State v. PadillaState v. Padilla
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- David K. Thomson, Michael E. Vigil, C. Shannon Bacon, Briana H. Zamora, Daniel A. Bryant
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
James W. Grayson, Chief Deputy Attorney General
Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Petitioner
Kennedy, Hernandez & Harrison, PC
Paul J. Kennedy
Jessica M. Hernandez
Elizabeth A. Harrison
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondent
THOMSON, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
{1} In June 2018, five and a half years into a six-year statute of limitations, the State filed two second-degree embezzlement-related charges in a criminal information against Demesia Padilla, former Secretary of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department, in district court in the First Judicial District. See
{2} We now review whether the Court of Appeals correctly vacated Padilla’s second-degree felony convictions as barred by the running of the statute of limitations.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{3} On June 29, 2018, the State charged Padilla by criminal information with two second-degree felonies in the First Judicial District Court. Padilla timely raised venue objections within ninety days of her arraignment. See
{4} On August 1, 2019, over six months after the running of the six-year limitations period, Padilla was indicted by a grand jury in Sandoval County. Relative to the June 28, 2018, criminal complaint, it was not a superseding indictment. See Indictment, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “superseding indictment” as “[a] second or later indictment that includes additional charges or corrects errors in an earlier case“). The State alleged that the felonies occurred “between December 19, 2011, and January 22, 2013.” Padilla moved to dismiss the charges as time barred. The parties acknowledge that absent statutory or common law tolling, the six-year limitations period for these offenses expired on January 23, 2019. See
{6} Padilla was convicted of both offenses and appealed, arguing in the Court of Appeals that the Legislature intended for Section 30-1-9(B) to govern second-degree felonies and that the statutory five-year cap between the alleged crime and the time of filing for the benefits of tolling denied the State the provision’s benefit. Padilla, 2023-NMCA-047, ¶ 4. The State maintained that Section 30-1-9(B) did not apply because (1) the prior information was never quashed or dismissed as required under Subsection (B)(3),2 (2) the five-year cap set out in Section 30-1-9(B) еxcludes second-degree felonies (and, for that matter, all felonies under New Mexico law) from the ambit of the statute, and (3) the running of the statute of limitations was suspended upon the filing of the original indictment, even though the filing was made in the wrong county.
{8} The Padilla majority distinguished Martinez, 1978-NMCA-095, relied upon by the district court and the dissent. The majority reasoned that the narrow question in Martinez was “[w]hether the timely criminal complaint that initiated the felony charges in magistrate court satisfied the statute of limitations even though the superseding felony indictment was filed in district court after the limitation period expired.” Padilla, 2023-NMCA-047, ¶ 12. The Padilla majority further noted that the cases Martinez relied upon all involved an original and a superseding charging document without any dismissal between the two, while here, in contrast, the charges were dismissed and a separate action subsequently filed. Id. Finally, the majority noted that Section 30-1-9 and Section 30-1-8 were adopted at the same legislative session, and, thus, the Legislature was acutely aware
{9} The Padilla dissent, however, identified the “crux of the dispute . . . [as] the interplay between nonstatutory tolling and our criminal tolling statute.” Id. ¶ 20 (Duffy, J., dissenting). In this light, the dissent read the five-year provision as a criterion limiting the applicability of the tolling provision wholesale. Id. ¶ 23. Under that interpretation, because the statute has no effect on felony offenses with limitations periods greater than five years, the Padilla dissent maintained that the Legislature must have intended that the tolling provision not apply to felonies but only, as the dissent put it, to “less serious offenses.” Id. ¶ 26. We appreciate the differing but thoughtful approaches of the Court of Appeals majority and dissent in this case and settle the question.
III. ANALYSIS
{10} The tolling provision, Section 30-1-9(B), showcases the first of two issues before this Court. Does Section 30-1-9 apply to second-degree felonies, or because of the five-year cap contained in Section 30-1-9(B)(4), does it only apply to crimes with a statute of limitations that is less than five years? This is important because if Section 30-1-9(B) governs tolling for second-degree felonies, then common law tolling principles could not apply. In that vein, the State—joined by the Padilla
{11} The Padilla dissent suggests importing common law (or “nonstatutory“) tolling principles, which it finds in Martinez, 1978-NMCA-095. See Padilla, 2023-NMCA-047, ¶¶ 18-20 (Duffy, J., dissenting)(“The Martinez Court ultimately concluded that nonstatutory tolling was consistent with the Legislature’s intent under the circumstances of the case, thereby establishing that Section 30-1-9 does not contain the entire universe of tolling for criminal cases in New Mexico.“). The Martinez Court concluded that an indictment filed after the statute of limitations has run was tolled by a previously filed and still pending complaint in magistrate court. 1978-NMCA-095, ¶¶ 10-11. The Martinez Court explained that “the indictment was timely because the limitation period was tolled by the filing of the complaint” in magistrate court, which occurred before the statute of limitations had run. Id. ¶ 12. The Padilla dissent would have applied this same reasoning to hold “that the timely filing for the State’s first complaint tolled the statute of limitations, and thus, the State had
{12} The State advances a similar argument: that the plain language of the statute of limitations for second-degree felonies, Section 30-1-8, supports tolling on its own terms without any need to rely on tolling under Section 30-1-9(B). Under the State’s theory, satisfying the statute of limitations with a timely filing of the first set of charges also serves to toll the statute and extend the timе for filing a second set of charges. Put simply, the State argues that as long as it filed some charges within the statute of limitations period, the statute of limitations is satisfied because the running of the limitations period is suspended at the time of filing.
