STATE OF OHIO v. HUGO RAMOS
No. 103596
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, County of Cuyahoga
November 10, 2016
2016-Ohio-7685
Before: Stewart, J., Jones, A.J., and Celebrezze, J.
[Please see vacated opinion at 2016-Ohio-5835.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 103596
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
HUGO RAMOS
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-14-589368-A
BEFORE: Stewart, J., Jones, A.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 10, 2016
Richard A. Neff
Richard A. Neff Co., L.P.A.
614 West Superior Avenue, Suite 1310
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Anthony Thomas Miranda
Andrew F. Rogalski
Blaise D. Thomas
Margaret Troia
Assistant County Prosecutors
Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶1} After an argument with his wife where he struck her in the head with a brick and strangled her, defendant-appellant Hugo Ramos killed her by stabbing her in her throat, completely severing her carotid artery. He put their three children in his car and drove aimlessly before deciding to kill himself. He stopped the car along a highway and stepped in front of a moving vehicle. The vehicle struck a glancing blow, allowing Ramos to survive. He walked back to his car and set himself on fire. A motorist who had stopped to render assistance used a fire extinguisher to put out the flames, allowing Ramos to again survive. Ramos told a paramedic on the scene that he killed his wife and that he wanted to die. He also wrote a note to an intensive care unit nurse that read “I Kile my wife She four me.” And in an interview with the police following his discharge from the hospital, Ramos again stated that he killed his wife.
{¶2} At a jury trial on multiple counts of aggravated murder, kidnapping, felonious assault, domestic violence, and endangering children, Ramos’s attorney conceded in opening statement that Ramos “unquestionably and undoubtedly” caused his wife’s death. Ramos insisted that he was not criminally responsible, however, because he was insane: he maintained that his relationship with his wife had deteriorated to the point where he
{¶3} In this appeal, Ramos assigns four errors for our review. His first assignment of error raises multiple arguments going to the sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶4} The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires criminal convictions to be based on legally sufficient evidence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The evidence is considered “legally sufficient” if, after viewing the evidence most favorably to the state, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. This is a quantitative standard of evidence that looks only at whether any rational trier of fact could find that the evidence existed; in other words, did the state offer any evidence going to each essential element of the offense. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). If so, the evidence is legally sufficient for purposes of the Due Process Clause. The sufficiency of the evidence standard requires
{¶5} Ramos argues that the court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the offense of aggravated murder as charged under
{¶6}
{¶8} Although the evidence showed that Ramos and his wife had an encounter that escalated into violence, Ramos’s decision to kill the wife was not due to an instantaneous event. A rational trier of fact could find that Ramos’s act of leaving the room, getting a knife, and returning to the room his wife was in was sufficient to show “studied care” in planning the wife’s death. Ramos’s act of leaving the room to get the knife created a break in the escalating series of events, showing that his decision to kill went beyond mere momentary deliberation and into the realm of a planned attack. Taylor at 19. In
{¶9} Ramos concedes that he left the room to get the knife, but claims that he did so in self-defense. Even if the jury could have accepted his self-defense argument, there was no evidence to show that Ramos believed he was under the threat of imminent bodily harm such that he had to use the knife to defend himself.
{¶10} Ramos next argues that the state failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove the child endangerment counts. He argues that the only evidence of endangerment was that the children, ages five, three, and one, were kept in the car along the highway as he twice attempted to kill himself, but that the children were not put in a situation of substantial risk to their health or safety.
{¶11} As charged in this case,
{¶12} A rational trier of fact could conclude that Ramos created a substantial risk to the safety and health of the three children by abandoning them in an unlocked car along the side of a four-lane highway with a 65 m.p.h. speed limit. Ramos not only abandoned the children, he took no steps to ensure their safety, leaving them to fend for themselves after he attempted suicide. At the same time, Ramos acted in complete disregard for their emotional well-being by attempting to commit suicide in front of them. Emergency responders testified that they found the children “visibly upset and crying.” This was sufficient proof that he created a substantial risk to the safety and health of his children.
