State v. ReillyState v. Reilly
ΟΡΙΝΙΟΝ
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
W. Alex Smith for Appellant
Angela M. Boes for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Louis A. Reilly (“Reilly“), appeals the July 31, 2019 judgment entry of sentence the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
{2} The facts of this case begin with the arrest of Reilly‘s roommate, Adam Barto (“Barto“), on January 24, 2019. Barto—who was the subject of a criminal investigation by the Seneca County Drug Task Force METRICH Enforcemеnt Unit (“drug task force“)—was arrested outside of the residence that he shared with Reilly. Subsequent to Barto‘s arrest, law enforcement entered the residence without a warrant after hearing persons inside the residence “scurrying” about the residence when they were alerted to law enforcement‘s presence. Law enforcement entered the residence (without a warrant) over the concern that those persons inside the residence may destroy drug evidence. Once inside the residence, law enforcement located Reilly exiting a bathroom and saw drugs in plain view on the (bathroom) floor and in the (bathroom) toilet. Thereafter, law enforcement obtained a search warrant to search the residence and discovered, in particular, drugs and tools commоnly associated with the drug trade.
{3} On February 20, 2019, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Reilly on five criminal charges: Count One of permitting drug abuse in violation of
{4} On March 18, 2019, at Reilly‘s request, the trial court ordered Reilly to be evaluated for his competency to stand trial. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15). On April 24, 2019, after a hearing on April 23, 2019, the trial court concluded that Reilly was competent to stand trial, which Reilly does not challenge. (Doc. No. 18).
{5} On May 20, 2019, Reilly filed a motion to suppress evidence in which he argued that law enforcement “made entry into [his] house without a search warrant and then secured the house and occupants before seeking a search warrant” and that law enforcement “then used evidence observed in the illegal search of the house to bolster the affidavit.” (Doc. No. 21). After a hearing on June 24, 2019, the trial court on July 9, 2019 denied Reilly‘s motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 25).
{6} On July 30, 2019, Reilly withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of no contest with a “consent finding of guilty,” under a negotiated plea agreement, to the counts in the indictment. (Doc. Nos. 39, 40, 41). In exchange for
{7} On August 8, 2019, Reilly filed a notice of appeal, and raises one assignment of error. (Doc. No. 47).
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Erred When it Denied the Defendant‘s Motion to Suppress
{8} In his assignment of error, Reilly argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence. Reilly argues that law enforcement‘s entry into his residence (and subsequent search) was conducted without a warrant and not pursuant to any exception to the warrant requirement of the
Standard of Review
{9} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court‘s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
Analysis
{10} “The
{11} “A warrantless search of a person‘s home is presumed unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement is shown.” State v. Yost, 5th Dist. Perry No. 18-CA-00024, 2019-Ohio-5446, ¶ 23, citing State v. Diaz, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016 CA 00113, 2017-Ohio-262, ¶ 16, citing State v. Angelo, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24751, 2009-Ohio-6966, ¶ 10. “At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and that it meets
{12} “Exigent circumstances are a well-established exception to the
The exigent or emergency circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies in a variety of situations, including when entry into a building is necessary to protect or preserve life, tо prevent physical harm to persons or property, or to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence, or when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect or someone inside poses a danger to the police officer‘s safety.
(Emphasis added.) Byrd at ¶ 13, citing State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498, 2008-Ohio-267, ¶ 48 (2d Dist.) and Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011). “In order to justify an exception to the warrant requirement, the costs
{13} “Whether exigent circumstances are present is determined through an objective test that looks at the totality of the circumstances confronting the police officers at the time of the entry.” State v. Enyart, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 08AP-184 and 08AP-318, 2010-Ohio-5623 ¶ 21, citing United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir.1990). “An important fаctor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.” Garrett at ¶ 43, quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984). “The duration of the intrusion and the scope of the search are governed by the constitutional command of reasonableness, which will be evaluated in terms of the emergency. Once the emergency conditions have been alleviated, further intrusion must be sanctioned by a warrant.” State v. Bethel, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 10-AP-35, 2011-Ohio-3020, ¶ 26, quoting Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search and Seizure, Section 10.5, at 185-186 (1999). See also State v. Kulyk, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 01 CA 13, 2002 WL 491849, *4 (Apr. 1, 2002) (noting that
{14} “It is well established that a warrantless entry is justified under exigent circumstances where there is imminent danger that evidence will be lost or destroyed if a search is not immediately сonducted.” Garrett at ¶ 36, citing State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 52 (2000). See also King at 460; State v. Benvenuto, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-39, 2018-Ohio-2242, ¶ 22. “This need may be particularly compelling where narcotics are involved, for ‘narcotics can be easily and quickly destroyed while a search is progressing.‘” United States v. Johnson, 457 Fed.Appx. 512, 516 (6th Cir.2012), quoting United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511-1512 (6th Cir.1988), quoting United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444-1445 (D.C.Cir.1988), and citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (2001) and Modrell v. Hayden, 436 Fed.Appx. 568, 578-579 (6th Cir.2011). See also Moore at 52 (“Because marijuana and other narcotics are easily and quickly hidden or destroyed, a warrantless search may be justified to preserve evidence.“).
