11 Ohio St. 3d 24 | Ohio | 1984
Lead Opinion
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 [36 O.O.2d 237], the United States Supreme Court held:
“* * * [W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom * * * in any significant way and is subjected to questioning,
This court in State v. Pyle (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 64 [48 O.O.2d 82], certiorari denied (1970), 396 U.S. 1007, subsequently held at paragraph two of the syllabus:
“The holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [36 O.O.2d 237], is not applicable to misdemeanors, as presently defined in Ohio.”
For the reasons hereafter stated, we overrule State v. Pyle, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus.
The rationale for the holding in Pyle appears in the opinion at pages 67-68 where it is stated:
“To extend the Miranda ruling to govern the interrogation process of police officers with respect to thousands of minor infractions of the law which occur daily throughout Ohio would be unwise and impractical.”
The conspicuous failing of the above reasoning is that the Miranda decision was unconcerned with the type of crime being investigated. Rather, in order to determine whether Miranda warnings need be given, the attention of the inquiry is directed to whether the individual has been subjected to custodial interrogation. Cases after Miranda have explored independently the concepts of “custody” and “interrogation.” For instance, in Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 301, the United States Supreme Court held with reference to interrogation as follows:
“* * * [T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
Other courts have dealt with the suspect’s rights to Miranda warnings while in custody. See Minnesota v. Murphy (1984), 79 L. Ed. 2d 409; California v. Beheler (1983), 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275; Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492; Orozco v. Texas (1969), 394 U.S. 324.
The state argues that to require Miranda warnings in misdemeanor cases “will stall the information gathering process on crimes that carry minimal penalties.” To the extent that the information gathering process will be stalled for the brief time it takes to give the Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation, the state’s position is correct. Otherwise, the state’s argument is completely unpersuasive.
Foremost, it was stated in Miranda at 477:
“Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. * * * General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding.”
The merit of Miranda, as explained by Justice Blackmun in Fare v. Michael C. (1979), 442 U.S. 707, 718, is that the protections are neither one-sided nor designed strictly to benefit criminal defendants.
“* * * Miranda’s holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis.”
In this state, the difference between felonies and misdemeanors relates solely to the degree of potential punishment. As an illustration, a first degree misdemeanor is punishable by incarceration for a period of up to six months. See R.C. 2929.21. Thus, were we to accept the state’s position and uphold
Although today’s decision affirms the court of appeals’ reversal of appellee’s conviction, we do so for a different reason than was taken below. The court of appeals reasoned that appellee was entitled to Miranda warnings because, at the time of the custodial interrogation, the police suspected appellee of participation in a felony, even though appellee was only eventually convicted of a misdemeanor. Applying the facts of the instant case, it is obvious that appellee had been implicated in a felony and not strictly a misdemeanor. Nevertheless, under the reasoning of the court of appeals, in order to determine whether Miranda warnings should have been given, it will be necessary, as a preliminary matter, to determine whether the crime being investigated was a felony or misdemeanor. Since any given set of facts could give rise to both felony and misdemeanor charges, that determination would seldom be as clear as it is here. As opposed to burdening the lower courts with additional and hazy issues, we feel the much better course is to overrule the holding in Pyle and thereby render the classification of the crime being investigated irrelevant to the determination of Miranda’s applicability.
Accordingly, we overrule State v. Pyle, supra, paragraph two of the syllabus, and hold that Miranda warnings must be given prior to any custodial interrogation regardless of whether the individual is suspected of committing a felony or misdemeanor. Today’s decision, however, should in no way be construed as requiring court-appointed counsel for prosecutions in which no term of incarceration may be given as a sentence. The right to counsel contemplated by Miranda, which serves to protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination, is analytically distinct from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal prosecution which carries the possibility of incarceration. See Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972), 407 U.S. 25.
Consequently, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
The state in the case at bar has not raised on appeal the question of whether appellee was subject to custodial interrogation at the time he gave the second statement. In light of the state’s argument that Miranda is inapplicable solely because appellee was convicted of a misdemeanor, we assume that the state concedes that appellee was in custody and subjected to interrogation.
We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari and heard arguments in McCarty v. Herdman (C.A. 6, 1983), 716 F. 2d 361, certiorari granted sub
The United States Supreme Court has had several recent opportunities to limit Miranda’s scope, yet has declined to do so. See Estelle v. Smith (1981), 451 U.S. 454, 467-469, and Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477.
