State v. Miranda, 2014 Ohio 5312

In August 2012, Angel R. Miranda, legally intoxicated, struck a highway guardrail while driving a Geo Prism; the Prism spun and became inoperable, coming to rest in a travel lane facing oncoming traffic.
Minutes later another driver, Mark Seidel, collided with the disabled Prism and suffered serious physical harm.
Miranda was indicted on multiple counts including Aggravated Vehicular Assault (R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a)) and OVI offenses; he pled guilty to some counts, withdrew his guilty plea as to one aggravated vehicular assault count, and proceeded to trial on that count.
At the bench trial Miranda moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A); the motion was denied and the court convicted him of Aggravated Vehicular Assault and imposed prison, fines, restitution, and license suspensions.
On appeal Miranda argued the State failed to prove he caused serious physical harm “while operating” a vehicle because the Prism was inoperable and he had exited it before Seidel’s collision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a defendant can be found to have caused serious physical harm “while operating” a vehicle when the vehicle was rendered inoperable before the harm occurred	The State: “Operate” includes causing movement (past/completed) under R.C. 4511.01(HHH); Miranda caused movement that proximately resulted in harm	Miranda: “While operating” requires actual operation at the moment of the injury; here the car was inoperable and he was not in it or in control	Court: “While operating” may include situations where defendant’s operation caused the vehicle to become disabled and that disablement proximately led to harm; conviction affirmed

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (establishes Jackson standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for conviction based on evidence viewed in light most favorable to prosecution)
Meeks v. Papadopulos, 62 Ohio St.2d 187, 404 N.E.2d 159 (statutes on same subject are in pari materia and may be read together)
Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12, 907 N.E.2d 706 (R.C. 4511.01(HHH) definition of “operate” informs interpretation outside Chapter 4511)
State v. Cleary, 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 490 N.E.2d 574 (pre-4511.01(HHH) cases treated operation more broadly than mere driving)
State v. Lindsey, 190 Ohio App.3d 595, 943 N.E.2d 613 (Ohio jury instruction definition of “operate” mirrors R.C. 4511.01(HHH))