State v. RhoadsState v. Rhoads
Susan M. Zurface Daniels, Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellant.
James B. Grandey, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith C. Brewster, III, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellee.
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Appellant appeals from his conviction and sentence by the Highland County Court of Common Pleas, after a jury found him guilty of forgery, in violation of
FACTS
{¶2} Appellant, David Rhoads, and Christina Sears have known each other and been friends for ten years. In the spring of 2007, Christina Sears unlawfully came into possession of several checks belonging to her uncle, William Blakey. On two different occasions, Appellant assisted in the cashing of these checks on Sears’ behalf. First, on March 28, 2007, Appellant, along with another unidentified woman, not Sears, entered Bolte‘s Grocery.1 The woman accompanying Appellant possessed check number 232 in the amount of $300.00, which had purportedly been made out to Bolte‘s and signed by Blakey with a note that it was “for golf cart.” Although the store clerk did not know the woman who presented the check,
{¶3} The very next day, Appellant entered Bolte‘s with another of Mr. Blakey‘s checks, numbered 224 and dated March 29, 2007, in the amount of $200.00. A note in the memo line indicated the check was written “for working.” Upon presenting the check to the owner of Bolte‘s Grocery, Appellant was asked to endorse the check, which he did, in his own name. Bolte‘s proceeded to cash that check as well. Sears testified that Appellant did not keep that money but instead gave it to her.
{¶4} The next week, on April 9, 2007, Appellant drove Sears through a U.S. Bank drive through in Hillsboro in order to cash another of Blakey‘s checks. This time, the check was written to Sears “for labor” and Sears signed the back of the check and sent her ID along with the check through the drive-through window. Because the bank had been previously notified by Mr. Blakey that his checks had been stolen, the bank notified the police, which promptly arrived at the bank and arrested Sears for forgery and receiving stolen property.
{¶5} Although Sears initially denied any wrongdoing, she later confessed to forging the checks. She maintained, however, that her cousin had stolen the checks from her uncle and that Appellant was unaware that
{¶6} Appellant denied the charges and the matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 9, 2008. In support of its case, the State called several witnesses including, William Blakey (Sears’ uncle and owner of the checks), William Bolte (owner of Bolte‘s Grocery who testified regarding the cashing of check number 224), Christina Sears (who claimed to have been best friends with Appellant for ten years), Betty Suiter (Bolte‘s clerk who cashed check number 232), as well as Officers Terrell and Salyers (who testified regarding Sear‘s initial denial of wrongdoing and subsequent confession).
{¶7} At the close of the State‘s case, Appellant moved for acquittal pursuant to
{¶8} The matter was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict of guilt on the remaining counts of forgery and receiving stolen property. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to serve nine months on each count, to be served consecutively. It is from this conviction and sentence that Appellant now brings his timely appeal, assigning the following errors for our review.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT‘S
II. THE VERIDICTS FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF FORGERY IN VIOLATION OF
III. THE VERDICTS FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF FORGERY IN VIOLATION OF
{¶9} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his
{¶10} At the close of the State‘s case-in-chief, Appellant moved for a
{¶11} The sufficiency of the evidence test “raises a question of law and does not allow us to weigh the evidence.” Smith at ¶ 34, citing State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Instead, the sufficiency of the evidence test “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact [to fairly] resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id., citing Jackson, supra, at 319. This court will “reserve the issues of the weight given to the evidence and the credibility of witnesses for the trier of fact.” Id., citing State v. Thomas (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 79-80, 434 N.E.2d 1356; State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶12} Appellant was charged and convicted of forgery, in violation of
“(A) No person, with purpose to defraud, or knowing that the person is facilitating a fraud, shall do any of the following:
* * *
(3) Utter, or possess with purpose to utter, any writing that the person knows to have been forged.” (Emphasis added).
{¶13} Likewise,
{¶15} The State presented testimony regarding Appellant‘s long relationship with Sears, spanning approximately ten years. Further, the State presented testimony that Appellant assisted Sears in cashing not one, but two, checks. Although the charges with regard to the first check that was cashed were dismissed, the circumstances surrounding the cashing of that check are relevant to Appellant‘s state of mind at the time and create an inference in favor of the State‘s argument that Appellant had knowledge that both checks had been forged and were stolen. For instance, although the charges with respect to the cashing of check number 232 were dismissed, the
{¶16} The State further introduced testimony at trial that on the very next day Appellant entered Bolte‘s once again with a check he received from Sears. This time, Appellant cashed the check himself, even endorsing the back of the check at the request of the owner of Bolte‘s. The State argued that such conduct created an inference that because Appellant had gotten away with cashing the check the day before, he was more confident with regard to the cashing of check number 224.
