State v. PattersonState v. Patterson
Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender; Melissa A. Blake and Jamie R. Eck, Assistant Public Defenders, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellant).
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, James F. Patterson (“Mr. Patterson”), appeals the judgments of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion to suppress and imposing an indefinite prison term of three to four and one-half years following Mr. Patterson’s no contest plea to aggravated possession of drugs.
{¶2} Mr. Patterson asserts six assignments of error, which we review out of order and, at times, collectively.
{¶4} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find as follows:
{¶5} (1) There is no basis to conclude that the inventory search of Mr. Patterson’s vehicle was unlawful. Mr. Patterson has not asserted that law enforcement administered its vehicle impoundment policy in bad faith or that its actions were a mere pretext for an evidentiary search. In addition, an inventory search is an administrative caretaking that is not subject to the same requirements as a protective search for weapons.
{¶6} (2) Pursuant to this court’s precedent, constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Act are not yet ripe for review.
{¶7} Thus, we affirm the judgments of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶8} The underlying case arose following a traffic stop in Painesville Township on the evening of October 5, 2020.
{¶9} Sergeant Zachary Ropos (“Sgt. Ropos”) of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office (“LCSO”) was situated in his marked patrol car near the intersection of Fairport Nursery Road and Mantle Road with his headlights shining onto the roadway. According to Sgt. Ropos, the area had experienced a high rate of crime, including an influx of stolen vehicles. Specifically, car thieves were stealing temporary tags and placing them in obscure locations on the stolen vehicles.
{¶11} Sgt. Ropos ran the vehicle’s registration through central dispatch and asked Mr. Patterson for his driver’s license. Mr. Patterson provided him with his Ohio identification card. While waiting for dispatch to respond, Mr. Patterson informed Sgt. Ropos that he had recently been released from prison. Dispatch advised Sgt. Ropos that Mr. Patterson was the registered vehicle owner and that he had a suspended driver’s status. Sgt. Ropos asked Mr. Patterson to step out of the vehicle and escorted him to the rear of the patrol car to issue him a citation.
{¶12} The LCSO’s written policies and procedures state that vehicle impoundment is necessary “[w]hen State laws dictate impoundment of vehicles such as driving under the influence laws and driving under suspension law.” Sgt. Ropos determined that it was necessary to tow Mr. Patterson’s vehicle because Mr. Patterson was the sole occupant, he did not have a valid license, and the vehicle was stopped on a traveled roadway. After calling the tow truck, Sgt. Rose conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and completed a vehicle inventory sheet.
{¶14} During his inventory search of the vehicle, Sgt. Ropos found drugs inside a large plastic bag in the driver’s side door compartment.
Indictment
{¶15} The Lake County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Patterson for the following offenses: aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the second degree, in violation of
{¶16} Mr. Patterson waived his right to be present at his arraignment, and the trial court entered pleas of not guilty on his behalf.
Motion to Suppress
{¶17} Mr. Patterson filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the LCSO from his vehicle, challenging the constitutionality of the traffic stop, his continued detention, and the search. The state filed a response opposing Mr. Patterson’s motion.
No Contest Plea; Sentencing
{¶19} Mr. Patterson subsequently withdrew his plea of not guilty to count 1 (aggravated possession of drugs) and its related forfeiture specification and entered written and oral pleas of no contest. The state agreed to dismiss the remaining count of the indictment, and the parties agreed to jointly recommend a prison sentence of three years. Mr. Patterson reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the trial court’s imposition of an indefinite prison term pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act.
{¶20} The trial court held a plea hearing, where it engaged in a plea colloquy with Mr. Patterson pursuant to Crim.R. 11, accepted his no contest plea to count 1 and the related specification, and found him guilty. Mr. Patterson waived a presentence investigation, and the matter proceeded to sentencing the next day.
{¶21} At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the Reagan Tokes Act and argued that it is unconstitutional on several bases. The trial court found that the law is constitutional and overruled defense counsel’s objection. The trial court sentenced Mr. Patterson to an indefinite prison term of a minimum term of three years and a maximum term of four-and-a-half years.
{¶23} “[1.] The defendant-appellant’s constitutional challenges to the indeterminate prison sentence of three to four and a half years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ aka Senate Bill 201, are ripe for review.
{¶24} “[2.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of three to four and a half years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ aka Senate Bill 201, must be reversed as the Reagan Tokes Act is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.
{¶25} “[3.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of three to four and a half years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ aka Senate Bill 201, must be reversed as the Reagan Tokes Act unconstitutionally violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
{¶26} “[4.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of three to four and a half years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ aka Senate Bill 201, violates his constitutional right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶27} “[5.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of three to four and a half years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ aka Senate Bill 201, violates his constitutional rights to fair trial and due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 5 & 10 of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶29} We address Mr. Patterson’s assignments of error out of order and, at times, collectively, for ease of discussion.