Concurrence in Part
dissenting in part and concurring in part. I would not overrule the holding in State v. Pyle (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 64 [48 O.O.2d 82], but
The majority opinion here would require that Miranda warnings be given before any custodial interrogations in any instance where a person is to be charged with any misdemeanor. This requires that Miranda warnings be given prior to questioning in all situations where a police officer formally places a person under arrest and takes him into custody, or where the person has otherwise been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
This overly broad application of the holding in Miranda would unduly burden the investigation process in a multitude of minor misdemeanor cases where the ultimate penalty would not involve the incarceration of the individual. Accordingly, this court, in Pyle, stated at 66-67 that:
“* * * the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda, was concerned with the procedures followed by law enforcement officers in investigations in felony cases, not with the procedures adhered to by those same authorities in investigations in misdemeanor cases.”
Further, this court stated in Pyle, at 67-68, as follows:
“It is our belief that to place the same restraints upon the interrogation process with respect to those persons accused of misdemeanors as exist with respect to those persons accused of felonies would ‘constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement.’ To extend the Miranda ruling to govern the interrogation process of police officers with respect to thousands of minor infractions of the law which occur daily throughout Ohio would be unwise and impractical. Furthermore, we believe that nothing said in the opinion in Miranda requires us to do so.”
These statements are equally applicable and viable today. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court was concerned with statements made by a person being interrogated in a matter involving a felony. Other jurisdictions have limited the Miranda holding solely to felonies. See Clay v. Riddle (C.A. 4, 1976), 541 F. 2d 456; United States v. LeQuire (C.A. 5, 1970), 424 F. 2d 341; State v. Neal (Mo. 1972), 476 S.W. 2d 547; Campbell v. Superior Court (1971), 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 685; State v. Gabrielson (Iowa 1971), 192 N.W. 2d 792, certiorari denied (1972), 409 U.S. 912; New Jersey v. Macuk (1970), 57 N.J. 1, 268 A. 2d 1; Capler v. Greenville (Miss. 1968), 207 So. 2d 339, certiorari denied (1968), 392 U.S. 941; State v. Angelo (1967), 251 La. 250, 203 So. 2d 710; Annotation (1970), 31 A.L.R. 3d 565; Annotation (1969), 25 A.L.R. 3d 1076, and cases cited therein.
The only known federal court case that has applied the Miranda warning
Judge Wellford, the dissenting judge in McCarty, supra, based his opinion on the overbreadth of the majority’s application of Miranda. Judge Wellford would only require the warnings be given in those instances of custodial interrogation of persons charged with misdemeanors involving penalties of incarceration. In support of this position, the learned judge aptly points out that Argersinger, supra, held that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor, even a traffic offense, must have counsel if he may be sentenced to jail, “but the right to counsel would not apply as a constitutional requirement if an offender were deprived of his automobile license or fined in a misdemeanor proceeding.” Applying his rationale to the case before the court which involved a first-degree misdemeanor that is punishable by incarceration up to six months (R.C. 2921.21), Judge Wellford agreed that the Miranda warnings were necessary after that offender had been arrested.
I am in agreement with the dissent in McCarty, supra. To require Miranda warnings in the multitude of misdemeanor charges in Ohio, including traffic violations involving no penalty of incarceration, would unduly hamper and delay the handling of these relatively minor infractions of the law. It is anticipated that significant numbers of those being interrogated for these minor offenses will now request legal counsel solely, or mainly, for the purpose of delaying the processing of the matter. Although I firmly support the Fifth Amendment right of an individual not to be required to give testimony against himself, and also support the individual’s Sixth Amendment right to legal counsel, I do not believe the Supreme Court of the United States has by any prior pronouncement, including the holding in Miranda, mandated the states to provide the breadth of warnings as would be required by the majority here.
In the instant case, the defendant had undergone custodial interrogation for both a felony and a misdemeanor. He was convicted of only the latter. In applying State v. Pyle, the court of appeals held that the Miranda warnings were not necessary in the custodial interrogation of the misdemeanor, but were required for the interrogation concerning the felony offense.
The misdemeanor involved here was falsification, a violation of R.C. 2921.13, which is a misdemeanor of the first degree that involves a penalty of
Therefore, although for other reasons than stated by the majority here and the court of appeals, I concur that the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed; but I dissent from the syllabus and that part of the opinion that would totally overrule State v. Pyle, and apply Miranda to all misdemeanors.