STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, - v - MATTHEW A. REFFITT, Defendant-Appellant.
CASE NO. 2021-L-129
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAKE COUNTY
Decided: September 26, 2022
2022-Ohio-3371
Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Trial Court No. 2021 CR 001063
Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, Melissa A. Blake, Assistant Public Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Matthew Reffitt, appeals following his guilty plea to one count of felonious assault, in violation of
{¶2} Appellant raises six assignments of error, arguing that his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to consider factors that made his offense less serious and that the Reagan Tokes indefinite sentencing law is unconstitutional.
{¶4} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶5} On August 14, 2021, appellant and the victim, his girlfriend, had been using drugs. At some point, the victim refused to give him more drugs, they argued, and she left the house. Appellant turned to alcohol and became intoxicated. Appellant claims that he had been sober from alcohol for four to six months prior to this date although he was not sober from drug use during this period.
{¶6} When the victim returned to the house, they continued to argue and appellant became violent. The victim attempted to call 911 but appellant took her phone and broke it while saying that he was going to kill her. Appellant struck the victim with a belt multiple times with the buckle, striking her arm, body, and head and leaving bruises. Appellant then strangled the victim with his belt and left bruising and red marks on her neck. Eventually, she was able to escape and sought help from neighbors. The victim‘s injuries required three staples in her head to close a wound caused by the belt buckle.
{¶7} On September 30, 2021, appellant pled guilty by way of information to one count of felonious assault, in violation of
{¶9} The court concluded that the offense was more serious and that the relationship with the victim facilitated the offense. The court noted that appellant had three prior domestic violence convictions, an attempted burglary conviction, drug trafficking charges, and that he had only been off postrelease control three months before the instant offense. The court said that appellant had not responded favorably to previously imposed sanctions and that he has done nothing to address his alcohol problem. The court said that nothing about the offense made it less serious. The court sentenced appellant to an indefinite prison term of six years to a maximum of nine years on count one, and twelve months on count two to be served concurrently. Appellant objected to the imposition of the indefinite sentence.
{¶10} Appellant timely appeals raising six assignments of error.
Assignments of Error and Analysis
{¶11} Appellant‘s first assignment of error states:
{¶12} “[1.] THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT [sic] SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER FACTORS THAT MADE THE OFFENSE LESS SERIOUS.”
{¶14} Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider
(C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender‘s conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.
(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender‘s conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.
{¶15} Appellant cites
{¶16} In reviewing sentencing challenges relating to
[I]t is fully consistent for appellate courts to review those sentences that are imposed solely after consideration of the factors in
R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 under a standard that is equally deferential to the sentencing court. That is, an appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the sentence.
{¶17} However, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the above language was dicta. State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.2d 649, ¶ 27. In Jones, the court held that
{¶18} Thus, under Jones, an appellate court reviewing alleged error under
{¶20} Howell pre-dates the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decisions in both Marcum and Jones, so its
{¶21} In this case, appellant does not argue that the trial court failed to consider the
{¶23} Appellant‘s second through sixth assignments of error challenge the constitutionality of
Presumption of Constitutionality:
{¶24} Initially we note that “we are to presume that the state statute is constitutional, and the burden is on the person challenging the statute to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17. “Further, the constitutionality of a statute is a matter of law that we review de novo.” State v. Lane, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3144, 2014-Ohio-2010, ¶ 46, citing State v. Jenson, 11th Dist. Lake No.2005-L-193, 2006-Ohio-5169, ¶ 5. Therefore, we must independently review the constitutionality of
{¶25} Appellant‘s second assignment of error states:
{¶26} “[2.] THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE INDETERMINATE PRISON SENTENCE OF SIX TO NINE YEARS THAT WAS ORDERED PURSUANT TO THE ‘REAGAN TOKES ACT,’ AKA SENATE BILL 201, ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW.”
Ripeness:
{¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the Reagan Tokes Law is ripe for review in State v. Maddox, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio 764. In Maddox, the Court said that the “challenge to the statute‘s constitutionality is ripe for review on direct appeal
{¶28} Appellant‘s third assignment of error states:
{¶29} “[3.] THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S INDETERMINATE PRISON SENTENCE OF SIX TO NINE YEARS THAT WAS ORDERED PURSUAUNT TO THE ‘REAGAN TOKES ACT,’ AKA SENATE BILL 201, MUST BE REVERSED AS THE REAGAN TOKES ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS.”
Void for Vagueness:
{¶30} Appellant next argues that the Reagan Tokes Law is void for vagueness because it fails to provide sufficient clarity for what conduct could result in the indeterminate portion of his prison sentence being invoked.
{¶31} “‘[A] law will survive a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is written so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is prohibited, and if the law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.‘” Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 533, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that a void for vagueness challenge requires a tripartite analysis to address three pivotal values. State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269-270, 581 N.E.2d
{¶32} In Grayned v. Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-228, the United States Supreme Court set out the following guidelines for evaluating a void for vagueness claim:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. * * * ” (Footnotes omitted.) Accordingly, when a statute is challenged under the due process doctrine of vagueness, a court must determine whether the enactment (1) provides sufficient notice of its proscriptions and (2) contains reasonably clear guidelines to prevent official arbitrariness or discrimination in its enforcement. Smith v. Goguen (1974), 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605.
{¶34} In like manner, the Fifth District compared the sexual offender classification scheme approved in Williams to Ohio‘s postrelease control enactments. State v. Hopkins, 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2000CA00053, 2000CA000054, 2000 WL 1751286, * 4 (Nov. 27, 2000). In Hopkins, the court said that postrelease control enactments were not unconstitutionally vague because they do “not prohibit any specific conduct.” Id.
{¶35} Guided by the U.S. and Ohio Supreme Court in Grayned and Collier as well as the framework set forth in Williams and Hopkins, we address
{¶36} As in Williams, we note that
{¶37} However, Appellant argues that Regan Tokes violates all three prongs of the tripartite analysis. He argues that institutional rule violations and infractions are enforced by the same people who will determine if his conduct warrants extending his prison term. He further claims that different institutions may have different definitions for what conduct constitutes a security threat and suggests that constitutionality protected rights such as freedom of speech or religion might “draw the ire” of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC“) and arbitrarily subject him to the indefinite portion of his sentence.
{¶38} In State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2021-Ohio 1809, opinion vacated on reh‘g en banc, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109315, 2022-Ohio-470, the Eighth District found that
{¶40} Importantly, these administrative proceedings under
{¶42} Accordingly, appellant‘s third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶43} Appellant‘s fourth assignment of error states:
{¶44} “[4.] THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S INDETERMININATE PRISON SENTENCE OF SIX TO NINE YEARS THAT WAS ORDRED PURSUANT TO THE ‘REAGAN TOKES ACT,’ AKA SENATE BILL 201, MUST BE REVERSED AS THE REAGAN TOKES ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.”
Separation of Powers:
{¶45} Appellant argues that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation of powers because it vests judicial power in the executive branch. He cites State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000). Bray addressed the constitutionality of
{¶46} In Bray, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
{¶47} Appellant‘s reliance on Bray is misplaced.
{¶48} Further, in Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000), decided a few months after Bray, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
{¶49} In Reagan Tokes sentences, the court imposes both presumptive minimum and possible maximum prison terms in its sentence. Thereafter, the ODRC determines whether the offender‘s conduct warrants more than the minimum imposed. However, the ODRC cannot exceed the judiciary‘s maximum imposed sentence. Therefore, Bray does “not compel the conclusion that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation of powers doctrine.” Id.; State v. Hacker, 3rd Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22;
{¶50} Accordingly, appellant‘s fourth assignment of error is without merit.
{¶51} Appellant‘s fifth assignment of error states:
{¶52} “[5.] THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S INDETERMINATE PRISON SENTENCE OF SIX TO NINE YEARS THAT WAS ORDERED PURSUANT TO THE ‘REAGAN TOKES ACT,’ AKA SENATE BILL 201, VIOLATES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
Trial by Jury:
{¶53} Appellant argues that
{¶55} The Eighth District said that Apprendi was inapposite because the issue in Apprendi was the court‘s ability to impose a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum without the factual circumstances justifying the enhanced sentence first being found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 40. In contrast,
{¶56} The Eighth District also distinguished Foster, where the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the “sentencing structure permitting a trial court to impose a consecutive sentence resulting in a term of imprisonment beyond the minimum based on the issuance of findings violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).” Id. at ¶ 42. However, Foster was superseded by the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), where the Court determined that a state court‘s imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the right to a jury trial because juries historically “played no role in” the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. Id., at ¶ 42, citing Ice, 555 U.S. at 167-168. “Instead, specification of the regime for administering multiple sentences has long been
{¶57} Because
{¶58} Accordingly, appellant‘s fifth assignment of error is without merit.
{¶59} Appellant‘s Sixth assignment of error states:
{¶60} “[6.] THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT‘S INDETERMINATE PRISON SENTENCE OF SIX TO NINE YEARS THAT WAS ORDERED PURSUANT TO THE ‘REAGAN TOKES ACT,’ AKA SENATE BILL 201, VIOLATES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION and
Due Process:
{¶61} Appellant next claims that the Regan Tokes Law violates due process because it fails to provide proper notice as to what type of conduct would allow the ODRC to extend his prison sentence. He further argues that
{¶62} In State ex rel. Blake v. Shoemaker, 4 Ohio St.3d 43, 446 N.E.2d 169 (1983), the Ohio Supreme Court said that a right to parole consideration did not create a “liberty interest sufficient to establish a right to procedural due process.” Id. The Court said that this argument was “rejected in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 [(1979)], with the exception of where the state statute itself creates an expectancy of release.” Id.
{¶63} Thus, while no Ohio appellate district has held that
{¶64} The Twelfth District concluded that the “hearings conducted by the ODRC under
{¶66} However, whether the rebuttable presumption of release under the Reagan Tokes Law is more akin to parole revocation proceedings or parole eligibility proceedings is not presently important for determining whether
{¶67} Appellant‘s challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are facial in nature and he must therefore establish that there exists no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44 at ¶ 37. Appellant‘s arguments relating to a future hearing to rebut his presumptive release are a challenge to the due process safeguards that will be afforded in the future under
{¶68} Therefore, appellant‘s arguments relating to
{¶69} Finally, in order to satisfy due process, a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.3d 274 (1969). A trial court must engage in a plea colloquy pursuant to
{¶70} In this case, the trial court advised appellant that he was subject to an indefinite term of imprisonment with a presumptive minimum release date and possible maximum sentence. The trial court advised that he would be presumptively released after the minimum term if he did not commit institutional violations. Appellant was told that the presumption of early release is not automatic and that he could be subject to a maximum prison sentence which was up to one half of his minimum sentence. He was told that he had a right to a hearing in order to overcome the imposition of the indefinite portion of his sentence. The trial court also explained the ability to earn good time credit based on his behavior in prison to reduce the minimum sentence. The court said that an earned early release was presumptive but that the trial court could oppose such early release and, in that event, appellant would be entitled to a hearing.
{¶71} Appellant said that he understood these components of his indefinite sentence and pled guilty to the charge. In this case, the trial court fully advised appellant of the consequences of his plea, and he acknowledged that he understood those consequences.
{¶72} Accordingly, appellant‘s sixth assignment of error is without merit.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.