State v. RogersState v. Rogers
Decided: November 18, 2022
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Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Felice L. Harris, for appellant.
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OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is a consolidated appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas which, following entry of guilty pleas, found appellant guilty of involuntary manslaughter and robbery and sentenced him to an aggregate prison term
I. Background
{¶ 2} On August 13, 2020, an Erie County Grand Jury indicted defendant-appellant, Ravon “Tay” Rogers, on one count of murder, a violation of
{¶ 3} The record contains the following relevant facts. In the early hours of July 23, 2020, appellant went to the home of his mother and the victim, his stepfather, in Sandusky, Erie County, Ohio, and drew the victim outside the home to talk. The victim suffered from heart problems well-known by his family. Appellant confronted the victim to give him “something” taken from him, either marijuana or $800 in cash, which the victim denied owing appellant. Appellant proceeded to severely beat the victim with a blunt object, believed to be a baseball bat, and left the victim on the ground with 20
{¶ 4} Through the assistance of neighbors, the victim called 9-1-1 and implicated appellant with the beating he received. An ambulance was summoned, and the responding police officer interviewed the victim while they waited for the ambulance. The victim again implicated appellant with the beating.
{¶ 5} The ambulance transported the victim to a local hospital, but his condition deteriorated rapidly and could not be interviewed further by law enforcement prior to his death. The victim died two days later from traumatic pneumothorax, described at sentencing as lung collapse, and catecholamine storm, described as cardiac arrhythmia. In the course of the investigation, appellant repeatedly insisted to law enforcement that he was not present at the home or, alternatively, acted in self-defense from the victim‘s unprovoked attack on him.
{¶ 7} The trial court received additional briefing on sentencing matters related to appellant‘s recommended sentencing range for seven to 10 years and appellant‘s questioning the constitutionality of
The Court finds that the appropriate sentence on Count 1, felony of the first degree, the Court imposes the * * * maximum sentence of 11 years; on Count 2, the maximum sentence of 8 years. The Court finds that consecutive sentence is necessary, that‘s 19 years, and, of course, under Reagan Tokes, 5 and a half years onto that for the felony of the first degree makes the sentence to be 19 years to * * * 24 and a half years.
{¶ 8} The trial court‘s August 13 journalized sentencing entry states, among other matters,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, based on the foregoing that: Defendant having been found guilty as to the following: Count #1 Involuntary Manslaughter – As Amended, Felony 1, in violation of
O.R.C. § 2903.04(A) /(C) . * * * Defendant is sentenced to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation andCorrection to be imprisoned and confined for a Minimum Prison term of 11 years to the Maximum Prison term of 24 years 6 months (Reagan Tokes law); Count #2 Robbery, Felony 2, in violation of (Emphasis sic.) O.R.C. § 2911.02(A)(2) /(B) . * * * Defendant is sentenced to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to be imprisoned and confined for a definite sentence of 8 years of which is Mandatory 0. * * * The Prison sentence imposed in this case is 19 years to 24 years 6 months of which 0 is Mandatory. * * * The Qualifying Offenses(s) are Count(s) #1, 2. The 11 years prison term is the Minimum Prison Term (Specifications not included). The 19 years prison term is the Aggregated Minimum Prison Term (combination of all consecutive indefinite minimum and definite terms). The 24 years 6 months prison term is the Maximum Prison Term (Specifications & PRC time not included). (Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 9} Appellant then timely filed this appeal setting forth four assignments of error:
I. The trial court plainly erred in failing to merge Mr. Rogers‘s convictions for Involuntary Manslaughter and Robbery.
II. Ravon Rogers‘s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made in violation of the Ohio and United States Constitution.
III. Mr. Rogers‘s sentence is contrary to law and fails to comply with R.C. 2929.14 andR.C. 2929.144 .IV. The Reagan Tokes Act is unconstitutional as it impermissibly violates the Separation of Powers doctrine and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
II. Felony Sentencing
{¶ 10} The essence of all four assignments of error challenge, as contrary to law, different aspects of appellant‘s felony sentence, which we will address out of order.
