State v. EdmonsonState v. Edmonson
Criminal law—Penalties and sentencing—
{¶ 1} Antione T. Edmonson was convicted in 1997 on one count of aggravated robbery for violating
{¶ 2} The Court of Appeals for Portage County agreed that, based on the language of
{¶ 3} The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the decisions of the Ninth Appellate District in State v. Crangle (Aug. 6, 1997), Summit App. No. 18268, unreported, 1997 WL 460161; State v. Miller (Apr. 29, 1998), Summit App. No. 18645, unreported, 1998 WL 208830; and State v. Blondheim (May 27, 1998), Summit App. No. 18594, unreported, 1998 WL 281917, certified the issue to this court for review and final determination. In accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. IV(2)(C) and Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 594, 613 N.E.2d 1032, paragraph one of the syllabus, we agreed to acсept the case.
Hirt & Hirt and David S. Hirt, for appellee.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and John Fenlon, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender.
COOK, J.
{¶ 4} Based on the recent changes to the sentencing law in Ohio, minimum sentences are favored for first-time imprisonment and maximum sentences are disfavored generally. For instance,
I
A
R.C. 2929.14(B)
{¶ 5}
“[I]f the court imposing a sеntence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender and if the offender previously has not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section, unless the court finds on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the offender‘s conduct or will not adеquately protect the public from future crime by the offender or others.”
{¶ 6} The appellate districts in this state currently hold differing opinions about what information a trial court must include in a sentencing hearing rеcord when imposing a sentence that is longer than the minimum upon an offender expected to receive the minimum sentence according to the presumption in
{¶ 7} We construe this statute to mean that unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a felony offender who hаs never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the lоnger sentence.
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} Our deduction is buttressed by other language in the sentencing statutes. The phraseology in
{¶ 10} Edmonson contends that construing the statute to require findings without also requiring the court to articulate its reasoning will hamper appellate review, and that the appellate courts will be unnecessarily forced to review the entire record. But because
B
{¶ 11} Having determined that a trial court sentencing an offender to his first imprisonment must specify on the record that one or both reasons allowed by
“I read the record that [sic] you have had problems, been locked down in a lock-down facility on two different occasions.1
“I find you to be a very dangerous offender and you to commit a crime again [sic]. This was a terrible incident with a person who has [sic] a gun, robbing people.
“Therefore, it is the sentence of this Court, that you be confined * * * [for] the sentence of ten years.”
{¶ 12} In the judgment entry, the trial court stated:
“The Court has considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and prеsentence report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under
Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11 , and has balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors underOhio Revised Code Section 2929.12 .
” * * * “The Court further finds that [Edmonson] is a dangerous offender, that recidivism is likely, and that a gun was used during this incident.”
{¶ 13} Although one or more of the remarks by the trial court might be argued to support a finding that the three-year minimum sentence would demean the seriousness оf Edmonson‘s conduct or that the public would not be adequately protected from his future crime, the trial court did not specify either of these reasons listed in
II
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R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d)
{¶ 14} In Pаrt I of this opinion, we considered the challenge to the sentencing decision that denied Edmonson the statutorily mandated minimum sentence without the record finding necessary to impose a longer one. In Pаrt II, we consider Edmonson‘s claim on appeal that the sentencing decision also fails to meet the statutory requirements for imposing a maximum sentence.
{¶ 15} The statutes to be construed are “[T]he court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose the longest prison term authorized for the offense * * * only upon offenders who committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest likelihood of committing future crimes, upon certain major drug offenders * * *, and upon certain repeat violent offenders * * *.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 16} The other statute at issue, {¶ 17} {¶ 18} We agree with the court of appeals that this cause should be remanded for resentencing. Judgment affirmed. MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only.
B