State v. Nathaniel S.State v. Nathaniel S.
McDONALD, J. A person convicted of a class A or class B felony on the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court may be subject to a lengthy mandatory minimum sentence and may suffer various adverse consequences attendant to a felony conviction. By contrast, a child adjudicated a delinquent on the juvenile docket for committing that same offense is subject to at most four years confinement at the Connecticut Juvenile Training School and is spared many of those attendant consequences. Our juvenile justice statutory scheme requires the automatic transfer of certain cases involving children who have been charged with the commission of a class A or class B felony from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket. In 2015, the legislature amended the juvenile transfer statute to increase the age of a child whose case was subject to an automatic transfer by one year, to fifteen years old. Public Acts 2015, No. 15-183, § 1 (P.A. 15-183, or act), codified at
The parties agree on the relevant procedural facts. By juvenile arrest warrant dated August 14, 2012, the defendant was charged with, among other crimes, sexual assault in the first degree in violation of
On October 1, 2015, while the defendant‘s case was pending on the regular criminal docket, P.A. 15-183 took effect. Among other things, the act amended
The following principles govern our resolution of the reserved question. With respect to criminal statutes, a statute is said to have retroactive application if it applies to crimes allegedly committed prior to its date of enactment. Robinson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 830, 836 n.7, 786 A.2d 1107 (2002). Whether a new statute is to be applied retroactively or only prospectively presents a question of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review. Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187, 195, 925 A.2d 1086 (2007). The question is one of legislative intent and is governed by well established rules of statutory construction. Id.
Several rules of presumed legislative intent govern our retroactivity analysis. Pursuant to those rules, our first task is to determine whether a statute is substantive or procedural in nature. In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 373, 678 A.2d 462 (1996). ‘‘[Although] there is no precise definition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D‘Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 621, 872 A.2d 408 (2005).
If a statute is substantive, then our analysis is controlled by
By contrast, ‘‘[p]rocedural statutes have been traditionally viewed as affecting remedies, not substantive rights, and therefore leave the preexisting scheme intact. . . . [Accordingly] we have presumed that procedural . . . statutes are intended to apply retroactively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary . . . .‘’2 Id., 196. ‘‘We have noted, however, that a procedural statute will not be applied retroactively if considerations of good sense and justice dictate that it not be so applied.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Narayan v. Narayan, 305 Conn. 394, 403, 46 A.3d 90 (2012). Because, in the absence of clear statutory guidance, these default rules provide a conclusive expression of the presumed intent of the legislature, it rarely will be necessary to consult legislative history or other extratextual sources to ascertain the legislative intent with respect to retroactivity. See State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529, 558–59, 107 A.3d 343 (2014).
Turning our attention to the present case, the parties agree that P.A. 15-183 has both procedural and substantive elements. The defendant, however, contends that the act is primarily procedural in nature and, therefore, presumptively retroactive in its application, whereas the state characterizes the act as having significant substantive effects and, therefore, is presumptively prospective in its application. We agree with the defendant.
There is no doubt that the amended statute, on its face, dictates only a procedure—automatic transfer—for adjudicating the cases of certain children accused of committing class A or class B felonies. For that reason, in State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 332, 537 A.2d 483 (1988), this court characterized the juvenile transfer statute as akin to a change of venue and, ‘‘by its nature, procedural.‘’ The only change effectuated by P.A. 15-183 is to narrow the class of persons to whom this procedure applies. A child who had only attained the age of fourteen when he allegedly committed such crimes is no longer subject to automatic transfer to the regular criminal docket pursuant to
The state offers several arguments as to why P.A. 15-183 should be deemed substantive for purposes of retroactivity, notwithstanding its facially procedural nature. We consider each argument in turn.