{15} “[A] warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidenсe is justified if the government demonstrates: ‘(1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that these third parties may soon
{16} At the suppression hearing in this case, the State offered the testimony of Officer Justin Nowak (“Officer Nowak“) of the Tiffin Police Department, who was assigned to the drug task force. (June 24, 2019 Tr. at 17). Officer Nowak testified that the drug task force was tracking Barto through a GPS tracking device affixed tо Barto‘s vehicle. (Id. at 18, 23). Based on the drug task force‘s monitoring of Barto‘s movements, it was determined that Barto was residing at 55 East New Haven Street, Bloomville, Ohio (the “residence“). (Id. at 19, 23-24). (See also id. at 28). Officer Nowak testified that, on January 24, 2019, the drug task force was awaiting Barto‘s to return the residence to arrest him. (Id. at 24-25). Specifically, law enforcement had warrants for Barto‘s arrest and to search the vehicle bеing operated by Barto. (Id. at 26-27).
{18} After Barto was arrested, “[o]fficers made entry into the residence.” (Id. at 27). More specifically, “[o]fficers knocked at the rear door of the residence. When no one answered the door, entry was made. Four subjects were located inside, and a cursory search was conducted and they were detained.” (Id.).
{19} Importantly, Officer Nowak testified that it was necessary fоr law enforcement to enter the residence because it was believed that the persons inside the residence could be destroying evidence. (Id. at 28-29). That is, “[t]he noises that the officers heard inside where they stated that it sounds as if people knew someone was outside and was scurrying about the residence, and then by knocking on the door and nobody answering or responding” led law enforсement to believe
{20} Moreover, according to Officer Nowak‘s testimony based on his training and experience, it is likely that other persons present at locations at which suspected illegal-drug activity is occurring are “affiliated or known associates” of the principal offender. (Id. at 29). Therefore, law enforcement concluded that it was likely that the persons inside the residence could be destroying drug evidence. (Id. at 29-30). And, on entering the residence, law enforcement found Reilly exiting the bathroom where drugs were on the floor and in the toilet in plain view. (Id. at 30-31). Thereafter, law enforcement obtained a search warrant and searched the residence. (Id. at 33-34).
{21} Here, the trial court denied Reilly‘s motion to suppress evidence after concluding that “[s]ufficient exigent circumstances existed to allow law enforcement to enter the residence to ensure their safety, and the safety of others on the scene.” (Doc. No. 25). In other words, the trial court concluded that law enforcement‘s warrantless entry and search was justified under the protective-sweep
{22} Moreover, law enforcement‘s warrantless entry was justified because it had a reasonable belief that third parties were inside the residence and a reasonable belief that those parties wеre aware of law enforcement‘s presence making the destruction of evidence probable. Specifically, Officer Nowak testified that the law enforcement officers positioned outside the residence not only heard third parties inside the residence, but heard those parties acknowledge law enforcement‘s presence. See State v. Melvin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27248, 2017-Ohio-7938, ¶ 13 (concluding that law enfоrcement‘s warrantless entry into the residence was justified under the exigent-circumstances exception because law enforcement was “concern[ed] that evidence would be destroyed or weapons obtained” after law enforcement was “discovered outside the house while preparing to execute the warrant“). Further, Officer Nowak testified that those law enforсement officers heard those third parties begin to scurry or move abruptly through the residence. See Gaston v. Toledo, 106 Ohio App.3d 66, 77 (6th Dist.1995) (noting that “particularized reasons can involve evidence of any unusual activity, noise or conduct indicating the destruction of evidence is being attempted“). Importantly, Officer Nowak testified that, based on these facts, and the knowledge that it is likely that third parties who share a residence with a known drug offender also engage in
{23} Once inside the residence, law enforcement properly limited the scope of their intrusion to only what was necessary to secure the premises and ensure that evidence would not be destroyed.3 State v. Martin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040150, 2004-Ohio-6433, ¶ 41 (holding that law enforcement “properly limited the scope of their intrusion into [the residence] to only that necessary to secure the premises and tо ensure that evidence would not be destroyed“). See also State v. Brewster, 157 Ohio App.3d 342, 2004-Ohio-2722, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.).
{24} For these reasons, the trial court did not err by denying Reilly‘s motion to suppress evidence obtained from law enforcement‘s warrantless entry into his residence or its subsequent search of the residence under the search warrant (albeit for a different reason than stated in the trial court‘s decision). See State v. Holland, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-790, 2014-Ohio-1964, ¶ 20 (affirming the trial court‘s
{25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
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