State v. MirandaState v. Miranda
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Angel R. Miranda, appeals his conviction for Aggravated Vehicular Assault in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. The issue before this court is whether a defendant may be found to be “operating” a vehicle where that vehicle has been rendered inoperable as a result of the defendant‘s driving under the influence of alcohol. For the following reasons, we affirm Miranda‘s conviction.
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{¶3} On May 13, 2013, Miranda waived his right to be present at arraignment and entered a plea of “not guilty” to all charges.
{¶4} On July 22, 2013, Miranda entered a Written Plea of Guilty to Aggravated Vehicular Assault (Count 1) and Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol (Count 2). Upon application of the State, the trial court entered a Nolle Prosequi on the remaining counts of the Indictment.
{¶5} On September 16, 2013, Miranda filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea.
{¶6} On November 19, 2013, the trial court granted Miranda‘s Motion with respect to Aggravated Vehicular Assault only.
{¶7}
{¶8} Between two and ten minutes after Miranda‘s Prism struck the guardrail, Mark Seidel was operating a Toyota Camry westbound on I-90. Seidel struck the Prism and, as a result of the collision, suffered serious physical harm.
{¶9} At the close of the evidence, counsel for Miranda moved for acquittal pursuant to
{¶10} On January 9, 2014, the trial court found Miranda guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Assault.
{¶11} On January 13, 2014, a sentencing hearing was held. The court imposed a mandatory term of imprisonment of twenty-four months for Aggravated Vehicular Assault (Count 1) to be served concurrently with a mandatory thirty-day sentence for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol (Count 2). The court ordered Miranda to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $45,052.84, and, under Count 1, a mandatory fine of $375.00. The court imposed a four-year license suspension under Count 1 to run concurrently with a one-year suspension under Count 2. The court advised Miranda that post release control was optional up to a maximum of three years. Finally, the court ordered Miranda to pay court costs and the costs of prosecution.
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{¶13} On February 21, 2014, Miranda filed a Notice of Appeal, amended on March 10, 2014.
{¶14} On appeal, Miranda raises the following assignment of error:
{¶15} “[1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant when it denied his
{¶16} An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
{¶17} In order to convict Miranda of Aggravated Vehicular Assault as charged in Count 1, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he, “while operating * * * a motor vehicle, * * * cause[d] serious physical harm to another person * *
{¶18} Miranda contends that there was no evidence that he caused serious physical harm “while operating” a vehicle. Miranda emphasizes that, at the time of Seidel‘s collision, “Mr. Miranda‘s car was inoperable“; “Mr. Miranda was not physically in the car“; and “he was not in control of the car and was not able to move it or manipulate it in any way.” Appellant‘s brief at 9.
{¶19} The issue of whether Miranda caused Seidel‘s injuries “while operating” a vehicle turns on the meaning of “operating,” which is not defined within
{¶20} Both parties appeal to the following rule of construction: “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.”
{¶21}
{¶22} The definition of “operate” in
{¶23} Consistent with the principle set forth in Meeks, the Ohio Supreme Court has applied the
{¶24} Also persuasive, if not controlling, is the fact that the Ohio Jury Instructions with respect to vehicular assault provide a definition of “operate” which mimics that found in
{¶25} Finally, we note that, prior to the enactment of
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{¶27} The sole assignment of error is without merit.
{¶28} For the foregoing reasons, Miranda‘s conviction for Aggravated Vehicular Assault was supported by sufficient evidence and, therefore, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the appellant.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J.,
concur.