{13} We address each of these arguments in turn. First, to set the proper analytical framework, we outline the relationship between statutes of limitations and mechanisms for suspending those limitations periods. We then walk through the statutory tolling provision at issue, Section 30-1-9, and the State’s argument that the terms of Section 30-1-8 act independently to toll the statute of limitations once an indictment is filed. Finally, we turn to principles of common law tolling and whether such a concept exists under Martinez.
{14} “A statute of limitations is . . . a law that bars claims after a specified period.” State v. Hill, 2008-NMCA-117, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 775, 192 P.3d 770 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For a criminal defendant, the statute of limitations is a substantive right. See State v. Kerby, 2007-NMSC-014, ¶ 18, 141 N.M. 413, 156 P.3d 704. Thus, we are charged to “liberally construe[]” statutes of limitations in favor of a defendant. Id. ¶ 13. “These statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). The purpose of a limitations period on criminal charges “is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.” Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970). On its own, a statute of limitatiоns is a bright-line rule. Once the period has passed, “[a] person shall not be prosecuted, tried, or punished . . .” for the charged offense.
{15} Whether by statutory or common law creation, tolling can be pivotal because where the statute of limitations has run, for an action to be viable, some mechanism
{16} Tolling may “mean either that the running of the limitations period is suspended or that the effect of the limitations period is defeated.” Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 93 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). When a statute suspends the running of the limitations period for a set amount of time, this is referred to as stopping the clock. Suspensiоn stops the running of the limitations period and later imputes the remaining time onto the end of the tolling period. Id. at 79-80.
[T]he “tolling” of limitations is a term most оften used to express the concept of interrupting the continuous flow of the passage of time, to be resumed afresh once the tolling ends. In that sense, if (say) four years of a five-year limitations period had elapsed before the tolling event occurred, once the tolling has stopped another year would still remain before the statute of limitations would bar bringing the criminal charge—and that would be so whether the tolling period had been a month, a year or even ten years. But that meaning of “tolling,” even if the one most frequently employed, is not the only possible usage of the term. “Tolling” can also describe the concept in which the return of an indictment renders timely any restatement of its charges—the familiar “superseding” indictment—while the earlier indictment is pending.
United States v. Lytle, 658 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (footnote omitted). These clear distinctions, well described by the Lytle court, are critical to understanding how New Mexico’s tolling statute operates.
B. Section 30-1-9 Governs Tolling for Second-Degree Felonies
{18} Both the State and the Padilla dissent assert that second-degree felonies fall outside the ambit of Section 30-1-9 to advance their positions. The Padilla dissent advocates for common law tolling principles where it perceives a gap in Section 30-1-9. The State, on the other hand, argues that it satisfied the statute of limitations provided in Section 30-1-8 by filing its initial information within the six-year window. Neither view is reconcilable with the plain meaning of Section 30-1-9, which includes second-degree felonies within its ambit but excludes them from the
1. Standard of review
{19} Because the facts are not in dispute and this is a matter of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See State v. Collier, 2013-NMSC-015, ¶ 29, 301 P.3d 370 (“When facts relevant to a statute of limitations issue are not in dispute, the Court reviews de novo whether the [lower] court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, criminal statutes of limitations “are ‘to be liberally construed in favor of a defendant because their purpose is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of [the sanctioned] acts.’” State v. Morales, 2010-NMSC-026, ¶ 13, 148 N.M. 305, 236 P.3d 24 (quoting Kerby, 2007-NMSC-014, ¶ 13).
