STATE OF OHIO v. CHAD X. PADGETT
Nos. 107015 and 107016
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, County of Cuyahoga
January 17, 2019
2019-Ohio-174
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
Nos. 107015 and 107016
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
CHAD X. PADGETT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-15-598191-A and CR-16-611486-A
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., Blackmon, J., and Keough, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 17, 2019
Edward M. Heindel
2200 Terminal Tower
50 Public Square
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Jennifer King
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant, Chad Padgett, appeals his convictions and claims the following three errors:
1. The trial court erred when it failed to notify Padgett at his plea hearing that postrelease control would be mandatory. This violated Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and rendered Padgett’s guilty pleas not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
2. The trial court erred when it failed to notify Padgett that the firearm specification required a mandatory prison term of three years. This violated Crim.R. 11(C)(2) and made the pleas not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
3. The trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 7(A) and R.C. 2941.021 when it failed to fully explain Padgett’s right to have his case presented to the grand jury.
{¶2} We find no merit to the appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶4} Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state amended the aggravated murder charge alleged in Count 1 of the indictment to involuntary manslaughter in violation of
{¶5} At the plea hearing, Padgett indicated that he waived his right to presentment of charges to the grand jury in Case No. CR-16-611486-A. The trial court accepted Padgett’s signed waiver and confirmed that he discussed it with his trial counsel before signing it. After the state reviewed the terms of the plea agreement on the record, the trial court advised Padgett of the constitutional rights he was waiving by virtue of his guilty pleas and confirmed that Padgett understood those rights.
{¶6} In Case No. CR-15-598191-A, Padgett pleaded guilty to the amended count of involuntary manslaughter, which included a three-year firearm specification. The court informed Padgett that he was required to serve the three-year prison term on the firearm
{¶7} Padgett also pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, which had been amended to delete the attendant firearm specifications. The court advised Padgett that the potential sentences on both the involuntary manslaughter and conspiracy charges ranged from 3 to 11 years and that both charges carried possible fines of up to $20,000. Padgett indicated that he understood these potential penalties.
{¶8} In Case No. CR-16-611486-A, Padgett pleaded guilty to the aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges alleged in the information. Again, the court informed Padgett that both charges were punishable by prison terms of anywhere between 3 and 11 years and that both charges included fines of up to $20,000. Padgett indicated that he understood these possible penalties.
{¶9} Upon inquiry by the trial court, Padgett stated that he understood all the penalties he faced as a result of his guilty pleas. The court further confirmed that Padgett understood his agreed sentence:
THE COURT: And I know there’s an agreed recommended sentence of 28 years aggregate. You understand that as well, correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
(Tr. 12.)
{¶10} The trial court accepted Padgett’s guilty pleas and found him guilty. At a later date, after Padgett had testified against his codefendants, the court sentenced him to 11 years on the involuntary manslaughter charge plus three years on the attendant gun specification, and 11 years on the conspiracy charge, to be served consecutively. Thus, Padgett received an aggregate
II. Law and Analysis
A. Guilty Pleas
{¶11} In the first assignment of error, Padgett argues his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the trial court failed to explain the mandatory nature of the postrelease control he would be subject to upon release from prison. In the second assignment of error, Padgett similarly argues his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because the trial court failed to explain that the gun specifications attendant to the involuntary manslaughter charge required a mandatory three-year prison term. We discuss these assigned errors together.
{¶12} In considering whether a plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, “an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances through a de novo review of the record.” State v. Spock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99950, 2014-Ohio-606, ¶ 7.
{¶13}
{¶15} Strict compliance by the trial court is required for the waiver of the constitutional rights set forth under
{¶16} With respect to the nonconstitutional rights described in
{¶17} Furthermore, a trial court’s failure to properly advise a defendant of his nonconstitutional rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice. Nero at 108. The test for prejudice is whether the plea would have otherwise been made. Id.
{¶18} It is undisputed that the trial court strictly complied with the requirements of
{¶19} In Sarkozy, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[i]f the trial court fails during the plea colloquy to advise a defendant that the sentence will include a mandatory term of postrelease control, the court fails to comply with
{¶20} By contrast, the trial court in this case not only explained that Padgett would be subject to five years of postrelease control; it also explained the consequences of violating postrelease control. The trial court stated:
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And if you violate the terms of your supervision under post[-]release control, an additional prison term up to half the original stated term can be imposed. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
(Tr. 12-13.) The trial court did not suggest that postrelease control may be discretionary; it explained that five years of postrelease control would be imposed if Padgett pleaded guilty to the charges in the amended indictment and information. Padgett informed the court that he understood the terms of postrelease control, and the trial court confirmed that understanding by asking if he had any questions, to which Padgett replied, “No, sir.” (Tr.13.) Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Padgett subjectively understood the mandatory nature of postrelease control.
{¶21} Similarly, with respect the mandatory three years on the gun specifications, the trial court informed Padgett as follows:
THE COURT: Furthermore, there is a three-year firearm specification associated with that count. That three years would have to be served prior and consecutive to any additional — or the time on the underlying count. Do you understand that? It’s three years on the firearm spec—
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: — and then the time to be served after that —
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
(Tr. 11.) The trial court did not use the word “mandatory” to explain the fact that a three-year prison term was required to be served for the gun specifications in addition to the sentence on the underlying charge. However, the court explained the mandatory nature of the three-year prison
{¶22} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
B. Waiver of Grand Jury
{¶23} In the third assignment of error, Padgett asserts that his right to a grand jury was violated because the trial court failed to notify him of the nature of the charges against him when he executed the grand jury waiver. He contends the court’s acknowledgment of a signed waiver on the record fails to satisfy the requirements set forth in
{¶24} Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10, provides that “no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” Thus, “the Ohio Constitution guarantees an accused that the essential facts constituting the offense for which he is tried will be found in the indictment by the grand jury.” State v. Pepka, 125 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-1045, 926 N.E.2d 611, ¶ 14, citing Harris v. State, 125 Ohio St. 257, 264, 181 N.E. 104 (1932).
{¶25}
A felony that may be punished by death or life imprisonment shall be prosecuted by indictment. All other felonies shall be prosecuted by indictment, except that after a defendant has been advised by the court of the nature of the charge against the defendant and of the defendant’s right to indictment, the defendant may waive that right in writing and in open court.
{¶26} The trial court did not explain the nature of the charges in the information in open court and on the record before Padgett signed the waiver and, therefore, failed to comply with
{¶27} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶28} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR