THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PEPKA, APPELLEE.
No. 2009-0678
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted January 12, 2010—Decided March 25, 2010.
125 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-1045
O‘CONNOR, J.
O‘CONNOR, J.
{¶ 1} Pursuant to
{¶ 2} Pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code, the only circumstance in which child endangering in violation of
Relevant Background
{¶ 3} In March 2007, Pepka lived in an apartment in Eastlake, Ohio, with his girlfriend, Kaysie Perry, and her eight-month-old daughter, M.P. On the morning of March 3, 2007, Pepka gave M.P. a bath, but when he placed her in the bathtub, the water was too hot, and M.P. cried. Pepka and Perry cooled the water, and Pepka finished giving the bath. After the bath, Perry noticed that M.P.‘s feet were pink. Perry and Pepka argued, and Perry left the apartment to do laundry, leaving M.P. with Pepka.
{¶ 4} Pepka later called Perry and told her that he thought M.P. was having seizures. Pepka claims that he took off M.P.‘s clothes, put her in a little bit of cold water in the bathtub to revive her, wrapped her in towels, and called 9-1-1. Responding paramedics testified that they found M.P. lying on a wet towel in the living room. She was partially dressed, and her clothes were wet. Her lips and extremities were blue, and she was unresponsive. The paramedics determined that her body temperature was 85.7 degrees Fahrenheit, and they transported her almost immediately to Hillcrest Hospital. On the way to the hospital, the paramedics managed to restore M.P. to consciousness. M.P. was later transferred from Hillcrest to Rainbow Babies and Children‘s Hospital. M.P. suffered permanent and serious physical injury as a result of Pepka‘s actions.
{¶ 5} At trial, the state introduced testimony from a consulting physician that M.P.‘s body temperature had dropped dangerously low, that her left foot had been burned from submersion into something hot, and that she had suffered a subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhages in both eyes. The physician testified that the latter two injuries were consistent with her having been shaken. The physician also testified that M.P.‘s injuries were inconsistent with the history given by Pepka.
{¶ 6} On June 25, 2007, a three-count indictment was filed against Pepka. Each count read as follows:
{¶ 7} “On or about the 3rd day of March, 2007, in the City of Eastlake, Lake County, State of Ohio, one JOSEPH PEPKA did recklessly, being the parent,
{¶ 8} “This act, to-wit: Endangering Children, constitutes a Felony of the Third degree, contrary to and in violation of the Ohio Revised Code, Title 29
{¶ 9} Pepka entered a not-guilty plea. And on December 11, 2007, the state moved the trial court to amend the indictment to add additional language to the first paragraph in each count specifying that Pepka had caused “serious physical harm to the said female minor victim.” The trial court granted the state‘s motion to amend on December 12, 2007, and a jury trial commenced on December 17, 2007.
{¶ 10} Prior to opening statements, Pepka objected to the judge‘s having allowed the state to amend the indictment and requested that the new language be removed, or, alternatively, that the judge grant him a two-week continuance. Pepka argued that he was not prepared to defend against the allegation that he had caused serious physical harm. However, upon questioning by the trial court, Pepka‘s counsel admitted knowing upon the initial indictment that the charges brought were for third-degree felonies, not misdemeanors, and that the state would argue that M.P. had suffered serious physical harm. Counsel also stated that he had received the medical records and the consulting physician‘s report, which described the seriousness of M.P.‘s injuries, two or three months before trial. After a lengthy dialogue, the trial court concluded that the amendment did not change the nature of the harm alleged, that appellee had sufficient notice regarding the serious-physical-harm allegation, and that appellee did not need additional time to prepare to defend against that allegation. The trial court overruled Pepka‘s objection to the amended indictment and denied his motion for a continuance.
{¶ 11} A jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. Before the sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved the court to sentence Pepka for first-degree misdemeanors rather than for the third-degree felonies of which he was convicted. Counsel argued that the state should not have been permitted to amend the indictment and that without the amendment, Pepka had been charged with only misdemeanor child endangering. The trial court reaffirmed its decision allowing the state to amend the indictment and sentenced Pepka to four years in prison on the felony convictions.
{¶ 12} Appellee appealed his convictions and sentence. A divided court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the original
{¶ 13} We granted the state‘s discretionary appeal to address the important constitutional issues implicated in this appeal. State v. Pepka, 122 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2009-Ohio-3625, 910 N.E.2d 477. The state asserts two propositions: (1) “an indictment that charges a defendant with endangering children in violation of
Analysis
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} As this court recently reaffirmed, “[u]nder
{¶ 17} The state asks the court to reverse the Eleventh District‘s judgment and hold that the amendment did not change the degree or identity of the crimes alleged against Pepka. Specifically, the state explains that the body of the indictment for each count specified that Pepka was charged with a third-degree felony and that pursuant to
{¶ 18} Pepka, however, contends that the charges in the indictment did not allege an essential element of third-degree-felony child endangering—that he caused the victim serious physical harm. Therefore, Pepka argues, the indictment was sufficient to charge him with only misdemeanor offenses. Pepka insists that by amending the indictment to allege that he caused M.P. serious physical harm, the state unconstitutionally changed the degree and identity of the offense with which he was charged.
{¶ 19} The state concedes that if the original indictment had been insufficient to charge Pepka with third-degree felonies, then the amendment impermissibly changed the charges from first-degree misdemeanors to third-degree felonies. Therefore, whether the trial court erred in granting the state‘s motion to amend the indictment turns on whether the original indictment was sufficient to charge Pepka with third-degree-felony child endangering. We hold that the indictment was sufficient.
{¶ 20} “The purposes of an indictment are to give an accused adequate notice of the charge, and enable an accused to protect himself or herself from any future prosecutions for the same incident.” State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 7. “An indictment meets constitutional requirements if it ’ “first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” ’ ” Id. at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Childs (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 564-565,
{¶ 21} The original indictment set forth the elements of child endangering under
{¶ 22} Pepka argues that the indictment was insufficient because the statement in the indictment—“This act, to wit: Endangering Children, constitutes a Felony of the Third degree * * *“—is a conclusion of law, whereas a grand jury‘s role is to find the material and essential facts constituting an offense. The assertion is not persuasive.
{¶ 23} In support of his argument, Pepka cites State v. Wozniak (1961), 172 Ohio St. 517, 521, 18 O.O.2d 58, 178 N.E.2d 800, a case that was decided prior to the enactment of
{¶ 24} Because the original indictment was sufficient to charge appellee with third-degree-felony child endangering, the trial court did not err in granting the state‘s motion to amend the indictment. The amendment changed neither the name nor the identity of the offense.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} Pepka was on notice from the initial indictment that he was charged with a third-degree felony for violating
Judgment reversed.
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, J., dissent and would dismiss the appeal as having been improvidently accepted.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joshua S. Horacek, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Albert L. Purola, for appellee.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender.