State v. MinneState v. Minne
Rendered on the 21st day of May, 2010.
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KENT J. DEPOORTER, Atty. Reg. #0058487, Prosecutor, 7501 Paragon Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JOHN D. POLEY, Atty. Reg. #0000051, 46 Rogge Street, Dayton, Ohio 45409 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Caroline Minne appeals from an order overruling her motion for relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence for violating
{¶ 2} We conclude that Minne failed to satisfy any of the requirements for relief from judgment under
{¶ 3} Minne‘s motion also fails to demonstrate grounds for relief under
{¶ 4} Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
I
{¶ 5} In April 2008, Carolyn Minne received a traffic citation for allegedly violating
{¶ 6} “GUILTY PLEAS, WAIVERS OF TRIAL, PAYMENT OF FINES AND COSTS
{¶ 7} “I, the undersigned defendant, do hereby enter my written pleas of guilty to the offenses charged in this ticket. I realize that by signing these guilty pleas, I admit my guilt of the offenses charged and waive my right to contest the offenses in a trial before the court or jury. Further, I realize that a record of this plea will be sent to the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. I have not been convicted of, pleaded guilty to, or forfeited bond for two or more prior moving traffic offenses within the last 12 months. I plead guilty to the offenses charged.”
{¶ 8} Minne signed the ticket and sent it to the Kettering Municipal Court, which filed the signed plea. By May 22, 2008, Minne had paid her fine and the case was concluded. Approximately ten months later, Minne filed a motion to vacate her conviction on the speeding ticket. Minne did not specify a particular provision under which she was proceeding, but contended in the motion that she did not understand that she was entitled to a lawyer. Minne also claimed that she had a good defense to the charge, because she was driving reasonably under the conditions at the time of her
{¶ 9} The trial court overruled the motion in a one-line entry in March 2009, without stating reasons for the denial. Minne now appeals from the decision overruling her motion to vacate the judgment.
II
{¶ 10} Minne‘s First Assignment of Error (phrased as an “Issue for Review“) is as follows:
{¶ 11} “WHETHER A WAIVER OF A HEARING CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT INTELLIGENTLY UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL AND ANCILLARY RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH A WAIVER.”
{¶ 12} Under this assignment of error, Minne contends that the traffic citation contains only a very brief and partial explanation of her rights. Minne contends this is insufficient to advise defendants of the seriousness of waiving their rights. Minne points to
{¶ 13} In State v. Mattachione, Greene App. No. 2004 CA 80, 2005-Ohio-2769, we held that municipal courts have the power to vacate their judgments under
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.”
{¶ 16} “To prevail on a motion brought under
{¶ 17} “These requirements are independent and in the conjunctive; thus the test is not fulfilled if any one of the requirements is not met.” Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174, 1994-Ohio-107. Motions for relief from judgment under
{¶ 18} Minne‘s motion fails to satisfy any of the requirements for relief from judgment. As an initial matter, the reasonableness of speed is not a defense to Minne‘s offense, which involves a violation of
{¶ 19} Minne‘s motion also fails to demonstrate grounds for relief under
{¶ 20} From the materials filed, the motion could only have been brought on the basis of excusable neglect or mistake, newly discovered evidence, or the catch-all provision in
{¶ 21} There is also no reason to resort to
{¶ 22} An increase in insurance rates could potentially be classified as “newly
{¶ 23} Pertinent to Minne‘s contention that the traffic citation is insufficient, the Ohio Supreme Court recently stated that:
{¶ 24} “Consistent with the goal of ensuring simplicity and uniformity in procedure, a ‘complaint prepared pursuant to [the Ohio Traffic Rules] simply needs to advise the defendant of the offense with which he is charged, in a manner that can be readily understood by a person making a reasonable attempt to understand.’ * * * In the traffic-citation context, this has generally been interpreted as focusing on whether the defendant had notice of the nature and the cause of the accusation. * * * Notice is satisfied when a defendant is apprised of the nature of the charge together with a citation of the statute or ordinance involved.” Bellville v. Kieffaber, 114 Ohio St.3d 124, 127, 2007-Ohio-3763, at ¶ 19.
{¶ 25} Minne‘s citation states the statute involved,
{¶ 26} Finally, although Minne‘s motion was filed within one year after judgment, the elapsed time (294 days), is not reasonable. “[A] motion may be filed within 1 year under Civil Rule 60(B) but still may not be considered within a ‘reasonable time.’ ” Adomeit, 39 Ohio App.2d at 106. Furthermore, the movant has the burden of presenting factual material establishing timeliness or justifying delay in filing the motion. Wolfe v. Cahill, Cuyahoga App. No. 88368, 2007-Ohio-638, at ¶ 18. Minne failed to meet this burden, as she did not submit factual material indicating why she delayed filing the motion for almost ten months.
{¶ 27} Based on the preceding discussion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Minne‘s motion to vacate the judgment.
{¶ 28} Minne‘s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
III
{¶ 29} Minne‘s Second Assignment of Error is as follows:
{¶ 30} “WHETHER IT IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO RESTRICT A DEFENDANT‘S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO SUCH A DEGREE AS TO IMPACT THEIR [SIC] JOB AND OR FINANCIAL SECURITY.”
{¶ 31} Under this assignment of error, Minne contends that it is not in the public interest to allow police officers and courts to restrict due process rights of defendants in the manner that occurred here. This argument does not provide a basis for setting the judgment aside. As noted, the Ohio Supreme Court has approved the use of the citation procedure, and there is no indication in the case before us that Minne‘s traffic citation failed to properly advise her of the charged offense in a manner that could
{¶ 32} In the regard, the Tenth District noted long ago that:
{¶ 33} “The city has an important and legitimate interest in the efficient processing of a great volume of minor traffic violations, and in keeping the docket and size of its court system at a manageable level. The people have an interest in fast and efficient handling of traffic citations and in avoiding unnecessary, time consuming, and expensive court proceedings. The establishment of the Traffic Violations Bureau by
{¶ 34} Accordingly, Minne‘s Second Assignment of Error is without merit and is overruled.
IV
{¶ 35} Minne‘s Third Assignment of Error is as follows:
{¶ 36} “WHETHER IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE FOR A JUDGE TO REFUSE TO ALLOW A HEARING ON A MINOR MISDEMEANOR IF THE DEFENDANT DID NOT INTELLIGENTLY UNDERSTAND HER WAIVER OF SAID HEARING.”
{¶ 37} Under this assignment of error, Minne contends that the trial court acted unconscionably by failing to allow Minne an opportunity to be heard, despite a “boiler plate waiver made unintelligently and without proper appraisal of her rights.” Appellant‘s Brief, p. 11. Again, Minne failed to present the trial court with evidence of any improper procedure that was followed.
{¶ 38} Minne‘s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.
V
{¶ 39} All of Minne‘s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.
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DONOVAN, P.J., GRADY, J., concur.
(Hon. Robert P. Ringland, Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
John D. Poley
Kent DePoorter
Hon. Robert L. Moore