{¶13} Ramos’s remaining arguments address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the felonious assault, domestic violence, and kidnapping counts. In our first opinion in this case, we found that the state offered sufficient evidence to prove the felonious assault and domestic violence counts, but found insufficient evidence to support the kidnapping counts. The state filed an application for reconsideration on our resolution of the kidnapping counts; however, we need not address the state’s arguments. On reconsideration, we now conclude under existing precedent that we should not have addressed the merits of Ramos’s sufficiency of the evidence arguments for any offense
{¶14} When counts in an indictment are allied offenses, and there is sufficient evidence to support the offense on which the state elects to have the defendant sentenced, the appellate court need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence on the count that is subject to merger because any error would be harmless:
Even if we held the evidence somehow insufficient as to Count Three (charging kidnapping by restraint), it was clearly sufficient as to Count Four (charging kidnapping by removal). Since the trial court merged the kidnapping convictions with one another, Powell received only one sentence for kidnapping, and an erroneous verdict on Count Three would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a finding of error on Count Three could not affect the sentence. Powell’s sixth proposition of law is overruled.
State v. Powell, 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 263, 552 N.E.2d 191 (1990).
{¶15} In State v. Croom, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 54, 2013-Ohio-5682, ¶ 60, the Seventh District Court of Appeals stated: “The Supreme Court has concluded that, even if there is insufficient evidence to support one count, where that count has been merged with another count, the error in rendering a verdict on that count is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” This court, too, has applied Powell to find that any issues concerning the weight of the evidence with respect to a count that was merged into another count for sentencing to be harmless error because the final sentence would not be
{¶16} In addition to the Powell line of cases, a second line of thought has developed, set forth in State v. Obsaint, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060629, 2007-Ohio-2661, holding that if a sentence for an allied offense was merged into another sentence, the defendant was not actually “convicted” of the allied offense. A “conviction” requires both a finding of guilt and a sentence, State v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 178, 389 N.E.2d 494 (1979), so if defendant did not receive a sentence on an allied offense, there was no conviction to review for error. Obsaint at ¶ 24. See also State v. Payne, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014-A-0001, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 17; State v. Franks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103682, 2016-Ohio-5241; State v. Singleton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103478, 2016-Ohio-4696, ¶ 37.
{¶17} We confess to some unease over these holdings: the Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause
{¶18} These are questions that we do not have to answer here. For purposes of this appeal, our conclusion that the state offered legally sufficient evidence to prove the aggravated murder conviction renders our hypothetical moot. On that basis, we find that any claimed error relating to the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence going to counts that merged into the murder count to be harmless beyond any doubt.
{¶19} Ramos next argues that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the only issue that he separately argues as required by App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7), is that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty of aggravated murder by reason of insanity.
{¶20} The manifest weight of the evidence standard requires the reviewing court to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340, 515 N.E.2d 1009 (9th Dist.1986). This is a difficult burden for an appellant to overcome because the trier of fact has the sole responsibility to resolve factual issues.
{¶21}
A person is “not guilty by reason of insanity” relative to a charge of an offense only if the person proves, in the manner specified in section 2901.05 of the Revised Code, that at the time of the commission of the offense, the person did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness of the person’s acts.
{¶22} An insanity defense “does not permit individuals who know what is legally wrong to eschew the law.” State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1051, 2006-Ohio-3704, ¶ 24. For this reason, a defendant suffering from mental illness cannot avoid criminal responsibility if he knows his conduct “violates the law and commonly
{¶23} Although there was significant evidence to show that Ramos suffered from major depressive disorder with “congruent psychotic features” (he heard voices urging him to take his own life), the evidence regarding his lack of knowledge of the wrongfulness of his acts was far less compelling.
{¶24} One of the state’s experts said that it “was not a close call” as to Ramos’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. In seeming contradiction to his statement that he “blacked out” while killing his wife, Ramos had the presence of mind to cover his wife’s body with clothes before leaving the house. By hiding the body from view, Ramos indicated that he knew he did something wrong.
{¶25} Other evidence showing Ramos’s knowledge of his wrongdoing was that he told the police that he had done “something wrong.” This statement demonstrated his conscious knowledge that his act of killing his wife was wrong. And in a note he wrote at the hospital, he not only admitted to killing his wife, but said that he did so because she “four” me — later telling a psychiatrist that the word “four” meant to say that “she f***ed my life, she messed up my life.” A psychiatrist testifying for the state concluded that Ramos’s anger with his wife provided a “rational motive” for him to kill, belying his claim that he did not know the wrongfulness of his acts.
{¶26} In support of his insanity argument, Ramos relies on the report of his expert, but does so for reasons that are unclear. His expert was “unable to reach an opinion with
{¶27} In its instructions to the jury at the close of trial, the court said that testimony had been admitted indicating that Ramos fled the scene and that although evidence of flight did not raise a presumption of guilt, the jury could consider evidence of flight as indicating Ramos’s “consciousness of guilt.” Ramos complains that there was no evidence that he fled his home in order to avoid apprehension; rather, he claims the evidence showed that left the home in order to kill himself.