Reviewing the imposition of a felony sentence, we use the standard set forth in
State v. Printke, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1233, 2022-Ohio-2981, ¶ 10. A sentence is “contrary to law” when imposed by a trial court “based on factors or considerations that
{¶ 11} As discussed below, we do not find clearly and convincingly appellant‘s felony sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
A. Merger of Guilty Pleas
{¶ 12} Appellant‘s first assignment of error argues the trial court‘s failure to merge his guilty pleas and to issue a concurrent sentence term of seven to ten years constituted plain error as a matter of law, citing State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 13. Appellant argues the record contains “no specific facts * * * that the robbery was committed with separate conduct, animus, or import” as involuntary manslaughter because: (1) his purpose, or animus, did not change during the course of his actions; (2) there was only one victim, whose pre-existing poor health issues were “precipitating factors that led to his death“; and (3) any physical harm to the victim only occurred after the victim refused to return what appellant believed the victim owed. We disagree.
{¶ 13} Plain error is an error affecting substantial rights. State v. Scott, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1128, 2022-Ohio-2071, ¶ 21. We follow a three-step process to determine whether the trial court committed plain error: (1) the existence of an error, i.e.,
{¶ 14} We review the alleged error in light of all admitted evidence and will reverse only in the exceptional circumstance to prevent a miscarriage of justice, i.e., that but-for the error, the outcome of the proceedings clearly would have been different. State v. Page, 2018-Ohio-2866, 117 N.E.3d 874, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.) (there must be a reasonable probability the error prejudicially affected the outcome of the trial); State v. Sneed, 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 10, 584 N.E.2d 1160 (1992) (notice of Crim.R. 52(B) plain error requires the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice). As we discuss below, we find no plain error as a matter of law with respect to appellant‘s unmerged, consecutive sentences.
{¶ 15} Merger is a sentencing question, and the defendant bears the burden to establish that
{¶ 16} We agree that
{¶ 17} “Under
{¶ 18} Further, Roger‘s rather inartful argument raised for the first time before this court that the victim died from pre-existing poor health issues will not be addressed.
{¶ 19} Upon de novo review, we do not find clearly and convincingly the trial court‘s determination under
{¶ 20} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 21} Appellant asserts as his third assignment of error that his sentence is contrary to law and fails to comply with
{¶ 22} In support of his claim in this assignment of error, appellant subdivides his argument into two issues. The first issue claims that the trial court erred in failing to impose an indefinite sentence with stated minimum terms pursuant to
{¶ 23} In this case, appellant was sentenced as follows:
1.) On the Involuntary Manslaughter Count #1charge ordered to serve a Minimum Prison term of 11 years to the Maximum Prison term of 24 years 6 months (Reagan Tokes law);
2.) On Count #2 Robbery, Felony 2, in violation of (Emphasis sic.)
O.R.C. § 2911.02(A)(2) /(B) . * * * Defendant is sentenced to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to be imprisoned and confined for a definite sentence of 8 years of which is Mandatory 0. * *
The court went on to impose these sentences consecutive to each other and therefore concluded that the total sentence imposed was 19 years to 24 years 6 months of which 0 is Mandatory. * * * The Qualifying Offenses(s) are Count(s) #1, 2. The 11 years prison term is the Minimum Prison Term (Specifications not included). The 19 years prison term is the Aggregated Minimum Prison Term (combination of all
{¶ 24} Appellant asserts that the judgment entry does not reflect the trial court‘s pronouncement when the court stated:
“The Court finds that the appropriate sentence on Count 1, felony of the first degree, the Court imposes the min – the maximum sentence of 11 years; on Count 2, the maximum sentence of 8 years. The Court finds that consecutive sentence is necessary, that‘s 19 years, and of course, under the Reagan Tokes, 5 and a half years onto that for the felony of the first degree makes the sentences to be 19 years and 24 ha – 24 and a half years.”
{¶ 25} Appellant pled guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{¶ 26} At both the July 12 and July 16 plea hearings, appellant heard the methodology leading to 19 to 24 and one-half years as the potential, indefinite, maximum sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law, if both felonies were made consecutive. The identical information of 19 to 24 and a half years became the indefinite, maximum sentence, and it was relayed at both the August 12 sentencing hearing and in the August 13 journalized sentencing judgment entry.
{¶ 27} We do not find clearly and convincingly that the sentencing “math” employed by the trial court is otherwise contrary to law. The trial court‘s sentence is within the statutory ranges authorized by the Ohio General Assembly for appellant‘s offenses, and we do not find any trial court error by adhering to the authorized statutory ranges. State v. Moore, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1033, 2021-Ohio-3995, ¶ 19.
