THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WORTHY, APPELLEE. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SUFFECOOL, APPELLANT.
Nos. 99-286, 99-764 and 99-765
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted January 12, 2000—Decided April 28, 2000.
88 Ohio St.3d 513 | 2000-Ohio-428
Criminal procedure—Sex offender registration—R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate constitutional rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy, Bill of Attainder, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions—R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate rights enumerated in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 97-P-0059.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 1998-CA-00101.
I. Case No. 99-286: Appellee Daniel Williams.
{¶ 1} In May 1986, appellee Daniel Williams pleaded guilty to one count of rape in violation of
{¶ 2} In April 1997, prior to his sex offender classification hearing and prior to his release from prison, Williams filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
{¶ 3} In September 1998, prior to the decision of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, this court issued its opinion in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, in which we held that
II. Case No. 99-764: Appellee Donald Worthy.
{¶ 4} In March 1995, appellee Donald Worthy pleaded guilty to two counts of rape in violation of
{¶ 5} In April 1997, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction recommended that Worthy be adjudicated a “sexual predator” pursuant to
III. Case No. 99-765: Appellant Paul D. Suffecool.
{¶ 6} In January 1983, appellant Paul D. Suffecool pleaded guilty to one count of statutory rape in violation of
{¶ 7} In March 1998, prior to Suffecool‘s release from prison, a sex offender classification hearing was conducted pursuant to
{¶ 8} Suffecool appealed his sexual predator classification to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. Suffecool argued that
{¶ 9} These cases are now before this court pursuant to the allowance of discretionary appeals.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, Vincent A. Culotta and Julie Mitrovich King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant in case No. 99-286.
R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa MacKnight, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee in case No. 99-286.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant in case No. 99-764.
Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito Co., L.P.A., and Michael A. Partlow, for appellee in case No. 99-764.
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark Caldwell, Chief Appellate Prosecuting Attorney; and Frederic R. Scott, for appellee in case No. 99-765.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Robert L. Lane, Chief Appellate Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 99-765.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, pro hac vice, State Solicitor, David M. Gormley and Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitors, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764, and urging affirmance in case No. 99-765.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Renee L. Snow, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor‘s Office in case No. 99-286.
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, David P. Joyce, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Prosecuting Attorneys of the Eleventh Ohio Appellate District in case No. 99-286.
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764.
Gray & Duning and Donald E. Oda II, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in case No. 99-286.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 10} In 1996, in an effort to protect the public, the General Assembly repealed and reenacted Ohio‘s sex offender registration statute. See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560 (“H.B. 180“). The General Assembly concluded that “[s]exual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses even after being released from imprisonment.”
{¶ 11} We have previously disposed of two challenges to the constitutionality of revised
{¶ 12} Today we are asked to determine whether
I. History and Overview of Sex Offender Registration Laws.
A. Origins of Current Sex Offender Registration Laws.
{¶ 13} Although sex offender registration statutes have been in effect for many years, see, e.g., former
See Weston, Megan‘s Law Familiarity Complicates Jury Selection (Jan. 13, 1997), N.N.J. Record at A4. In response to this horrible crime and what was deemed by the New Jersey legislature as a legislative emergency, New Jersey enacted “Megan‘s Law,” a sex offender registration statute that includes a public notification provision.
{¶ 14} After the enactment of Megan‘s Law, Congress in 1994 passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act,
{¶ 15} In its original version, the Jacob Wetterling Act permitted, but did not require, state agencies to notify appropriate communities about sex offenders. Former
B. Sex Offender Registration Laws in Other States.
{¶ 16} Although all fifty states have enacted a sex offender registration law, the laws vary significantly in what sex offenses are covered, registration and notification procedures, and the process of assessment used to determine sex offender status. See Note, Who are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws (1999), 74 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1451, 1459-1460. In addition to the common registration and notification provisions, some states such as California and Texas are considering more extreme methods of addressing repeat sex offenders. Id. at 1460, fn. 42.