The problem with the state‘s argument is that many, if not most, rules of legal procedure have the potential to be outcome determinative, and thus to have substantive effects, under certain circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 684–86, 888 A.2d 985 (addressing retroactive application of statute of limitations), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030, 127 S. Ct. 578, 166 L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006). If we treat as substantive any procedural statute that impacts substantive rights, then the line between substantive and procedural will become hopelessly blurred. That in turn defeats the purpose of default rules—such as the rule that procedural statutes are presumptively retroactive—which is to maximize the likelihood that, in the absence of
The state‘s second argument is that In re Daniel H., supra, 237 Conn. 364, and its progeny, stand for the proposition that the substantive/procedural distinction applies only to the civil law, and that all changes to the criminal law are presumptively prospective regardless of whether they are substantive or procedural in nature. The state misreads In re Daniel H. In that case, as in our other cases addressing the retroactive or prospective application of criminal statutes, we made clear that purely procedural changes to the criminal law presumptively apply retroactively, subject of course to the requirements imposed by the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. See id., 372–73; see also Mead v. Commissioner of Correction, 282 Conn. 317, 323, 920 A.2d 301 (2007); State v. Tabone, 279 Conn. 527, 537 n.13, 902 A.2d 1058 (2006); State v. Skakel, supra, 276 Conn. 680; State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 282, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995). When this court stated in In re Daniel H. that ‘‘[i]n criminal cases, to determine whether a change in the law applies to a defendant, we generally have applied the law in existence on the date of the offense, regardless of its procedural or substantive nature‘‘; In re Daniel H., supra, 377; it was in the context of discussing not the default presumptions but, rather, the predicate determination of whether the issue of retroactivity is even implicated. See id., 376–77. That is to say, whereas certain of our sister states take the position that a substantive criminal statute has retroactive application if it applies to crimes committed before the statute was enacted but that a procedural criminal statute is deemed to have retroactive application only if it applies under circumstances (such as the present case) in which the procedures dictated by the prior law already have been undertaken; see M. Gilmore, ‘‘Application of Statutory Changes to Cases in Progress: The Crossroads of the Legislative and Judicial Power—An Analysis of Federal and Idaho Law,‘’ 34 Idaho L. Rev. 517, 562 (1998); Connecticut follows the rule that the date of the offense is the touchstone for both substantive and procedural changes to the law. Accordingly, In re Daniel H. does not require prospective application of the act.
The state also argues that: (1) retroactive application of the act is barred by the savings statutes; see
First, it is well established that
Second, we perceive no absurdity in the fact that retroactive application of the act will affect pending cases but not those that already have reached a final judgment, as this will be true of most retroactive amendments to procedural rules. If the legislature wishes to avoid such a result, it need only specify that a particular procedural change is to be applied only prospectively.
Third, we observe that our sister states, in considering whether changes to their juvenile transfer statutes applied retroactively or only prospectively, have reached differing conclusions. Compare, e.g., Watts v. Commonwealth, 468 Mass. 49, 59, 8 N.E.3d 717 (2014) (prospective application only), with State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St. 3d 437, 442, 775 N.E.2d 829 (2002) (retroactive application). Because of the differences in the statutory language, governing statutory regimes, and controlling legal precedents, those decisions are of limited use in construing the intent of the Connecticut legislature with respect to P.A. 15-183.
For these reasons, we conclude that P.A. 15-183 is procedural in nature and that the changes to the automatic transfer provisions of
The state argues that the text of other contemporaneous legislation addressed to juvenile sentencing speci
One week before P.A. 15-183 was signed into law, the governor signed No. 15-84 of the 2015 Public Acts (P.A. 15-84), which made various changes to Connecticut‘s juvenile sentencing laws. Most sections of P.A. 15-84 merely provide an effective date of October 1, 2015. Unlike P.A. 15-183, however, four sections of P.A. 15-84 contain the following language: ‘‘Effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date . . . .‘’ (Emphasis altered.) P.A. 15-84, §§ 6 through 9. The state contends that the fact that the legislature expressly made certain changes to the juvenile sentencing laws applicable retroactively in contemporaneous legislation, but did not include such language in the relevant provisions of P.A. 15-183, indicates that it did not intend the latter changes to apply retroactively. See State v. Rupar, 293 Conn. 489, 509, 978 A.2d 502 (2009).
The flaw in this argument is that all the amendments contained in P.A. 15-84 that the state highlights are plainly substantive changes in the law. For example, they specify that juvenile offenders will no longer be subject to the death penalty or to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. P.A. 15-84, §§ 6 through 9. Because substantive amendments are presumptively prospective, in order to afford those changes retroactive effect the legislature was required to include express language to that effect. By contrast, because P.A. 15-183 amends the state‘s criminal procedure, the act is presumptively retroactive, and there was no need for the legislature to so specify. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of the act, as informed by the statutory presumptions, unambiguously indicates that the amendments to the juvenile transfer statute contained in P.A. 15-183 apply retroactively to cases pending on the effective date of October 1, 2015.5
Lastly, we are not aware of any ‘’ ‘considerations of good sense and justice’ ‘’ that would preclude retroactive application of P.A. 15-183 in the present case. See Narayan v. Narayan, supra, 305 Conn. 403. The parties and the trial court sought the guidance of this court at the outset, prior to trial, and there is no indication in the record that the state has relied to its detriment on the defendant‘s transfer status as an alleged adult offender.6 Moreover, the rationales that appear to have motivated the adoption of the act apply with equal force to children such as the present defendant who allegedly committed felony offenses prior to its enactment. See footnote 5 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature intended P.A. 15-183 to apply retroactively to cases such as this.
The reserved question is answered ‘‘yes.‘’
In this opinion the other justices concurred.