State v. PulizziState v. Pulizzi
Michael Anthony Pulizzi appeals his judgment of conviction for felony possession of methamphetamine,
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Over a period of roughly five months, detectives from the Twin Falls County Sheriff’s Office conducted seven warrantless trash pulls from a garbage bin placed on the sidewalk outside the curtilage of Pulizzi’s apartment. The bags were taken to another location, where their contents
Pulizzi filed a motion to suppress, arguing he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he placed out for collection and, thus, the warrantless searches and seizures of the garbage violated his rights under the
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, a detective with Twin Falls County Sheriff’s Office testified to the trash pull operation, the evidence obtained from the trash pulls, and the subsequent search of Pulizzi’s residence. The detective further testified that he received no monetary gain from searching through Pulizzi’s garbage. Pulizzi did not testify during the hearing.
The district court denied Pulizzi’s motion to suppress. It determined Pulizzi failed to “provide[] . . . any reasonable basis upon which this [c]ourt could simply ignore the decades-old
Pulizzi timely appealed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“When this Court reviews a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Sutterfield, 168 Idaho 558, 561, 484 P.3d 839, 842 (2021) (citing State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019)). “Unless clearly erroneous, this Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact.” Id. (citing Gonzales, 165 Idaho at 671, 450 P.3d at 319). “This Court will, however, freely review the trial court’s ‘application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 589, 448 P.3d 1005, 1017 (2019)).
“Interpretation of an ordinance or statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Rouwenhorst v. Gem County., 168 Idaho 657, 662, 485 P.3d 153, 158 (2021) (quoting Lane Ranch P’ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 89, 175 P.3d 776, 778 (2007)).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Pulizzi argues the district court erred when it determined the WCO did not create an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the district court misinterpreted the WCO. Pulizzi further argues this Court should reconsider its holdings in State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001), and State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2001), and instead conclude that the protections in
Both the
“Although the United States Supreme Court establishes no more than the floor of constitutional protection, this Court has found there is ‘merit in having the same rule of law applicable within the borders of our state, whether an interpretation of the
In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held the
[W]e conclude that [defendants] exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to
Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, [defendants] placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through [defendants]’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage “in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,” [defendants] could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.
Id. at 40–41 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
In the following years, state courts confronted the question of whether particular warrantless searches and seizures of one’s garbage offended parallel provisions in state constitutions. See generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Searches and Seizures: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Contents of Garbage or Trash Receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th 1 (1998). In State v. Donato, we addressed the issue of whether
[T]he rule enunciated in Greenwood is the proper interpretation of the protections provided by
Article I, [section] 17 of the Idaho Constitution . Donato has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items deposited in a public area, conveyed to a third-party for collection, and “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”
Id. at 474, 20 P.3d at 10 (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40). On the same day this Court issued its opinion in Donato, we also issued our opinion in State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 26 P.3d 1222 (2001). The McCall opinion addressed a similar challenge to a warrantless search and seizure of curbside garbage, which was disposed of on the same grounds as Donato. Id. at 887, 26 P.3d at 1224.
“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Brown, 170 Idaho 439, 443, 511 P.3d 859, 863 (2022) (quoting State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4–5, 343 P.3d 30, 33–34 (2015)). Those circumstances are not present here. Pulizzi has not demonstrated that the precedent established by Donato and McCall is manifestly wrong, unjust or unwise, or that overruling these precedents “is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, our interpretation of the protections of
Pulizzi argues that our holdings in Donato and McCall are not dispositive because they did not address whether a city’s waste collection ordinance created a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash that is put out for collection in accordance with the ordinance’s provisions. According to Pulizzi, the WCO creates this expectation because it: (1) requires the City’s residents to place their trash out for collection in a publicly accessible space; (2) restricts who can collect garbage to
“The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted it.” Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County., 145 Idaho 121, 131, 176 P.3d 126, 136 (2007) (citing Payette River Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Valley Cnty, 132 Idaho 551, 554, 976 P.2d 477, 480 (1999), overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 908, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012)). “Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction.” Id. (citation omitted). “Language of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine the legislature’s intent.” Id. (quoting Friends of Farm to Market, v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002)). In this case, neither party has argued—nor do we conclude—that the language of the WCO is ambiguous. Therefore, we need not consider rules of statutory construction when interpreting the WCO.
The WCO, as set forth in chapter 3, title 7 of the Twin Falls City Code, establishes a garbage collection scheme under the supervision of the Twin Falls City Council. Section 7-3-1 sets forth the WCO’s purpose of promoting the general health, welfare, and safety of the people in the city:
This Chapter is declared to be an ordinance to promote the general health, welfare and safety of the people in the City; and is enacted for the promotion and protection of the public health and safety; and to prevent nuisances, the spread of disease and fire hazards. It is the purpose of this Chapter to aid the people in keeping the City clean, safe, sanitary and free from petty annoyances and nuisances.
Section 7-3-8 grants the City Council authority “to provide for the collection of garbage and rubbish as a city function or by contract with one or more independent collectors,” and also states that: “[n]o person or firm shall engage in the collection of garbage or rubbish for monetary gain unless authorized and licensed by the council . . . .” Section 7-3-10 instructs independent collectors
The WCO also sets requirements and restrictions for storing garbage and placing it out for collection. Sections 7-3-3 and 7-3-4 require that all garbage and rubbish be placed in containers, and, under section 7-3-6, these containers must be placed in front of premises for collection (or in alley ways in certain circumstances). Absent special permission from the City Council, “[n]o user of a premise within the City shall be exempt from the collection and disposal service provided by the City or by individual collectors and licensees[.]” Twin Falls City Code § 7-3-12.