{¶17} Based upon the trial testimony and construing that testimony in favor of the State, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found that Appellant either knew or had reason to believe that the check he was cashing for Sears was both forged and obtained through commission of a theft offense. Because Appellant only challenges the knowledge element of the crimes for which he was convicted, he apparently concedes that the State proved the other elements of the offenses charged. Consequently, after
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
{¶18} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that his convictions for forgery and receiving stolen property were against the manifest weight of the evidence. “The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. Sufficiency is a test of the adequacy of the evidence, while “[w]eight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other[.]’ ” State v. Sudderth, Lawrence App. No. 07CA38, 2008-Ohio-5115, at ¶ 27, quoting Thompkins at 387.
{¶19} “Even when sufficient evidence supports a verdict, we may conclude that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the test under the manifest weight standard is much broader than that for sufficiency of the evidence.” Smith at ¶ 41. When determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence,
{¶20} As with his first assignment of error, Appellant only challenges the State‘s proof with regard to his mental state under this assignment of error. As such, we limit our analysis to whether the jury‘s determination that Appellant acted with knowledge in committing forgery and receiving stolen property was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶22} The State counters by correctly pointing out that the reasoning of State v. Kulig, supra, on the issue of the weight to be afforded to circumstantial evidence, was overruled by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Jenks, supra. In fact, the Jenks court stated as follows:
“We hold that when the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the offense charged, there is no requirement that the evidence must be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. State v. Kulig (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 157, 66 O.O.2d
351, 309 N.E.2d 897, is overruled to the extent it is inconsistent with our decision announced today. All other cases adhering to the Kulig rule are hereby disapproved to the extent they conflict with this opinion.” Jenks at 273.
Further, this Court has previously reasoned that whether the evidence supporting a defendant‘s conviction is direct or circumstantial does not bear on our determination. State v. Judy, Ross App. No. 08CA3013, 2008-Ohio-5551. “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected to the same standard of proof.” Id., citing Jenks at paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, we reject Appellant‘s argument that the State‘s reliance on strictly circumstantial evidence in support the knowledge elements of the offenses at issue must be subjected to a more stringent standard.
{¶23} The record reveals that Appellant rested below without presenting any witnesses or evidence. In his appeal, Appellant cites us to Sears’ testimony which claimed that Appellant knew nothing regarding her drug addiction and was unaware that the checks at issue were forged or stolen. Appellant argues that Sears’ trial testimony weighed in his favor. However, the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to the evidence are issues for the trier of fact. See Cole v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 771, 777-778, 696 N.E.2d 289; GTE Telephone Operations v. J & H Reinforcing & Structural Erectors, Inc., Scioto App.
{¶24} Here, the evidence presented at trial indicated that Sears had a history of stealing checks, had a drug habit, had known Appellant for ten years and was best friends with Appellant. Additional evidence presented at trial established that Sears asked Appellant to cash checks for her because she knew he would not question her, Sears lied to police about how she obtained the checks when initially arrested and lied again to police even after a partial confession, claiming that her cousin, not Appellant, assisted her in cashing the checks. Based upon the evidence presented, the jury
{¶25} Appellant also suggests that the fact that he endorsed check number 232 in his own name weighs in favor of his not knowing that the check had been stolen or forged. The same argument is made with respect to Sear‘s own endorsement of the check presented to U.S. Bank, along with her identification card. A similar argument was made and rejected in State v. Bender (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 131, 493 N.E.2d 552, albeit with regard to the presentment of forged credit slips. In Bender, the court reasoned that “[s]igning one‘s own name and using one‘s own identification to cash a credit slip does not legitimize an otherwise spurious writing and constitutes a ‘forgery’ under
{¶26} As a result, we cannot find that the jury, as the trier of fact, clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Appellant‘s convictions must be reversed and a new trial granted. We find substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that all the elements of both forgery and receiving stolen property were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including that Appellant acted with
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
{¶27} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for forgery and receiving stolen property. We review Appellant‘s sufficiency of the evidence claim using the same standard that we used to review his first assignment of error. State v. Hicks, Highland App. No. 08CA6, 2009-Ohio-3115; citing State v. Gravelle, Huron App. No. H-07-010, 2009-Ohio-1533, at ¶ 37 and State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 1995-Ohio-104, 651 N.E.2d 965. We have already found that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant‘s
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Harsha, J.: Dissents.
For the Court,
BY:
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.