{¶ 17} The major differences among sex offender registration laws are found in the registration and notification provisions. For instance, the laws differ with regard to retroactive application. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted laws that are fully retroactive, applying to all sex offenders regardless of the date of their offense. See Note, “Megan‘s Laws” Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay Police Harassment (1999), 87 Geo.L.J. 2431, 2467-2473. Twenty-nine states have partially retroactive laws that, generally, apply to all sex offenders under some form of criminal supervision on the effective date of the particular statute. Id. The remaining states apply sex offender registration laws to sex offenses committed on or after the effective date of their statute. Id.
{¶ 18} The scope of community notification also varies among the states. Several states have no community notification provisions. Id. Other states will release information only upon request, when the information concerns high-risk offenders, or when dissemination of information is necessary for public protection. Id. In addition, the Internet is being used more frequently for the dissemination of sex offender data. According to a United States Department of Justice report, over half of the states have, or are planning to develop, an Internet site for public access to sex offender registries. See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet, Summary of State Sex Offender Registry Dissemination Procedures (August 1999), at 1.
C. R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶ 19} Ohio first enacted a sex offender registration statute in 1963. See former
{¶ 20} In revising
{¶ 21} The General Assembly found that if the public is provided notice and information about sexual predators, habitual sex offenders, and other individuals convicted of sexually oriented offenses as defined in
{¶ 22} Revised
{¶ 23} As defined, a “habitual sex offender” is a person who has been “convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense and who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more sexually oriented offenses.”
{¶ 24} There are two ways in which a sex offender may be classified as a sexual predator. First, if a person is convicted of or has pleaded guilty to a sexually violent offense on or after January 1, 1997, and also is convicted of or has pleaded guilty to a sexually violent predator specification alleged in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the sexually violent offense, the sex offender is automatically classified as a sexual predator.
{¶ 25} In determining whether a sex offender is a sexual predator, a judge shall consider all relevant factors to determine whether the individual is likely to engage in future sex offenses. See
{¶ 26} The court shall make the determination that a sex offender is a sexual predator only if its conclusion is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
{¶ 27} The second set of provisions in
{¶ 28} Pursuant to
{¶ 29} The last set of provisions in
{¶ 30} Once the offender registers, the sheriff must notify certain law enforcement officials, adjacent neighbors, and other neighbors designated by the Attorney General, within seventy-two hours of the registration.
II. Constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950.
{¶ 31} As an initial matter, it must be noted that statutes enacted in Ohio are presumed to be constitutional. See State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 161-162, 38 O.O.2d 404, 405-406, 224 N.E.2d 906, 908-909. This presumption of constitutionality remains unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional. See Roosevelt Properties Co. v. Kinney (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 7, 13, 12 OBR 6, 11, 465 N.E.2d 421, 427. Therefore, we begin with the presumption that
A. Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 32} The courts of appeals in Williams and Worthy held that
{¶ 33}
{¶ 34} A constitutional provision is self-executing when it is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplemental or enabling legislation. In re Protest Filed by Citizens for the Merit Selection of Judges, Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 102, 104, 551 N.E.2d 150, 152. Likewise, a constitutional provision is not self-executing if its language, duly construed, cannot provide for adequate and meaningful enforcement of its terms without other legislative enactment. State ex rel. Russell v. Bliss (1951), 156 Ohio St. 147, 151-152, 46 O.O. 3, 5, 101 N.E.2d 289, 291. Stated more succinctly, the words of a constitutional provision must be sufficiently precise in order to provide clear guidance to courts with respect to their application if the provision is to be deemed self-executing.
{¶ 35} The constitutions of other states reflect Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. We consider the judicial interpretations of those states in the absence of Ohio precedent. See State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith (1921), 102 Ohio St. 591, 599, 133 N.E. 457, 459.
{¶ 36} The
{¶ 37}
{¶ 38} In language virtually identical to that of the Ohio Constitution, the
{¶ 39} In addition to Vermont, New Mexico, and California, numerous other states with constitutional provisions similar to Section 1, Article I have not construed their provisions to be a sole basis for challenging legislation.1 The reason for such a construction is that the language contained in these states’ constitutional provisions is not sufficiently complete so that courts would have a standard that could be routinely and uniformly applied. Cf., e.g., Sepe v. Daneker (1949), 76 R.I. 160, 168, 68 A.2d 101, 105. Against this backdrop, we now analyze Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution to determine whether its language is self-executing.
