State v. MooreState v. Moore
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Eugene A. Lucci, Matt Lynch, John J. Eklund
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} John W. Moore appeals his conviction, after a bench trial in the Warren Municipal Court, for criminal damaging, in violation of Warren Municipal Code 541.03(a)(1) and (b). Mr. Moore raises a single assignment of error challenging both the sufficiency and the manifest weight of the evidence. Although this matter is well argued on both sides and Mr. Moore offers reasonable foundations for his arguments, we affirm based upon our deferential manifest-weight standard.
{¶2} The Stаte filed a complaint against Mr. Moore on July 17, 2025, alleging that he knowingly caused, or created a substantial risk of physical harm to the rear driver-
{¶3} A bench trial was held on January 6, 2026, before the Warren Municipal Court. The State presented the testimony of two witnesses, Officer Joseph Black of the Warren Police Department and Ms. Rider. The defense presentеd no witnesses, and Mr. Moore elected not to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
{¶4} Officer Black testified that he was first dispatched to Douglas Avenue on an unrelated matter, a report that a man had been struck by a vehicle. While the officer was at the scene, he was redirected to a nearby Save-A-Lot to speak with a woman, later identified as Ms. Rider, who reported that her tire had been slashed. Officer Black was not present when the tire was damaged but testified, without objection, that Mr. Moore was handed a knife by Ms. Rider‘s ex-boyfriend and was told to stab Ms. Moore‘s tires.
{¶5} At Save-A-Lot, Officer Black found Ms. Rider—whom he described as frazzled and upset—standing near her vehicle, which had a flat tire with three or four puncture marks that, in his opinion, looked like knife slashes rather thаn nail punctures. Officer Black did not photograph the tire. On cross-examination, the officer acknowledged that he did not examine the marks for indications of age—dirt, brittleness, or otherwise—that might have shown whether the damage was recent. The officer testified, however, that, even though he did not know whether “dirt or debris” existed on the tire, he specifically stated the damage to the tire consisted of “slashes.” Moreover, a review of
{¶6} The State played an edited portion of Officer Black‘s body-worn camera, skipping to selected timestamps. The portions played show Officer Black‘s arrival and interview at Save-A-Lot and a segment from the earlier scene on Douglas Avenue in which another officer asks an individual, shirtless and wearing blue shorts, his name; the individual responds, “John Moore.” Officer Black testified that this was the same John Moore who appeared in the courtroom at trial.
{¶7} We point out that none of the video evidеnce depicts the act of the tire being cut. To this point, on cross-examination, Officer Black testified that there was no surveillance of the area—no officer‘s camera, no dash camera, no traffic or “Flock” camera, and no camera mounted on a nearby pole—that recorded the incident itself. Moreover, on cross-examination, Officer Black further testified that he did not author the police report underlying the charge; Officer Raegan Hoffman did. Officer Black testified that he never spoke with, questioned, or otherwise interacted with Mr. Moore, at the scene or at any later time, and that no statement from Mr. Moore appears anywhere in the report.
{¶8} No knife was recovered by any officer, no witness described the type of knife allegedly used, and Officer Black did not know whether anyone else had recovered one. Officer Black also acknowledged that, when he interviewed Ms. Rider, he did not separate her from the companion who was with her at the time.1
{¶10} Ms. Rider testified that she went to Mr. Moore‘s residence to drop off a bicycle seat, that her ex-boyfriend, Robert Maiden, whom she did not expect to see there, arrived and “made a scene,” and that, while she remained seated in her vehicle attempting to drive away, her tire was slashed. Asked how the tire was cut, she testified, “All I remember is somebody telling somebody else to slash my tire,” without identifying who told whom. Although she agreed on direct examination that she had been “able to actually see who did that tire slashing,” when the prosecutor later asked her directly whether she “did know that [her] friend John did it,” she answered only, “I—I believe so.” Later, the prosecutor asked whether the damaged vehicle belonged to Ms. Rider, to which Ms. Rider responded in the affirmative. The prosecutor then asked, “And you obviously have damage to that vehicle, and you‘re saying [the defendant] caused it?” Ms. Rider responded, “Yeah.”
