State v. EsparzaState v. Esparza
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Cook
Lead Opinion
In this appeal, Esparza presents four propositions of law. Finding none meritorious, we аffirm.
I
In State v. Gillard, supra, we held that the judge who rules on a
In Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, the United States Suрreme Court distinguished between two types of constitutional error: “trial error” and “structural errоr.” Trial error “occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury, and * * * may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order tо determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 499 U.S. at 307-308, 111 S.Ct. at 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d at 330. Structural error affеcts “the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end” as well as “the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Such errors “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” Id. at 309-310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d at 331. Esparza argues that a Gillard-type error is structural and therefore is not subject to harmless-error analysis.
We reject Esparza’s claim. If the information prеsented to the judge had instead been improperly presented to the jury, that would clearly be trial error, *662not structural error. We cannot see why the conclusion would be different, where the information was improperly presented to the judge, who in this case was not even the trier of fact.
But more fundamentally, the trial-error/structural-error distinction is irrelevant unless it is first established that constitutional error has occurred. We did not base our holding in Gillard on any constitutional provision, and we do not think a violation of the Gillard rule is constitutional error.
It is true that “thе presence on the bench of a judge who is not impartial” is structural constitutional error. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d at 331. Moreover, Esparza cites In re Murchison (1955), 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942, 946, which indicates that the mere appearance of bias can violate due рrocess. See, also, Vasquez v. Hillery (1986), 474 U.S. 254, 263, 106 S.Ct. 617, 623, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, 609.
However, Esparza cites no case involving a situation remotely similar to this one. Murchison, for instance, is readily distinguishable. There, the defendants were charged with сontempt by a judge acting as a “one-man grand jury” under a unique Michigan statute. The very judge who рreferred the charges then proceeded to try and convict the defendants. Murchison stands for the proposition that the accuser cannot sit as a judge to try the truth or falsity of his own аccusation. Similarly, in Turney v. Ohio (1927), 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749, the appearance of bias existed by virtue of “a system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant.” 273 U.S. at 531, 47 S.Ct. at 444, 71 L.Ed. at 758. We do not think a judge who presides over a trial after hearing a
Moreover, Liteky v. United States (1994), 510 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474, held that “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduсed or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior рroceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display а deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” 510 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d at 491. Although Liteky involved the interpretation of a federal statute,2 we doubt that the due process standard is more stringent.
In Gillard, we went beyond the requirements of the Constitution and extended greater protection to defendаnts purely as a matter of state law. Federal *663constitutional law does not mandate the Gillard rule, and consequently does not govern the application of harmless-error analysis to violations of that rule.
Esparza further сontends that, even if harmless-error analysis is proper here, the error was not in fact harmless. However, we agree with the court of appeals’ finding of harmless error. We therеfore overrule Esparza’s first proposition of law.
II
In Esparza’s second propоsition of law, he claims that, when the court of appeals reinstated his appeаl, it had a duty to reweigh the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors, despite already having done so in the original appeal. In his third proposition, Esparza claims he was еntitled to an evidentiary hearing on his application to reinstate the appeаl. No basis exists for either claim.
In his final proposition, Esparza argues that his original apрellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not raising sixteen issues in the court of appeals. We overrule this proposition for the reasons stated in the cоurt of appeals’ decision and judgment entry of July 27,1994.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., Douglas, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer and Coоk, JJ., concur. Wright, J., dissents. Resnick, J., not participating.Notes
. Section 455(a), Title 28, U.S.Code.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this matter. I joined my former collеague, Justice Herbert Brown, in his dissent in Esparza’s original appeal, State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 16, 529 N.E.2d 192, 200. Furthermore, I think the error raised by appellant in his first proposition of law is a “structural error,” rendering a harmless-error analysis inappropriate. Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331.