State v. ReedState v. Reed
Decided: April 24, 2023
Judgment: Affirmed and remanded
Colleen M. O‘Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christine Davis, Assistant Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Prosecutor‘s Office, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Michael A. Partlow, P.O. Box 1562, Stow, OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.
{1} Appellant, Kassandra Reed, appeals the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to 24 months in prison for violating
{2} Appellant has raised a single assignment of error arguing that the record does not support the 24-month term of imprisonment.
{3} Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find appellant‘s assignment of error to be without merit. The trial court did not err in imposing a 24-month
{4} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural History
{5} Appellant‘s seven-week-old child, M.R. (DOB 4-17-2022), received injuries, including fractured bones, to all four extremities. According to the presentence investigation, appellant‘s husband and co-defendant caused those injuries. Appellant waited several days before taking M.R. to receive treatment for these injuries. M.R. was removed from the home due to the suspected abuse.
{6} On March 2, 2022, appellant was indicted on one count of Endangering Children, in violation of
{7} At the September 8 sentencing hearing, appellant requested a sentence of community control while the State requested that prison be imposed, without specifying a length of sentence. Appellant‘s attorney said that a community control sanction was appropriate because the child‘s injuries were primarily caused by appellant‘s husband, appellant expressed remorse, and acknowledged that she failed to execute her duty of care for the child. The State emphasized that M.R. had suffered for days before receiving medical treatment for the multiple broken bones and fractures inflicted.
{8} The trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and said that the extent of the injuries was “wrong on all levels.” The Court concluded that under
{9} Appellant timely appealed raising one assignment of error.
Assignments of Error and Analysis
{10} Appellant‘s sole assignment of error states:
{11} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING APPELLANT TO A TERM OF 24 MONTHS [sic] INCARCERATION AS THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT SUCH A SENTENCE.”
{12} Appellant argues that the record “clearly and convincingly indicates that the Trial Court should have imposed a community control sanction.” Appellant does not argue that the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under
{13}
{14} Appellant claims that the trial court issued a sentence contrary to law under
{15} Although appellant argues that the foregoing holding of Jones renders her sentence essentially unreviewable, that is not the case. We agree with that aspect of Justice Fischer‘s concurring opinion in Jones, which discusses the reviewability of
There is also no reason to believe that a trial court‘s consideration under
R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 is wholly unreviewable. First, although, as the majority opinion explains,R.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 do not require a trial court to make any specific findings on the record, those statutes are not optional. Both statutes use the term “shall” multiple times in relation to other matters. For example,R.C. 2929.11(A) and2929.12(A) through (F) set forth matters that a sentencing court “shall consider,” andR.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the trial court “shall be guided by” the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing.R.C. 2929.11(B) further states that the sentence imposed by the trial court “shall” meet certain specific criteria. Second,R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) expressly requires an appellate court to “review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence.” The breadth of this statutory provision necessarily means that if a trial court does make findings underR.C. 2929.11 and2929.12 , the appellate court may review those findings for certain limited purposes. Third,R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) provides that an appellate court can modify or vacate a sentence on the ground that it is “otherwise contrary to law.” This court‘s holding today specifies what an appellate court may not do under this provision: it may not conduct an independent review of *** whether the record supports the sentence and substitute its own judgment regarding the appropriate sentence.
{16} Unlike
{17} Appellant‘s argument that the trial court should have imposed a community control sanction is unavailing. We see nothing about her sentence to suggest it is contrary to law and appellant has not identified how the imposition of a 24-month sentence for a third-degree felony was contrary to law. Her arguments essentially ask this Court to do what it cannot do review whether the record supported the trial court‘s decision to impose a prison term rather than a community control sanction.
{18} Having found no failure to comply with
{20}
{22} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment entry to correct the clerical error in the judgment entry to reflect that the trial court considered
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., concur.