{¶28} Flight from justice “means some escape or affirmative attempt to avoid apprehension.” State v. Wesley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80684, 2002-Ohio-4429, ¶ 19. Flight is more than merely leaving the scene of a crime — it would be unrealistic to expect persons who commit crimes to remain on the scene for ready apprehension. State v. Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95516, 2011-Ohio-3058, ¶ 30. Flight in this context requires the defendant to appreciate that he has been identified as a person of interest in a criminal offense and is taking active measures to avoid being found. The trier of fact
{¶29} Ramos showed a consciousness of guilt after killing his wife — he twice tried to commit suicide, he begged emergency responders to “let me die” in conjunction with admitting that he killed his wife, and he told a police detective that he did “something wrong.” But this consciousness of guilt was not made in active flight from law enforcement. At the time he left the crime scene, Ramos had no reason to believe that the police were actively seeking him. The evidence showed only that Ramos left a crime scene, not that he was actively fleeing to avoid apprehension. The court abused its discretion by giving a flight instruction.
{¶30} The error in giving the flight instruction, however, was harmless beyond any doubt. See
{¶31} Ramos’s final argument is that the court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial after a police detective testified that the wife sought refuge at a women’s shelter due to domestic violence. He maintains that this was other acts evidence admitted in violation of
{¶32} Before trial, Ramos made a motion in limine asking the court to exclude any evidence that the wife and children had lived in a “women’s shelter” in Rhode Island. Ramos argued that there was no evidence that he committed any acts of domestic abuse against her. The state agreed that it had no evidence of domestic violence and told the court that it was “undecided” as to whether it would seek to offer evidence that the wife had stayed in a women’s shelter. It did tell the court, however, that it believed that it could “show a pattern of domestic violence that resulted in a domestic homicide[.]” The court held Ramos’s motion to exclude the evidence in abeyance until the state desired to offer the evidence, requesting that the state give the court some notice before it sought to use the evidence.
{¶33} Despite seeking to exclude any evidence regarding the women’s shelter, defense counsel mentioned the women’s shelter in opening statement, telling the jury that the wife went to Rhode Island to “check in at a woman’s shelter, a shelter where she could get help in finding housing, subsidized housing, where she could get connected to
{¶34} On cross-examination of the detective, defense counsel’s first question was whether the detective checked police records to determine if Ramos had physically abused his wife. The detective replied that the Cleveland Police Department had no record of Ramos having done so. The detective testified that he checked in other jurisdictions where Ramos lived (New York City and Rhode Island) and could find no reports that Ramos physically abused his wife.
{¶35} On redirect examination of the detective, the state referenced defense counsel’s questions about whether there were any domestic violence reports from New York and asked, “Did you learn at some point about any domestic violence history in Rhode Island, specifically with regard to a domestic violence shelter?” Over objection, the detective answered, “I think she went to a shelter with the kids and may have reported some domestic abuse.” At sidebar, the state told the court that after the ruling on the motion in limine, it obtained two documents prepared by the women’s shelter in Rhode Island indicating that the wife and children “came to our shelter because they were involuntarily displaced as a result of domestic violence and in need of a safe place to
{¶36} Granting a mistrial is an extraordinary remedy for an error. For that reason, “a mistrial should not be ordered in a cause simply because some error has intervened. The error must prejudicially affect the merits of the case and the substantial rights of one or both of the parties.” Tingue v. State, 90 Ohio St. 368, 108 N.E. 222 (1914), syllabus. Indeed, “[m]istrials need be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991). We review a decision to grant or deny a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 21, 517 N.E.2d 900 (1988).
{¶37} The record in this case does not permit us to conclude that the court acted irrationally by finding that the ends of justice did not require a new trial. The defense first mentioned that the wife and children stayed in a “woman’s shelter.” Opening statements at trial are not evidence, Parrish v. Jones, 138 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-5224, 3 N.E.3d 155, ¶ 29, nevertheless, it was Ramos who set the stage for evidence about the women’s shelter. When the detective testified that Ramos mentioned in his statement that his wife and children stayed in a women’s shelter in Rhode Island, that testimony was unobjectionable because the detective learned that fact directly from Ramos. It was at that point that defense counsel specifically asked the detective whether there were any records to substantiate a claim that Ramos physically abused the wife. That question allowed the state to introduce documents from the women’s shelter that
{¶38} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., A.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR