, apply to criminal conduct committed before the amendment’s effective date. See, e.g., State v. Gum,
{16} Despite the overwhelming weight of authority, Defendant argues that pursuant to Kerby, the “statute of limitations is a substantive right.”
{17} In Kerby, the applicable statute of limitations had expired and, therefore, the defendant’s right to be free from criminal prosecution had fully vested. Under these circumstances, the statute of limitations defense is a substantive right and subsequent statutory amendments cannot be “applied to revive [the] previously time-barred prosecution.” Stogner,
{18} We conclude that the crimes committed by Defendant after July 1, 1982 are not time-barred under Section 30-l-8(H). In this case, we are not presented with the question of whether the prosecution of these crimes may be barred by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. “While the statutes of limitation provide the primary protection against delay-induced prejudice ... the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment provides additional, albeit limited, protection against improper preaccusation delay.” Gonzales v. State,
B. Scope of Our Grant of Certiorari
{19} Defendant claims, in his answer brief, that application of the 1997 amendment to unexpired criminal conduct violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 10; N.M. Const, art. II, § 19. However, our grant of certiorari is limited to the question of legislative intent, namely, whether the Legislature intended the 1997 amendment to apply to unexpired crimes committed before its effective date. Defendant did not seek and, therefore, we did not grant certiorari review of the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the ex post facto clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. See Rule 12-502(F) (permitting any party to file a conditional cross-petition for certiorari, “to be considered only if the Court grants the petition [for writ of certiorari]”). “Under the appellаte rules, it is improper for this Court to consider any questions except those set forth in the petition for certiorari.” State v. Sewell,
III. CONCLUSION
{20} We conclude that the 1997 amendment, which abolished the statute of limitations for all capital felonies and first-degree violent felonies, applies to unexpired criminal conduct committed before the amendment’s effective date of July 1, 1997. Because the
{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.