State v. RidderState v. Ridder
{¶1} Defеndant-appellant Samuel Ridder moved in with S.W.‘s mother shortly after S.W. was born. For the first few years, the three lived in Kentucky with S.W.‘s older brother. Shortly after S.W.‘s mother gave birth to another child, the family moved to Delhi. According to testimony by S.W. at trial, Ridder, on several occasions, both in her bedroom and his bedroom, had placed his fingers in her vagina and her anus, licked her privates, made her rub his penis with her hand, and put his penis in her mouth. S.W.‘s mother had been unaware of Ridder‘s conduct at the time of the incidents, which had occurred when S.W. was between four and five years old.
{¶2} After a domestic-violence incident, S.W.‘s mother took the children and left the home. After staying briеfly with S.W.‘s maternal grandfather, S.W.‘s mother took the children with her to stay in a domestic-violence shelter in Circleville, Ohio. After staying at the shelter for a few weeks, S.W. disclosed the incidents to her mother. Her mother took S.W. to the Center for Family Safety and Healing at the Nationwide Children‘s Hospital in Columbus (“Center“). The Center operаtes under the same guidelines and protocols as the Mayerson Center for Safe and Healthy Children at the Cincinnati Children‘s Hospital Medical Center (“Mayerson Center“). S.W. was interviewed by Jennifer Westgate, a licensed social worker. After the interview, during which she disclosed some of the conduct and indicated that it had hаppened “in Kentucky,” S.W. was examined and treated by physicians with the hospital. Additionally, staff members from the Center contacted the Delhi Police Department.
{¶3} Detective Joe Macaluso contacted Ridder and asked him to appear for an interview. In the interview, Ridder denied the allegations. After сoncluding the
{¶4} At trial, Ridder‘s trial counsel pursued two separate theories of the case. Counsel‘s first theory was that her mother had coached S.W. to make the allegations in order to secure the family‘s stаy at a domestic-violence shelter in Circleville. Counsel‘s second approach to the case involved convincing the jury that the incidents occurred in Kentucky, based on what S.W. had said in her interview with Westgate.
{¶5} Ridder was found guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Ridder to life in prison without parole for each of the rape convictions, and to 18 months in prison for the GSI. Neither the transcript of the proceedings nor the sentencing entry explicitly states whether the life sentences were to be served consecutively or concurrently.
The Admission of S.W.‘s Interview
Was Not Plain Error
{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Ridder claims that the trial court erred by allowing the statе to play the video recording of S.W.‘s interview with Westgate to the
{¶7}
{¶8} In determining whether a child‘s statements were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, the Lukacs court noted that the inquiry “depends upon the facts of the particular case” and the factors to be examined include (1) the nature of the questioning—whether the interviewer asked leading or suggestive questions; (2) whether the child had a reason to lie; (3) whether the child understood the need to tell the truth; (4) the age of the child at the time the statements were made; and (5) whether the child‘s statements were consistent. Lukacs at ¶ 7.
{¶9} Our application of the facts in this case to the considerations set forth in Lukacs cause us to conclude that the statements were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Westgate did not ask leading or suggestive questions, S.W. had no reason to lie, Westgate impressed upon her the need to tell the truth, her responses
Prosecutorial Misconduct
{¶10} In his second assignment of error, Robinson claims that the trial prosecutor engaged in misconduct through both a series of leading questions and a series of cоmments made during closing argument. Again, counsel failed to object to any of the cited instances. Of the five page citations listed by Ridder that he claims contained leading questions, none of them were related to key testimony about the incidents referenced in the indictment. These five, isolated instances—in a trial thаt lasted several days and from a transcript that contained over 1200 pages—did not affect the outcome of the trial, and therefore, do not constitute plain error.
{¶11} As for the comments made during closing argument, none of them were improper. The test for prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is whеther the comments were improper and prejudicial to the accused‘s substantial rights. State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 439, 2003-Ohio-4164, 793 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 44, citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). In determining whether a prosecutor‘s remarks during closing argument were prejudicial, we must consider “the effect the misconduct had on the jury in the context of the entire trial.” State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 410, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993).
{¶12} In this case, the statements made by the prosecutor were fair comments on the evidence and argument of defense counsel. They did not so adversely affect the jury, within the context of the entire trial, that Ridder can now show prejudice. Pointing
{¶13} Finding no prosecutorial misconduct, we overrule Ridder‘s second assignment of error.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶14} In his third assignment of error, Ridder claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a
{¶15} To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant generally has to demonstrate that counsel‘s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Prejudice results when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessiоnal errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bradley at 142.