{¶ 28} Despite appellant‘s protestations, the trial court‘s reference to a “maximum sentence of 8 years” for Count no. Two, a second-degree felony, is also a correct reference to the maximum of the range, from a minimum of two years to a maximum of eight years, of that portion of his sentencing “math,” i.e., the “flat time” which is the “stated minimum time” pursuant to
{¶ 29} In sentencing a defendant to a consecutive sentence for multiple crimes where at least one is subject to an indefinite sentence, a court is required to add all of the indefinite and definite terms that are to be served consecutively and then [under
{¶ 30} Therefore, we find no merit in appellant‘s argument that the trial court failed to impose a minimum sentence under the statutory scheme.
{¶ 31} The second issue raised by appellant in support of his third assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to make the requisite findings pursuant to
{¶ 32} That section states:
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
2929.16 ,2929.17 , or2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct.
(c) The offender‘s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 33} Thus,
{¶ 34} Although a “word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required,” a reviewing court must be able to discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis, and to determine that the record contains evidence to support the trial
{¶ 35} In imposing appellant‘s sentence, the trial court relevantly stated the following at sentencing: “First, it has to look at the need to protect the public from future crimes by this Defendant; then it has to look to punish the Defendant for his activity; then it as to look at deterring that Defendant from doing it again and deterring others in the community from doing that again or future crimes like that.”
{¶ 36} The court further stated:
Now, let‘s look at your past record. You have adjudications for delinquency in Juvenile Court back in ‘97 and ‘98.
2001, disorderly conduct.
2001 assault. Victims listed there. You received community control sanctions for that offense.
2002, aggravated burglary. Victims listed there. You received community control sanctions for that. It was revoked and the prison sentence imposed.
2002, drug abuse
2004, complicity to commit trafficking in cocaine and preparation of cocaine for sale. You received a prison sentence for that.
2004, disorderly conduct.
2008, disorderly conduct.
2011, intoxication.
2011, disorderly conduct.
2011, non-support. You received community sanctions for that and were terminated off of community sanctions, which is probation, unsuccessfully.
2013, drug abuse and drug paraphernalia and open container.
2014, trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine. You received a prison sentence for that.
2015, disorderly conduct.
{¶ 37} The court then went on to list the numerous misdemeanor offenses for which appellant had been convicted.
{¶ 38} It is obvious from the record that the trial court did engage in an analysis required pursuant to
The Court read through the numerous injuries; abrasions and contusions to the back of the neck, the head, the upper back, forearms, hands, arterial chest wall, right thigh, both legs; fracture of ribs 7 and 9 of the right posterior lateral aspect; right lung with a lobe contusion; fractures of the left distal ulna and right fourth phalange; extensive soft tissue swelling; intramuscular hemorrhages. The Court read through all that. * * * Was the Defendant‘s relationship with the victim, did it facilitate the offense. No doubt. This man died as a result of what you did. That makes it more serious than not serious.
{¶ 39} Thus, the court in fact specifically considered whether consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct and to the danger that the offender poses to the public.
{¶ 40} Thereafter, the court needed to find only one of the
{¶ 42} Furthermore, the judgment entry states, “This Court finds Consecutive sentences are applicable based upon factors in
{¶ 43} Although the better course would have been for the trial court to have been more specific in its sentencing judgment entry to reflect the statements made at the sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, we find that the sentencing judgment entry reflects that the trial court did engage in an analysis required pursuant to
{¶ 44} We therefore find appellant‘s third assignment of error to be without merit.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 45} In support of his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in accepting his guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and robbery because of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. Appellant argues his two guilty pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he did not agree to consecutive sentences, yet his trial counsel stipulated that appellant will serve consecutive sentences. As a result, his trial counsel‘s plea advice fell below legal standards because the stipulation relating to consecutive sentences was neither required by, nor warranted by, the facts. We disagree.
{¶ 47} To overcome this presumption of competence, appellant had the burden to show: (1) deficient performance by his trial counsel below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) a reasonable probability of prejudice that but for his trial counsel‘s errors the outcome would have been different, i.e., he would have gone to trial on four felony counts and not have entered guilty pleas to one original felony, one reduced felony, and dismissal of the third and fourth original felonies. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. In making a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court considers the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Id. at 695.
{¶ 48} Appellant‘s two guilty pleas are admissions of committing the crimes charged against the defendant and consent to entry of judgment without a trial.