Motion to Suppress
{¶30} In his sixth assignment of error, Mr. Patterson contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. On appeal, Mr. Patterson asserts that the inventory search of his vehicle was “unlawful.”
Standard of Review
{¶31} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id. On appeal, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id. “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id.
Legal Standards
{¶32} The United States and Ohio Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
{¶33} The warrant requirement is subject to “‘a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), quoting Katz at 357. An inventory search is one of these exceptions. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 405, 604 N.E.2d 743 (1992).
{¶34} There are two portions of an inventory search: (1) the impoundment of the vehicle and (2) the inventory of the items therein. State v. Perry, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-125, 2012-Ohio-4888, ¶ 31. Vehicles are frequently taken into police custody in the interests of public safety as part of the community-caretaking functions of police. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 20. Examples include vehicles that have been in accidents; violate parking ordinances; are stolen or abandoned; and cannot be lawfully driven. Leak at ¶ 20. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, “[t]he authority of police to seize and remove from the street vehicles that impede traffic or threaten public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” Opperman at 369; see Leak at ¶ 20.
{¶35} When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. Opperman at 369. These procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: (1) the protection
{¶36} Because inventory searches are administrative caretaking functions unrelated to criminal investigations, the policies underlying the warrant requirement, including the standard of probable cause, are not implicated. Opperman at 370, fn. 5; Hathman at 406. Rather, their validity is judged by the Fourth Amendment’s standard of “reasonableness.” Opperman at 370; Hathman at 406.
{¶37} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “a routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when performed pursuant to standard police practice and when the evidence does not demonstrate that the procedure involved is merely a pretext for an evidentiary search of the impounded vehicle.” Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 113 Ohio St.3d 67, 2007-Ohio-1103, 862 N.E.2d 810, ¶ 11.
Analysis
{¶38} Mr. Patterson first challenges the tow of his vehicle. According to Mr. Patterson, Sgt. Ropos testified that an alternative in this type of situation was to allow a designated person to pick up the vehicle. Mr. Patterson asked to have someone pick up the vehicle, but Sgt. Ropos refused. Had Sgt. Ropos allowed the vehicle to be picked up instead of calling for a tow, the vehicle would not have been the subject of the inventory search.
{¶40} While Sgt. Ropos admittedly did not give Mr. Patterson an opportunity to contact someone prior to ordering the tow, this is not constitutionally required. Even if it had been possible for police to give a defendant an opportunity to make alternative arrangements for a vehicle, “‘the real question is not what “could have been achieved,” but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps. * * * The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative “less intrusive” means.’” Bertine at 374, quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983); see Blue Ash at ¶ 19. Instead, “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.” Bertine at 374; see Perry at ¶ 47-48.
{¶41} Mr. Patterson has not asserted that Sgt. Ropos administered the LCSO’s written impoundment policy in bad faith or that Sgt. Ropos’s actions were a mere pretext for an evidentiary search. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the tow of Mr. Patterson’s vehicle was unlawful.
{¶43} Mr. Patterson’s argument is based on case law regarding a protective search of a vehicle following an investigative stop. See, e.g., State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 181, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988) (“[A] police officer, during an investigative stop, has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer may initiate a protective search for the safety of himself and others”). Sgt. Ropos’s search of Mr. Patterson’s vehicle was an inventory search, which is an administrative caretaking function that is not subject to these requirements. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the search of Mr. Patterson’s vehicle was unlawful.
{¶44} Mr. Patterson’s sixth assignment of error is without merit.
Reagan Tokes Act
{¶45} We collectively address Mr. Patterson’s first through fifth assignments of error, which involve the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act.
{¶46} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Patterson contends that his constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Act are ripe for review. In his second through fifth assignments of error, he contends, respectively, that the Reagan Tokes Act is void for vagueness; violates the doctrine of separation of powers; violates his right to trial by jury; and violates his rights to a fair trial and due process.
{¶47} This court has previously described the relevant portions of the Reagan Tokes Act, as follows:
{¶49} In State v. Lavean, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-045, 2021-Ohio-1456, we concluded, in accordance with several of our sister districts, that constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Act on appeal from sentencing are not yet ripe for review because it is uncertain whether the offender’s release date will extend past the minimum term of imprisonment imposed. Id. at ¶ 8-12.
{¶51} In addition, the question of whether the Reagan Tokes Law is ripe for review is currently pending before the Supreme Court of Ohio. See State v. Maddox, 160 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2020-Ohio-6913, 159 N.E.3d 1150.
{¶52} Thus, in accordance with this court’s precedent, we conclude that Mr. Patterson’s first assignment of error lacks merit and that his second through fifth assignments of error are not yet ripe for review.
{¶53} For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.