2. Section 30-1-9 applies to second-degree felonies and excludes the State from the benefits of tolling in this case
{20} Section 30-1-9(B) presents a series of six independent clauses joined by semicolons setting forth when tolling applies. Section 30-1-9(B) reads:
When
(1) an indictment, information or complaint is lost, mislaid or destroyed;
(2) the judgment is arrested;
(3) the indictment, information or complaint is quashed, for any defect or reason; or
(4) the prosecution is dismissed because of variance between the allegations of the indictment, information or complaint and the evidence; and a new indictment, information or complaint is thereafter presented, the time elapsing between the preferring of the first indictment, information or complaint and the subsequent indictment, information or complaint shall not be included in computing the period limited for the prosecution of the crime last charged; provided that the crime last charged is based upon and grows out of the same transaction upon which the original indictment, information or complaint was founded, and the subsequent indictment, information or complaint is brought within five years from the date of the alleged commission of the original crime.
(Emphasis added.)
{21} The plain language of Section 30-1-9(B) is naturally read as establishing a condition that has a single exception, viz., the five-year proviso. The condition sets out the required characteristics for Section 30-1-9(B) to apply: when one of the four events⸻enumerated clauses (1) through (4)⸻occurs and “a new indictment, information or complaint is thereafter presented.” Where the condition is met, “the time elapsing between the preferring of the first indictment, information or
{22} The third clause of Section 30-1-9(B)(4) is a proviso3 limiting the benefit of the tolling clause. It reads: ”provided that the crime last charged is based upon and grows out of the same transaction upon which the original indictment, information or complaint wаs founded, and the subsequent indictment, information or complaint is brought within five years from the date of the alleged commission of the original crime.” (Emphasis added.) This third clause establishes two exceptions to the general rule, one of which is the five-year cap at issue here.
{23} In this case, the original information was quashed due to improper venue so the general rule (or condition) of the tolling provision is applied. See
{24} The Section 30-1-9(B)(4) proviso and how it interacts with the statute of limitations in Section 30-1-8(A) complicates matters. The Legislature afforded second-degree felonies a generous six-year statute of limitations, Section 30-1-8(A), which is greater than the tolling provision’s applicability cap of five-years set forth in the proviso. The State and the Padilla dissent read the proviso as establishing a condition, an additional criterion, for Section 30-1-8(A) to apply.
{25} We disagree and conclude that the proviso of Section 30-1-9(B)(4) operates “to except some particular case or situation from a general principle or enactment.”
{26} In lieu of a plain meaning analysis of Section 30-1-9, the Padilla dissent focuses its interpretive efforts on the 1963 amendment, which added the tolling provision’s five-year cap. The 1963 amendment was part of a years-long effort
When an indictment is lost, mislaid, or destroyed, or when the judgment is arrested, or the indictment quashed, for any defect therein, or for the reason that it was not found by a grand jury regularly organized, or because it charged no offense, or for any other cause, or when the prosecution is dismissed because of a variance between the allegations of the indictment and the evidence, and a new indictment is thereafter presented, the time elapsing between the preferring of the first charge or indictment and the subsequent indictment shall not be included in computing the period limited for the prosecution of the offense last charged, provided that the offense last charged is based upon, or grows out of, the same transaction upon which the first indictment was founded.
1912 N.M. Laws, ch. 42, § 2; see NMSA 1953, § 41-9-3 (1963) (repealing the 1912 enactment). The original and the amended statute are strikingly similar except, of course, for the new five-year proviso.
{27} There is nо dispute that the prior statute governed all felonies. From a statutory interpretation perspective, the fact that the Legislature retained much of the same language, including the word shall, implies that there was an intent to continue to govern all offenses. The Padilla dissent, however, reads into the 1963 amendment a policy argument that the addition of the five-year cap illustrates legislative intent to “preclude indefinite tolling” and “rein in the statutory tolling period.” Padilla, 2023-NMCA-047, ¶¶ 25, 28 (Duffy, J., dissenting). Because the language of Section 30-
{28} To begin, the 1963 changes to the criminal code which remain unamended and in effect in the code today actually included a specific provision allowing for indefinite tolling in circumstances when, “after any crime has been committed,” a defendant flees or is not a resident of the state. Section 30-1-9(A) (“If after any crime has been committed the defendant shall conceal himself, or shall flee from or go out of the state, the prosecution for such crime may be commenced within the time prescribed in Section [30-]1-8, after the defendant ceases to conceal himself or returns to the state. No period shall be included in the time of limitation when the party charged with any crime is not usually and publicly а resident within the state.“) Because “crime” is inclusive of any forbidden act or omission,
{29} The dissent suggests the addition of the five-year provision evinces “a [legislative] intent to narrow the application of the tolling statute.” Padilla, 2023-NMCA-047, ¶ 25 (Duffy, J., dissenting). If that is true, and the Legislature thereby intended to exclude more serious felony offenses from the ambit of the tolling provision, then we are left with the following unsound proposition: courts should apply a common law tolling principle to a situation where a statute once applied but no longer does because the Legislature expressly amended the provision to preclude its application. The dissent’s interpretation frustrates legislative intent.