{¶ 49} Appellant blames his guilty pleas on deficient consecutive sentencing advice from his trial counsel. A defendant entering a plea in a criminal case must do so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and the failure of any one element renders enforcement of that plea unconstitutional. State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 10. The three-part inquiry on appeal is: “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of [
{¶ 50} We will first address appellant‘s argument that his trial counsel‘s plea advice between the July 12 and July 16 hearings, when the Earley stipulation was added, deprived him of “the benefit of an allied offenses argument.” However, appellant‘s trial
{¶ 51} The issue of consecutive sentences arose at the July 12 plea hearing, when appellee stated on the record, without objection, the “possible sentence * * * maximum sentence would be 19 to 24 and a half years * * *, if the Court was so inclined, that consecutive sentences would be appropriate or it‘s within the rights of the Court to do that. In other words, it‘s not barred by law.”
{¶ 52} The consecutive sentencing stipulation was then raised during the July 16 plea hearing. The trial court announced, “It is also my understanding that as part of the negotiated plea agreement, that the parties agree and/or stipulate that the [sic] consecutive sentence may be imposed by the Court pursuant to Ohio Supreme Court case, State v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281.” The lack of consent to mandating consecutive sentences specifically arose later regarding appellant‘s written plea agreement:
Court: On page 3 of 5, counsel, under the recommended sentence, it says, number two: If the recommended sentence requires imposition of consecutive sentence, I agree to the imposition of a consecutive sentence, I agree to the imposition of that sentence, waive any statutory -- there‘s no requirement, and I don‘t think he‘s waiving the review –
Prosecutor: Correct.
Court: -- because there‘s no agreed consecutive. I think the State‘s arguing consecutive or maybe asserting that, and the victims maybe, but I don‘t think there‘s a recommendation of that, correct?
Trial Counsel: Correct, Your Honor.
Prosecutor: Right.
Court: So I‘m going to put N, slash, A for that one. Okay. At this point, Mr. Rogers, one last time. Before I accept your plea, do you have any questions of this Court at all, sir?
A: No, sir.
{¶ 53} The parties are free to present stipulations to the court, where a stipulation is a voluntary agreement concerning the disposition of a relevant point to a matter that obviates the need for proof of that point. State v. Martin, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-01-1214, 2002 WL 597332, *2 (Apr. 19, 2002). However, the record shows appellant‘s trial counsel did not stipulate either to consecutive sentences or, alternatively, to nonmerger of the offenses, and the stipulation is not a part of the trial court‘s sentencing judgment entry. Even if appellant‘s trial counsel had stipulated that Earley mandated the trial court to impose consecutive sentences, that stipulation did not prejudice appellant because a stipulation to a legal conclusion or what the law requires is not binding on the trial court. Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Pro-Net Financial, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-726, ¶ 26.
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty * * *, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
I‘m going to ask you some questions. They‘re not designed to trick you or confuse you. They‘re designed so you understand the ramifications of your plea and this Court can determine if that plea is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given. If during these proceedings you don‘t understand my questions or you‘re confused, get your attorney‘s attention or mine so we can make sure you understand what‘s happening.
{¶ 56} Appellant assented on the record. The trial court asked appellant, “You heard the plea agreement here today. Do you have any questions about that?” Appellant answered, “No.” The trial court then asked appellant, “Do you understand the nature of the charges you‘re pleading guilty to?” Appellant answered, “Yes.” Later, the trial court asked appellant, “Has there been anything said off the record, outside of the Courtroom, about this plea agreement you think this Judge should know about?” Appellant answered, “No, sir.” The trial court asked appellant, “Did anyone promise you, offer you, or guarantee you anything in exchange for this plea?” Appellant answered, “No.” The trial court asked appellant, “Did anyone force you, coerce you, threaten you, or place you under duress in entering this plea?” Appellant answered, “No.”
{¶ 58} We do not find ineffective assistance by appellant‘s trial counsel. Appellant‘s
{¶ 59} Appellant‘s second assignment of error is not well-taken.
R.C. 2967.271
{¶ 60} In support of his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion challenging the constitutionality of
This court has recently addressed the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. In Stenson, rejecting the argument that the ODRC‘s ability to rebut the presumptive minimum sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine, we found that like the discretionary system of parole and postrelease control controlled by the parole board and found constitutional, the ODRC has the ability to extend the minimum sentence of a defendant up to but not exceeding the maximum sentence that was imposed by the court. Next, we agreed that due process rights are implicated by the liberty interest created by the presumption that the offender serve the stated minimum prison term. However, we concluded that
{¶ 61} We do not find clearly and convincingly appellant‘s sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Appellant‘s fourth assignment of error is well-taken, in part.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 62} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
State of Ohio v. Ravon Q. Rogers E-21-027, E-21-031
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ____________________________ JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J. CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.