State v. MireeState v. Miree
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Miree, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-5714.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-5714
DONNELLY, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., dissented, with an opinion joined by FISCHER, J.
DONNELLY, J.
{¶ 1} A recent amendment to
BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Appellants, Jaidee Miree and Desmond Duncan, were charged with murder, involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and other offenses arising from the death of Ramses Hurley on June 16, 2019. Their trial commenced in June 2021. Evidence at trial showed that Miree, Duncan, and Trinity Campbell picked up Hurley in Campbell’s car under the pretense of buying
{¶ 3} After the close of evidence, over defense objection, the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense under the preamendment version of
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants did not use deadly force in self-defense and/or defense of another.
To prove that the defendants did not use deadly force in self-defense or defense of another, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following:
A, the defendant was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the death of Ramses Hurley;
Or, B, the defendant did not have reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief, even if mistaken, that he was in imminent or immediate danger of death or great bodily harm;
Or, C, . . . the defendant violated a duty to retreat to avoid danger;
Or, D, the defendant did not use reasonable force.
These instructions did not incorporate 2020 Am.S.B. No. 175, which had become effective two months earlier. The jury found Miree and Duncan guilty of felony murder, felonious assault, and other offenses. The trial court imposed sentences of 15 years to life in prison.
{¶ 4} Among their arguments in the Eighth District Court of Appeals, Miree and Duncan argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that they had had a duty to retreat before acting in self-defense instead of incorporating the new law diminishing the duty to retreat. A majority of the appellate court’s three-judge panel held that the amendment to
applied to all trials after the effective date of the amendment, primarily because
{¶ 5} Miree and Duncan both sought our discretionary review of the Eighth District’s decision, advancing multiple propositions of law. We accepted Miree’s following proposition of law:
In a criminal case which was tried after the April 6, 2021 effective date of Ohio’s “Stand Your Ground” law and its amendments to
R.C. 2901.05 ./09, a trial court is required to apply those amended statutes in instructing the jury on a defendant’s self-defenseclaim, and it must do so even if the underlying alleged crime occurred before that April 6, 2021 effective date. A trial court thereby commits reversible error and denies the defendant due process and a fair trial when, over the defendant’s objection, it instructs the jury to consider whether the defendant had a “duty to retreat” in determining his self-defense claim because the plain language of the amended statute, in effect at the time of trial, unambiguously prohibits such an instruction.
See 2023-Ohio-381.
{¶ 6} We accepted Duncan’s related proposition of law: “2020 S.B. 175, which amended
ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} We presume that a statute is “prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.”
{¶ 8} When these crimes occurred,
For purposes of any section of the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person who lawfully is in that person‘s residence has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person‘s residence, and a person who lawfully is an occupant of that person‘s vehicle or who lawfully is an occupant in a vehicle owned by an immediate family member of the person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense or defense of another.
2008 Sub.S.B. No. 184. The 2021 amendment to
{¶ 9} Miree and Duncan assert that the wording of the instruction to the trier of fact in
{¶ 10} We acknowledge that the prohibition against a fact-finder’s consideration of the duty to retreat in
{¶ 11} The changes to
punishment for any offense” applies to crimes committed before the effective date of the amendment and tried afterwards.
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied the former version of
CONCLUSION
{¶ 14} The 2020 Am.S.B. No. 175 amendment to
Judgment affirmed.
STEWART, J., joined by FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 15} While I agree with the majority opinion’s determination that the substantive
{¶ 16} Following Hurley’s death, but before Miree and Duncan were brought to trial on murder charges, the law on self-defense underwent significant changes. On April 6, 2021, 2020 Am.S.B. No. 175 (“S.B. 175”), known as the “stand your ground” law, came into effect. The new law relaxed the duty to retreat in self-defense situations and limited how a trier of fact could consider an individual’s ability to retreat. Specifically, S.B. 175 amended
(A) As used in this section, “residence” and
“vehicle”have has the samemeaningsmeaning as in section 2901.05 of the Revised Code.(B) For purposes of any section of the Revised Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person
who lawfully is in that person’s residencehas no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence, and a person who lawfully is an occupant of that person’s vehicle or who lawfully is an occupant in a vehicle owned by an immediate family member of the person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense or defense of anotherif that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.
(C) A trier of fact shall not consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not a person who used force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent injury, loss, or risk to life or safety.
S.B. 175.
{¶ 17} S.B. 175 introduced two types of changes to the self-defense law—one substantive and one procedural. First, S.B. 175 substantively changed
{¶ 18} In Ohio “[a] statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.”
{¶ 19} Nevertheless, I disagree with the majority’s determination that
{¶ 20} There is no reason to conclude, as the majority does here, that
{¶ 21} Thus, while the jury should have been instructed on the duty to retreat as it existed before S.B. 175 became effective, it should also have been told that the possibility of retreat was irrelevant when considering whether the force employed by Miree and Duncan was reasonable. Because the jury in this case was instructed entirely on the duty to retreat as it existed before S.B. 175 became effective, i.e., without the procedural limitation prospectively imposed by newly enacted
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Timothy F. Sweeney, for appellant Jaidee Miree in case No. 2022-1449.
Russell S. Bensing, for appellant Desmond Duncan in case No. 2022-1458.
Steven L. Taylor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.