{¶ 40} Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution describes rights inherent in the individual to be free and happy—rights that the government is to hold inalienable. Yet, we have never held rights of property or rights of liberty to be completely free from government restraint. Accordingly, the “natural law” rights outlined in Section 1, Article I will, at times, yield to government intrusion when necessitated by the public good. The issue we must decide is whether this language gives us a methodology to determine how to accord protection to these rights.
{¶ 41} “Natural law” rights, in and of themselves, are of no legal force. Rather, it is the laws enacted by legislatures that define the rights of the individual. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, if “the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard.” Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399, 1 L.Ed. 648, 654 (Iredell, J., concurring). In order for a court of law to enforce any right, there must be a fixed standard to ensure equal and uniform application. Id.
{¶ 42} The language in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, in many ways, mirrors the precatory words of the Declaration of Independence (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness“) and in the state constitutions previously mentioned. Similar to the language in the Declaration of Independence and other state constitutions, the language in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is not an independent source of self-executing protections. Rather, it is a statement of fundamental ideals upon which a limited government is created. But it requires other provisions of the Ohio Constitution or legislative definition to give it practical effect. This is so because its language lacks the completeness required to offer meaningful guidance for judicial enforcement.
{¶ 43} This lack of completeness can best be demonstrated by comparing Section 1, Article I to other provisions of the Ohio Constitution. For example,
{¶ 44} Section 1, Article I declares that all men are “free and independent,” and that the rights of life, liberty, property, and happiness are inalienable. This constitutional provision, however, does not indicate how these rights are subject to judicial enforcement. All of the aforementioned guarantees are not inalienable in the most strict sense of the term. It is beyond doubt that the rights of property can be infringed upon through, for example, the power of eminent domain. See, e.g.,
{¶ 45} Even if, however, Section 1, Article I was self-executing, the General Assembly has not violated its declaration. The court of appeals in Williams held that
{¶ 46} In reviewing legislation that impacts the rights guaranteed by Section 1, Article I, the legislation will be upheld if it bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and if the legislation is not arbitrary or unreasonable. See Benjamin v. Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 110, 4 O.O.2d 113, 117, 146 N.E.2d 854, 860. Questions of reasonableness within the meaning of Section 1, Article I “are questions which are committed in the first instance to the judgment and discretion of the legislative body, and, unless the decisions of such legislative body on those questions appear to be clearly erroneous, the courts will not invalidate them.” (Citations omitted.) Id. The question we must answer, then, is whether
{¶ 47} We have suggested the answer to the question in State v. Cook, where we compared
{¶ 48} We have stated that the right to privacy under Section 1, Article I runs parallel to those rights of privacy guaranteed by the
{¶ 49} The right to privacy has been described as “the right to be let alone; to live one‘s life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they can be justified by the clear needs of the community living under a government of law.” Time, Inc. v. Hill (1967), 385 U.S. 374, 413, 87 S.Ct. 534, 555, 17 L.Ed.2d 456, 481 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see, also, Housh v. Peth (1956), 165 Ohio St. 35, 39, 59 O.O. 60, 62, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343. As Justice Brandeis observed, the right to privacy is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United States (1928), 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944, 956 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Yet the right to privacy is not absolute. See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 605, 608, 640 N.E.2d 164, 167. Privacy of the individual will yield when required by public necessity. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 413, 87 S.Ct. at 555, 17 L.Ed.2d at 481.