{30} The six-year statute of limitations established under the 1963 criminal code provides a different lens through which to view the tolling provision’s five-year cap. During the same 1963 legislative session that amended the tolling provision and adopted the crime classification scheme, a new statute of limitations regime was also enactеd. Compare NMSA 1953, Section 40A-1-9(G) (1963) (providing a statute of limitations for “revenue” crimes of three years), with
{31} If the 1963 Legislature had wanted to restrict the reach of the provision to certain types of offenses, the new criminal code provided the ideal opportunity to do so. In addition to the changes to the tolling provision, the 1963 criminal code saw an overhaul in its terms, influenced heavily by the MPC. The new criminal code adopted the MPC’s classifications of crimes: “felonies, misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors.”
C. The State’s Argument That It Satisfied the Statute of Limitations by Filing the First Action Bеfore the Statute Had Run Fails
{32} The State advances another variant of a tolling principle that has more to do with satisfying the statute of limitations than actual tolling. As the State would have it, all that is required is that the State file an indictment within the statutory period,
{33} The State’s most persuasive argument lies in the cases from Utah and Vermont, which allow common law tolling principles in a criminal context similar to here. See Strand, 674 P.2d at 112; Stewart, 438 A.2d at 673. However, there are two distinguishing features worth noting. First, both of the State Supreme Courts involved rely heavily on a misapplication of Grady. The Courts accept Grady for the proposition that a timely filed charge tolls an action such that a limitations period may be suspended to allow the initiation of a time-barred action after the original charges are dismissed. Stewart, 438 A.2d at 675 (“We agree with [the Grady Court’s] analysis and feel that it applies exactly to the present case.“); Strand, 674 P.2d at 112 (noting the Stewart Court’s reliance on Grady). This understanding is in sharp contrast to federal courts’ view of Grady as holding the opposite. United States v. Bortnovsky, 683 F. Supp. 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he [Grady] Court was not establishing a ‘tolling’ principle beyond
{34} Finally, the State’s reliance on Grady reveals the greatest weakness in its position: it is out of touch with our statutory scheme here in New Mexico. If we were to accept the State’s argument that filing an indictment alone tolls the statute of limitations, there would be no purpose in the language of Section 30-1-9(B). See Katz v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 1981-NMSC-012, ¶ 18, 95 N.M. 530, 624 P.2d 39 (“A statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.“). The conditions set forth in Section 30-1-9(B) would never come to pass. Once an indictment is filed in a timely manner, the statute of limitations would in the State’s view be satisfied, full-stop. Automatic tоlling or suspension would appear to render Section 30-1-9(A)’s indefinite tolling for fleeing and out-of-state residency, superfluous. A criminal information would immediately toll the
D. Martinez Does Not Provide a Foundation for Adopting Common Law Tolling Principles
{35} The Court of Appeals opinion in Martinez, 1978-NMCA-095, does not apply to the facts of this case and cannot be read so broadly as to support adopting common law tolling principles in criminal prosecutions where tolling is not рrovided by statute. As the Padilla majority noted, the question in Martinez was “[w]hether the timely criminal complaint that initiated the felony charges in magistrate court satisfied the statute of limitation even though the superseding felony indictment was filed in district court after the limitation period expired.” 2023-NMCA-047, ¶ 12. This question is different than the one before this Court where the initial complaint was dismissed. The Martinez Court employed a theory of tolling that is closer to a continuation or relation back theory than it is to common law tolling. See 1978-NMCA-095, ¶¶ 10-12; Snow v. Warren Power & Mach., Inc., 2015-NMSC-026, ¶ 19, 354 P.3d 1285 (“‘Whenever the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct . . . set forth . . . in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.’“(quoting
{36} The Martinez Court began its analysis with the tolling provision, acknowledging that it “does not expressly apply to the voluntary dismissal of [a] complaint.” Id. ¶ 16 (relying on Section 40A-1-9 (1963), now compiled as
{37} The facts of Martinez are substantially different from those here and are more aligned with the facts of Grady. Martinez involved a superseding indictment while this case involves a dismissed complaint refiled after the limitations period had run.
IV. CONCLUSION
{38} In summary, we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate Padilla’s convictions for the time-barred charges.
{39} IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID K. THOMSON, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice
DANIEL A. BRYANT, Judge
Sitting by designation