{¶11} Ms. Rider testified that she had repeatedly asked, both before and during trial, that the chargеs against Mr. Moore be dropped because he is her friend. She testified
{¶12} On cross-examination, Ms. Rider could not recall the time of day the incident occurred, never gave police a description of the knife allegedly used, and testified gеnerally that she did not “remember the whole night at all.” This testimony, while confirmed by the record, must be read in relation to Ms. Rider‘s recognition that her statement at the time was, in her estimation, “true.” She testified that she has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, bipolar disorder (described as “mixed, severe“), and depression; that she was not medicated for those conditions in July 2025; and that when she becomes upset, she “blacks out” and “remember[s] nothing.”
{¶13} On re-direct examination, however, Ms. Rider was asked, “It was July [2025], so I wouldn‘t expect you to remember exactly what was said then. I can‘t even remember what I had for breakfast yesterday, but in that instance, would it be accurate that anything that we saw you say to an officer was the truth?” Ms. Rider responded, “Yeah.” The prosecutor then asked whether she had any reason to lie to the responding officer at that moment. Ms. Rider stated, “I would say I wouldn‘t because - - especially like when I‘m upset and I black out and I‘m going off - - it‘s usually true. . . .” The prosecutor pointed out that the discussion with the officer was “pretty close to right after this happened, you were pretty upset[,] and you just told him what happened, right?” Ms. Rider responded, “Yeah.”
{¶14} At the close of the State‘s case, defense counsel moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29, arguing that no witness had described the alleged knife, that no physical or forensic evidence tied the tire‘s damage to that day, and that the only witness who claimed
{¶15} In its оral verdict, the trial court explained that it was relying on out-of-court statements—made to Officer Black and captured on video—that it admitted as excited utterances and present sense impressions. The court found Mr. Moore guilty of criminal damaging, a misdemeanor of the second degree. In imposing sentence, the court cited Mr. Moore‘s voluntary involvement in the incident and his use of a knife, a deadly weapon, and imposed the maximum sentence available for the offense: 90 days’ incarceration, a $25 fine, and costs.2 This appeal followed.
{¶16} Mr. Moore assigns the following as error:
{¶17} “The trial court erred when it found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly caused physical harm to the victim‘s tire.”
{¶18} A sufficiency challenge presents a question of law: whether, viewing the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. This standard does not permit a reviewing court to weigh the evidence or assess
{¶19} A manifest-weight challenge is a different inquiry. The reviewing court sits, in effect, as a “‘thirteenth juror‘“: it examines the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses, and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in thе evidence, the trier of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 25, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982), and State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). That discretion is to be exercised “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.‘” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Martin at 175. In weighing the evidence, we remain mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fаct, particularly as to credibility, because the trial judge is best positioned to observe a witness‘s demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections. See State v. Vanover, 2021-Ohio-3172, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Haney, 2013-Ohio-2823, ¶ 43 (11th Dist.) (“‘The trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve all or any of the testimony‘” and “‘is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, along with the witnesses’ manner and demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses’ testimоny is credible.‘” (Quoting State v. Sevilla, 2007-Ohio-2789, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.)).
{¶20} Because the conclusion that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence necessarily includes a finding of sufficiency, while the reverse is not true, we address the manifest-weight argument first. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 2017-Ohio-4434, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.) (A sufficiency analysis is subsumed under a manifest weight analysis.). A
{¶21} To convict Mr. Moore of criminal damaging under Warren Municipal Code 541.03(a)(1) and (b), the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he knowingly caused or created a substantial risk of physical harm to Ms. Rider‘s tire, without her consent. A person acts knowingly “when the person is aware that the person‘s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
{¶22} On that central question, the record contains remarkably little first-hand, tested testimony. The only witness who claimed to have personally observed the tire being cut was Ms. Rider, and her account, once subjected to cross-examination, was conflicting: she could describe the act only by saying that she remembered “somebody telling somebody else” to do it, without saying who spoke or who acted, and when asked directly whether she knew that Mr. Moore did it, she retreated to “I believe so.” However, as noted, during direct examination she was asked whether Mr. Moore caused the damage, to which she replied, “Yeah.”