The district court determined that the WCO “does not require any resident to participate in the City’s garbage collection program” and that residents were “free to discard of their trash in any other lawful manner[,]” such as contracting with other licensed garbage collectors, “hiring document shredding companies, burning their garbage (where lawful or otherwise obtaining a permit), or personally transporting their garbage to the county transfer station.” The district court further concluded the ordinance “clearly does not apply to law enforcement officers” because its purpose is “to promote the health and safety of City residents and to prevent the spread of disease[,]” rather than to “restrict law enforcement officers from performing their lawful duty.” Moreover, the district court concluded section 7-3-8’s prohibition against unauthorized collection of garbage for “monetary gain” had no application to law enforcement performing trash pulls because they were not the garbage collection entities section 7-3-8 addressed, and they were not collecting Pulizzi’s garbage for any type of monetary gain.
Pulizzi argues the district erred by misinterpreting the WCO because participation in the “City’s collection trash collection program was mandatory” under section 7-3-12, and “placing his trash out for collection in a public place likewise was mandatory” under sections 7-3-3, 7-3-4, and 7-3-6. We disagree. The WCO does not require residents to dispose of their personal effects, including evidence of illegal drug use, into the garbage receptacles that are accessible to the public and law enforcement. As the district court noted, residents have other lawful means to discard their trash, such as burning their garbage after obtaining a permit or personally transporting their
Pulizzi argues the district court erred when it determined that the WCO did not prohibit law enforcement from conducting the trash pulls. Specifically, Pulizzi argues that section 7-3-8 prohibited law enforcement officers from searching his trash because they “were being paid to periodically collect Mr. Pulizzi’s garbage,” and thus “the detective’s collection of [his] trash was for ‘monetary gain’ under the plain language of City Code [section] 7-3-8.” This argument is also unavailing.
First, it is clear that law enforcement officers are not those “person[s] or firm[s]” that are prohibited from collecting garbage for monetary gain as contemplated under section 7-3-8. Instead, this provision is directed at independent contractors who were not “authorized and licensed” by the Twin Falls City Counsel to collect garbage within city limits. This reading is supported by: (1) the prior sentence in section 7-3-8, which establishes the City Council’s authority to provide for the collection of garbage “as a city function or by contract with one or more independent collectors[;]” (2) the language conditioning this prohibition, (i.e. “for monetary gain” and “unless authorized and licensed by the council . . .”), and (3) the provision stating, “said council may establish the geographic limits for such collection.” These provisions—along with the ordinance’s stated purpose of “promot[ing] the general health, welfare and safety”—clearly establish that the intent of section 7-3-8 was to create a unified garbage collection scheme under City Council’s supervision, rather than prohibiting suspicious detectives (or nosey neighbors) from rummaging through curbside garbage.
Second, we reject Pulizzi’s argument that this prohibition applied to law enforcement because they were being paid a salary while conducting the trash pulls. As the State notes, the detective testified that he “would have been paid regardless of whether [he] pulled Mr. Pulizzi’s trash or not[;]”and the district court found that “[n]one of the law enforcement officers involved in any of the trash pulls received any monetary gain from picking up and sifting through Defendant’s trash.”
Pulizzi’s reliance on Wright is misplaced for several reasons. First, unlike the ordinance in Wright, the WCO does not prohibit “any person” from taking garbage that is placed out for collection. Instead, section 7-3-8 only prohibits “person[s] or firm[s]” from collecting garbage “for monetary gain unless authorized and licensed by the council . . . .” As discussed above, this prohibition applies to independent garbage collectors. However, it does not apply to law enforcement. Furthermore, even if we interpreted this provision to broadly prohibit any person from taking garbage that is placed out for collection, this would not prevent nosy neighbors, curious kids, scavengers, or unpaid snoops from accessing this garbage, provided that they do not do so for “monetary gain.”
Second, as the South Dakota Supreme Court explained, an objective expectation of privacy is not created simply because an ordinance aimed at maintaining society’s interest in sanitation dictates how trash is to be collected:
While city ordinances may, in some cases, be reflective of societal expectations of privacy, they do not manifest such an expectation simply because they dictate how persons are to place their trash for collection or how the trash is to be collected. Nothing in these ordinances suggests that Rapid City enacted them to protect a citizen’s interest in garbage privacy. These ordinances were obviously enacted solely to maintain society’s interest in sanitation.
State v. Stevens, 734 N.W.2d 344, 347–48 (S.D. 2007) (footnote omitted). Nothing in the WCO indicates that it was intended to promote society’s privacy interest in the content of their curbside garbage. As the district court and the State emphasized, the WCO’s express purpose is to “promote
Lastly, the Wright court specifically rejected the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Greenwood that “an expectation of privacy in garbage bags left outside the curtilage of a home was not objectively reasonable” based on the “common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.” Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 418 (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. 39–40). Rather, the Wright court concluded that under the Iowa state constitution, “[w]hen a citizen places garbage out for collection in a closed garbage bag, the contents of the bag are private, as a factual matter.” Id. at 418. In contrast, this Court has explicitly concluded that the rule enunciated in Greenwood is the proper interpretation of the protections provided by
In sum, the plain language of the WCO does not support Pulizzi’s argument that his expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable because the WCO was not intended to promote society’s privacy interest in curbside garbage, and it does not interfere with the public’s access—or law enforcement’s access—to curbside garbage in any noteworthy way. Accordingly, Pulizzi “has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items deposited in a public area, conveyed to a third-party for collection, and ‘readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.’ ” Id. (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40). Because this conclusion is dispositive of Pulizzi’s challenge to the district court’s order, we do not address the State’s alternative argument challenging Pulizzi’s standing to dispute the search of his garbage.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Pulizzi’s judgment of conviction.
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices MOELLER, ZAHN and MEYER CONCUR.