{¶ 50} The courts of appeals held that the notification provisions of
{¶ 51}
{¶ 52} Nor does the fact that the government is required to actively disseminate information collected from convicted sexual offenders, rather than merely allowing the public access, impact the right to privacy. Active distribution, as opposed to keeping open the doors to government information, is a distinction without significant meaning. The information at issue is a public record, and its characteristic as such does not change depending upon how the public gains access to it. We hold, therefore, that
{¶ 53} The courts of appeals also held that
{¶ 54} There is nothing in the community notification provisions in
{¶ 55} Likewise, the right to pursue an occupation has not been violated by
{¶ 56} Likewise,
B. Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
{¶ 57} The defendants argue that
{¶ 58} The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
{¶ 59} This court, in Cook, addressed whether
C. Bill of Attainder Clause of the United States Constitution.
{¶ 60} The defendants also argue that
{¶ 61} As defined by the United States Supreme Court, a bill of attainder is “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468, 97 S.Ct. at 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d at 907, citing United States v. Brown (1965), 381 U.S. 437, 445, 447, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1713-1714, 14 L.Ed.2d 484, 491; see, also, State ex rel. Matz v. Brown (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 279, 280, 525 N.E.2d 805, 806. Thus, a bill of attainder is a law that (1) inflicts punishment, (2) without a judicial trial, (3) upon an identifiable individual. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468, 97 S.Ct. at 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d at 907.
{¶ 62} As previously discussed,
{¶ 63} Nor does
{¶ 64} The fact that
D. Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.
{¶ 65} The defendants further contend that
{¶ 66} The
{¶ 68} “[A] suspect class is one ‘saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’ ” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 525, quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 40. Moreover, the only classifications recognized as “suspect” are those involving race, alienage, and ancestry. Id. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 524, fn. 4. Sex offenders, therefore, are not a suspect class. See Cutshall v. Sundquist (C.A.6, 1999), 193 F.3d 466, 482; Artway v. Atty. Gen. of New Jersey (C.A.3, 1996), 81 F.3d 1235, 1267.
{¶ 69} Nor does
{¶ 70} Under the rational basis standard, we are to grant substantial deference to the predictive judgment of the General Assembly. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. Fed. Communications Comm. (1997), 520 U.S. 180, 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 1189, 137 L.Ed.2d 369, 391. The state does not bear the burden of proving that some rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the challenger must negative every conceivable basis before an equal protection challenge will be upheld. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271.
{¶ 71} The defendants argue that
{¶ 72} It is also asserted that the use of the “clear and convincing” standard denies equal protection of the laws. This is so, the defendants argue, because sex offenders who are charged in an indictment as a sexually violent predator are entitled to have a jury determine the specification by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶ 73} As aptly noted by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, this argument “misstates
{¶ 74} “Because there are punitive aspects of the sexually violent predator specification, the law requires that, like any other specification, those aspects be determined by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is in direct contrast to the nonpunitive notice and registration requirements [of
E. Void for Vagueness.
{¶ 75} The defendants urge us to hold that
{¶ 76} The void-for-vagueness doctrine ensures that individuals can ascertain what the law requires of them. See State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 566 N.E.2d 1224, 1226-1227. In order to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge, the statute at issue must be written so that a person of common intelligence is able to determine what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must provide sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Chicago v. Morales (1999), 527 U.S. 41, 56-57, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d 67, 80; see, also, State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 354, 358, 588 N.E.2d 116, 120. A statute will not be declared void, however, merely because it could have been worded more precisely. See Roth v. United States (1957), 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1510-1511. Mathematical precision has never been required. See Boyce Motor Lines v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330-331, 96 L.Ed. 367, 371.
{¶ 77} As an initial matter, it should be noted that the defendants are raising facial-vagueness challenges to
{¶ 78} As stated, a law will survive a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is written so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is prohibited, and if the law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Morales, 527 U.S. at 56-57, 119 S.Ct. at 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d at 80. First,
{¶ 79} The defendants argue that use of the “clear and convincing” standard to make a finding that a sex offender is likely to commit future offenses is illogically vague. We fail to understand, however, how the likelihood of future conduct and the burden of proof required to make that finding conflict in such a manner as to
{¶ 80} In addition,
{¶ 81}
{¶ 82} Even if the terms of
III. Conclusion.
{¶ 83} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
Judgments reversed and causes remanded in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764.
Judgment affirmed in case No. 99-765.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.