{¶23} We acknowledge that the specific, dramatic account credited by the trial court—that Mr. Maiden handed Mr. Moore a knife and directed him to stab the tire—does
{¶24} Officer Black‘s testimony regarding the incident may have invоlved hearsay statements. No objection, however, was leveled by the defense to the narrative and the trial court treated the testimony as excepted by the rules of hearsay; namely, the excited utterance and the present-sense-impression exceptions. No argument is asserted on appeal that counsel was ineffective for failing to object or that thе potentially problematic testimony was plain error. See State v. Johnson, 2000-Ohio-276, ¶ 55 (plain error analysis applied where trial counsel lodged no objections to any of the statements challenged on appeal). Where no argument is offered in support of a position, it is not the appellate court‘s duty to advocate in favor of such a contention. See
{¶25} While the body-camera footage does not confirm Ms. Rider‘s version of the event, it does not necessarily undermine her rendition either. We acknowledge the body-camera video that was played for the trial court shows an individual in blue shorts identifying himself as “John Moorе” during a chaotic, multi-person disturbance on Douglas Avenue—the same disturbance in which the initial dispatch information, by the State‘s own exhibit, named an entirely different person (“a male named Bobby popped a female‘s tire“). Still, Officer Black testified that an initial narrative statement from a person calling
{¶26} We recognize that the video establishes Mr. Moore was present and was identified by name. The victim, albeit reluctantly, testified she observed Mr. Moore cut her tire. This, notwithstanding her stated mental health issues, and where she confirmed her recollection was fairly strong at the time Officer Black interviewed her, is credible evidence of Mr. Moore‘s actions.
{¶27} We emphasize the deference owed to the trial court‘s credibility findings, particularly as to a witness who testified in person and whom the court observed to be emotional and, at times, tearful. But that deference is not unlimited, and it is most appropriately applied where the witness‘s own testimony, taken as a whole, supports the verdict reached. Here, the trial court and the State both treated Ms. Rider‘s reluctance to see Mr. Moore prosecuted as evidence that bolstered her credibility—-reasoning that a witness with no motive to fabricate blame is more likely to tell the truth. That inference is reasonable and entitled to some deference. That inference, however, is not the only reasonable manner of treating Mr. Rider‘s reluctance and concerns. After all, Ms. Rider testified to having issues with her memory and, although she confirmed Mr. Moore cut her tire, she also testified she only “believed” he was the actor who cut the tire.
{¶28} Nevertheless, Ms. Rider testified Mr. Moore caused the damage to her vehicle. This testimony is confirmed by Officer Black‘s body cam where, after his response to the Save-A-Lot parking lot, Ms. Rider directly states Mr. Moore stabbed her tire such that it was not drivable. Also, Ms. Rider testified she had no reason to lie to Officer Black during the interview and that her recollection, despite her professed mental
{¶29} Further, we acknowledge that Officer Black did not question Mr. Moore regarding the incident. This, however, does not have an impact on the sufficiency or the weight of the evidence upon which the State relied to obtain its conviction. The State offered evidence that, after he was told to cut the victim‘s tire, Mr. Moore possessed a knife and did so. There was no indication that thе act was an accident, was negligent, or even reckless. Officer Black offered testimony that Mr. Moore acted knowingly, i.e., he acted with the awareness that his voluntary actions would likely cause the result of cutting the victim‘s tire.
{¶30} We accordingly hold that Mr. Moore‘s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because that determination is dispositive, we do not seрarately reach the sufficiency argument. Mr. Moore‘s assignment of error is without merit.
{¶31} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant‘s assignment of error is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Warren Municipal Court is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.