State v. MonfordState v. Monford
OPINION.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Nicholas Monford appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea to the offenses of (1) felonious assault, in violation of
{¶ 2} On March 10, 2003, Monford turned up his apartment thermostat to ninety degrees and forced his wife into their bathroom. He kept her confined for four hours in the bathtub with a hunting knife while he repeatedly threatened her life. He poked her with the knife, causing a number of superficial cuts on her body. She ultimately escaped by jumping off the second-floor balcony. She was treated for her injuries at a hospital. When police officers arrived at Monford‘s apartment, they found him in possession of a sawed-off shotgun.
{¶ 3} Withdrawing an initial plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and a motion for a competency evaluation, Monford entered a guilty plea to each count in the indictment. Before accepting his guilty plea, the trial court engaged in a detailed
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, Monford now contends that his sentence of more than the shortest prison term and the imposition of consecutive prison terms must be reversed because the trial court did not make the statutory findings or articulate its reasons as mandated by State v. Edmondson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 1999-Ohio-110, 715 N.E.2d 131, and State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E. 2d 473. The state argues that the three-and-one-half-year prison term, requested by Monford and his counsel, was the equivalent of an agreed sentence that is not subject to review pursuant to
{¶ 5} The range of prison terms from which the trial court was authorized to select a sentence for felonious assault, a second-degree felony, was a term of years from two to eight; for unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance, a fifth-degree felony, a term from six to twelve months; and for abduction, a third-degree felony, a term from one to five years. See
{¶ 6} The Ohio sentencing guidelines favor minimum sentences for offenders who have no history of imprisonment. See State v. Evans, 102 Ohio St.3d 240, 2004-Ohio-2659, 809 N.E.2d 11, at ¶ 14. If the offender previously has not served a prison term, the trial court must impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense unless it “finds on the record that the shortest sentence will demean the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender or others.”
{¶ 7} When a trial court imposes non-mandatory consecutive prison terms for multiple offenses under
{¶ 8} Since consecutive sentences are reserved for the worst offenses and offenders,
{¶ 9} The trial court apparently intended to make statutory findings to support the sentence it imposed on Monford. Before announcing the sentence, the court stated, “The Court, as counsel knows, is required to make felony sentencing findings. I‘d like to do it by written entry.” If the trial court made written findings, they are not in the record. Furthermore, written findings would not have satisfied the need for orally stating on the record the court‘s reasons for imposing consecutive sentences pursuant to
{¶ 10} No sentencing court should purposely disregard the felony-sentencing statutes. And a sentencing court usually must strictly comply with its statutory duties, such as the duty to impose a “specific prison term” for sanction violations when sentencing an offender to a community-control sanction. See
{¶ 11} Here, the trial court‘s failure to make findings, to give its reasons, and to do those two tasks on the record at the sentencing hearing was erroneous. The question is whether the error was reversible error. See
{¶ 12} There is a “limited class of constitutional defects, called `structural errors,’ that defy harmless-error analysis and are cause for automatic reversal” without a showing that a substantial right has been affected. Id. at ¶ 16. Structural-error analysis is reserved for “constitutional deprivations * * * affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (citation omitted), quoted with approval in State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, at ¶ 9. Among the limited class of errors that the Ohio Supreme Court recognizes as structural is the complete denial of counsel, a biased trial court, racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, the denial of self-representation at trial, the denial of a public trial, and conviction upon a defective reasonable-doubt instruction. See State v. Perry, at ¶ 18.
{¶ 13} The trial court‘s failure to perform some of the duties prescribed in
{¶ 14} We, therefore, apply the traditional analysis for unobjected-to error under
{¶ 15} When, as here, a defendant cannot demonstrate any prejudice flowing from a judicial error, much less that his substantial rights were affected, we hold that the trial court‘s error in failing to comply with the statutory mandates of
{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, Monford argues that his counsel‘s failures to offer mitigation, to waive a presentence investigation, and to emphasize his “positive attributes” denied him the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
{¶ 17} Because his counsel‘s strategy was successful in avoiding a maximum prison term of eight years for the felonious-assault conviction, as well as the potential for an aggregate sentence of consecutive prison terms totaling fourteen years, we hold that counsel‘s efforts were not deficient and that Monford was not prejudiced in any way. See Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364, 370, 113 S.Ct. 838; Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18} Finally, Monford has moved to cite additional authority and to file a supplemental brief because of the holding in Blakely v. Washington (2004), ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Under a strict reading of Blakely, a jury must determine “any fact” that increases “the prescribed statutory maximum” sentence. Id., ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2536, quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In State v. Eckstein, 1st Dist. No. C-030139, 2004-Ohio-5059, at ¶ 22, however, this court applied Blakely more broadly, noting that a “minimum sentence * * * was not a `statutory maximum.‘” This court held that a defendant‘s sentence complied with Blakely because the findings necessary for imposing a sentence greater than the minimum for an offender who had never served a prison term — like Monford — were discretionary factors and did not implicate Blakely where the sentence imposed was within the range authorized by state law. See id. At this time, we elect to follow Eckstein and, therefore, deny Monford‘s motion to file a supplemental brief.
{¶ 19} Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Doan, P.J., and