{¶16} Ridder first argues that it was ineffective for trial counsel to fail to make a
{¶18} Additionally, counsel argued that S.W.‘s mother had coached her in order to stay in the domestic-violence shelter in Circleville. The only evidence of coaching that counsel wаs able to develop came from the phrasing of a couple of S.W.‘s statements in the recording, and he referred to it repeatedly during his closing argument. Without the recording, counsel would not have had any direct evidence of coaching.
{¶19} While these two strategies ultimately proved unsuccessful, that doеs not mean that they were not sound trial strategies based on the case counsel had to defend. Even “debatable” trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 146. And trial counsel‘s strategy was far from debatable, being likely his best argument for acquittal based on the evidence presented by the state.
{¶20} Finally, Ridder argues that it was ineffective for trial counsel to fail to object to the statements and comments made by the prosecutor. But none of the statements were improper. And merely failing to object to a few leading questions is not ineffective assistance. There is value, from a trial-strategy perspective, to not objecting to every de minimis violation during the course of a trial. See State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 168; State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (1988). The fact-finder may perceive objections to be disruptive and annoying, and an objection may draw unwanted attention to an issue that might pass without the jury‘s notice absent the objection. See State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 53, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994); State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-Ohio-4836, 873 N.E.2d 828, ¶ 90. As a result, “comрetent counsel may reasonably hesitate to object in the jury‘s presence.” Campbell at 53.
{¶21} This reasoning goes for objections during closing arguments as well. A reasonable attorney may decide not to interrupt his opponent‘s closing argument. State v. Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 339, 738 N.E.2d 1178 (2000). In addition, Ridder has failed to demonstrate that, but for these comments and the leаding questions, the outcome would have been different. See Bradley at 142.
{¶22} Since Ridder has failed to show that a
Sufficiency/Weight
{¶23} Ridder‘s fourth assignment of error is that his convictions were based on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether thе state presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). On the other hand, when reviewing whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must determine
{¶24} S.W.‘s testimony was enough to establish the еlements of all four rape counts and the GSI count. She testified that it hurt when he put his finger in her, that he would “wiggle” his finger when it was inside her, and that she knew that he had put his finger inside her because he had “opened” her and she could feel it. She described his penis as a “fat noodle” with a hole at the end, and said that he would “wiggle” it when hе put it in her mouth. She said that it tasted “nasty” and that she would gargle with water afterward to get rid of the taste. As the trial court noted, her testimony went far beyond what a then seven-year-old girl would have been able to discuss—even with “coaching.”
{¶25} And, while S.W. said that the events occurred in Kentucky when interviewed by Westgate, at trial the state was careful to ask her only about things that happened in the Delhi home. And, based on the testimony about where the family had lived on different dates, it was clear that the events that S.W. described had occurred in Hamilton County, Ohio. The fact that S.W.‘s mother was addicted to and actively using heroin, cocaine, and presсription pain pills, and was a chronic liar does not change this. And while Ridder points to the fact that there was no physical evidence to establish the claims, both a doctor from the Mayerson Center and Detective Macaluso testified that the lack of physical evidence is actually common in this tyрe of case.
{¶26} The state presented sufficient evidence to prove that, on at least two occasions, Ridder had digitally penetrated S.W.‘s vagina or anus, forced S.W. to perform fellatio on him, engaged in cunnilingus with S.W., and forced S.W. to grab his penis with her hand. This was sufficient to establish the four counts of rape and оne count of GSI of
Ridder was Properly Sentenced to Life
Without Parole
{¶27} Finally, Ridder argues that the trial court imposed “excessive consecutive prison terms without make the requisite Ohio statutory sentencing findings.” We disagree.
{¶28} Ridder first argues that the trial court imposed the maximum sentences on each count without properly considering the purposes and principles of sentencing or any of the factors set forth in
{¶29} The court was not required to make findings or to give reasons for imposing the maximum term of confinement. See White at ¶ 8 (noting that 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86, Section 2 repealed statutory provisions requiring findings for maximum sentences). Nor was the court required to make findings concerning the
{¶30} Ridder next argues that the trial court did not comply with
{¶31} As Ridder has demonstrated no error in the imposition of the sentences he received in this matter, we overrule his fifth assignment of error.
Conclusion
{¶32} Having considered and overruled all five of Ridder‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Cunningham, P.J., and DeWine, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.