State v. ReeceState v. Reece
Caleb Carson, III for Appellant
Kevin P. Collins for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Shada L. Reece (“Reece”), appeals the June 7, 2017 judgment entry of sentence of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from an investigation that took place in Marion, Ohio. In June of 2016, law enforcement officers in Marion conducted a controlled drug buy from William Maniaci (“Maniaci”). As part of that operation, a confidential informant (“CI”) picked up Maniaci at the Avalon Lakes apartment complex and drove Maniaci to several locations before dropping him off near Chestnut Street, where the CI purchased cocaine from Maniaci. On August 11, 2016, law enforcement observed Maniaci depart from an address on Kibbey Drive at which Maniaci was known to reside with Reece. That same day, law enforcement requested and obtained an anticipatory search warrant for Maniaci’s residence. The execution of that search warrant produced items indicative of drug activity.
{¶3} On August 25, 2016, the Marion County Grand Jury returned a joint indictment in which it indicted Reece on Count One of possession of cocaine in violation of
{¶4} On October 21, 2016, Reece filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 21). In that motion, Reece sought the suppression of evidence obtained during the search of the residence on Kibbey Drive, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit in support of it contained stale information, because the affidavit contained only conclusory assertions with no specific mention of the residence in question and no observations of criminal activity at that location, and because the affidavit did not contain indications that the CI was reliable. The trial court held a suppression hearing on December 22, 2016 and, on December 28, 2016, the trial court denied Reece’s motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 29).
{¶6} Reece appeared for arraignment on March 28, 2017 and pled not guilty to the relevant counts and specifications in the joint superseding indictment. (Doc. No. 72).
{¶7} On April 6, 2017, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Reece appeared and pled no contest to Count Three and to an amended Count One.3 (Doc. No. 118). Count Two, as well as the MDO and forfeiture specifications as to Counts One and Two, were dismissed. (Id.). The trial court accepted the plea of no contest and found Reece guilty. (Id.). The trial court sentenced Reece to two years in prison as to Count One and two years of community control as to Count Three. (Id.). The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 7, 2017. (Id.).
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court Erred When It Determined That The Anticipatory Warrant To Search The Residence In Question Was Supported By Sufficient Probable Cause.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court Erred When It Determined That The Triggering Conditions In The Affidavit Of The Anticipatory Warrant To Search Supported Probable Cause that Drugs Would Be Found At The Residence In Question.
Assignment Of Error No. III
The Good[-]Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply To Validate The Anticipatory Search Warrant.
{¶9} In her first assignment of error, Reece argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the anticipatory warrant to search the residence in question is supported by probable cause. Specifically, Reece argues that the warrant is not supported by probable cause because the affidavit alludes to a controlled drug buy that took place two months prior at a location other than the residence that was ultimately searched. Reece further argues that the warrant was not supported by probable cause because it indicates that Maniaci was driven to many locations before he was dropped off at an address near Chestnut Street, and the CI did not observe Maniaci in possession of drugs at the residence searched. Reece also argues
{¶10} In her second assignment of error, Reece argues that the trial court erred when it found that the triggering conditions identified in the warrant provided probable cause to believe drugs would be found at the residence in question. Specifically, Reece argues that the conditions in question did not give rise to probable cause to believe that there were drugs in the home because Maniaci was not arrested immediately after leaving the residence, but rather was arrested after entering and exiting two vehicles from which drugs may have been obtained. Reece also argues that Maniaci’s departure from the residence in question after a phone call was insufficient because there were no prior instances of such an event during the investigation.
{¶11} In her third assignment of error, Reece argues that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not validate the search conducted under the anticipatory search warrant. Specifically, Reece argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the affidavit in support of the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief in the existence of probable cause was entirely unreasonable.
{¶13} “Probable cause” means less evidence than would permit condemnation such that only probability, and not a showing of criminal activity, is the standard of probable cause. State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶14} When reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, our duty is simply to “ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” George at 325 citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). We must not conduct “a de novo determination as to whether the affidavit contains
{¶15} A valid affidavit in support of a search warrant must contain timely information so as to justify a finding of probable cause at the time the warrant issues. State v. Fayson, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-17-08, 2017-Ohio-7793, ¶ 16, citing State v. Prater, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA 2001-12-114, 2002-Ohio-4487, ¶ 11. The issue is whether the facts alleged in the warrant create a reasonable basis to conclude that
{¶16} The
{¶17} The exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate even if that warrant is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. George at 325, citing U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). Exclusion remains proper, however, where the magistrate or judge who issued the warrant was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false if not for reckless disregard of the truth, where the magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial function in issuing the warrant, where the affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” or where the warrant is so facially deficient that officers cannot reasonably presume its validity. Id. at 331, citing Leon at 923.
{¶18} An anticipatory search warrant is a search warrant based on an affidavit that provides probable cause to believe that, at some future time rather than presently, evidence of a crime will be located in a particular place. State v. Blevins, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-06-40, 2007-Ohio-6972, ¶ 21, quoting US v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 93, 126 S.Ct. 1494 (2006). Anticipatory search warrants are no different
{¶19} In the affidavit in support of the search warrant, the affiant provided generally the following information: On June 16, 2016, a CI made a controlled purchase of cocaine from Maniaci. The CI picked Maniaci up from the Avalon Lakes apartment complex and drove him to several locations before purchasing cocaine from Maniaci near Chestnut Street. After the controlled buy, Detective Andrew Isom (“Detective Isom”) of the Marion Police Department viewed an audio-visual recording of the CI’s interaction with Maniaci and found that recording to be consistent with the events related by the CI. The recording included Maniaci’s discussing the possession of narcotics. On August 11, 2016, law enforcement saw Maniaci depart a known address on Kibbey Drive. Law enforcement planned to search Maniaci’s residence if the CI placed a telephone call to Maniaci to arrange
{¶20} Where an affidavit in support of a search warrant indicates an ongoing relationship spanning several weeks between a CI and the target of a drug investigation, such information supports probable cause for a search. State v. Maniaci, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-17-14, 2017-Ohio-8270, ¶ 26. Such is all the more the case when the target of the investigation involved the CI in drug-related activity and boasted to the CI regarding the quantity of drugs he could sell. Id. Because drug traffickers tend to keep evidence of their illicit activities in their residences, evidence of an individual’s drug trafficking supports probable cause to search his residence even where observed illegal activity is not at or near the residence to be searched. State v. Myers, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27576, 2015-Ohio-2135, ¶ 13.
{¶21} In the present case, the evidence indicates an ongoing relationship between the CI and Maniaci such that Maniaci both sold drugs to the CI and was comfortable enough in the presence of the CI to have the CI accompany him to various locations around Marion while Maniaci boasted about the quantity of drugs he had for sale. Maniaci at ¶ 26. Even if we assume without holding that such information is too stale to provide the basis for a search of Maniaci’s residence less than two months later, such evidence at a minimum establishes his involvement in
{¶22} For the reasons explained above, Reece’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶23} Because we have found that probable cause supported the issuance of the search warrant, Reece’s assertions pertaining to the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement are rendered moot. State v. Cook, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-02-12, 2003-Ohio-1794, ¶ 12.
{¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.