STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHOTA MEKOSHVILI
(AC 42144)
Lavine, Devlin and Beach, Js.
Argued September 23, 2019—officially released January 7, 2020
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Syllabus
Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crime of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony from the victim‘s wife and the victim‘s business partner, A. The victim, a taxi cab driver, was stabbed to death during his evening shift on a Tuesday night, and money was stolen from the taxi‘s glove compartment. During the trial, the victim‘s wife stated that on the night of the victim‘s murder, he returned home briefly to retrieve money to pay for his portion of a certain taxi fee and to send money to his family overseas. A testified that the victim regularly placed his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment on Tuesday nights for A to pay the following day. Held:
- The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the wife‘s testimony regarding statements made to her by the victim was irrelevant as to whether the defendant killed the victim or whether he acted with criminal intent; the wife‘s testimony regarding the victim‘s statements reasonably could have made it more likely that the defendant had a financial motive in killing the victim and less likely that the killing was the result of self-defense, as claimed by the defendant, and the defendant‘s claim that the victim‘s statements to his wife were self-serving and backward looking and, thus, did not satisfy the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule was unavailing, as the victim‘s statement to his wife indicated his intention to take money to pay the taxi company in the immediate future, and although the part of the statement indicating that he had taken money for that purpose was retrospective, it provided context as for the expression of his intention to pay his taxi fees and send money to his family, and at the time the victim made those statements to his wife, no crime had been committed nor was one foreseeable.
- The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly allowed testimony from A, pursuant to the habit exception of the hearsay rule, regarding the victim‘s customary habit of leaving his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment of the taxi on Tuesday nights, as A‘s testimony was relevant to the issue of motive for the defendant to kill the victim; the jury reasonably could have inferred from A‘s testimony that the victim had placed money in the glove compartment of the taxi that was, thereafter, taken by the defendant, and that financial gain could have been the motive for murder, and the defendant‘s claim that the state failed to provide an adequate foundation for the admission of A‘s testimony regarding habit evidence was unavailing, as there is no particular numerical threshold that must be met in order for a person‘s conduct to rise to the level of habit, and A‘s testimony established that the victim‘s specific conduct of leaving his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment of the taxi on Tuesday nights constituted a sufficiently regular practice.
- The trial court properly instructed the jury with a general unanimity charge and did not err in failing to grant the defendant‘s request for a specific unanimity charge as to the claim of self-defense; the jury instructions, viewed in their totality, were correct in law and fairly presented the case to the jury, as each of the four elements of a claim of self-defense were explained in detail and in accordance with the model jury charge, the factual scenario in the present case was not especially complex and the defendant‘s course of conduct did not comprise separate incidents, and because the trial court did not sanction a nonunanimous verdict, a unanimity instruction on the claim of self-defense was not required.
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford and tried to the jury before Blawie, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty,
Norman A. Pattis, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin Smith, for the appellant (defendant).
Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., state‘s attorney, and James Bernardi, supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
BEACH, J. The defendant, Shota Mekoshvili, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered on a jury verdict of murder in violation of
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found from the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and procedural history are relevant on appeal. The victim, Mohammed Kamal, operated a taxi with his business partner, Jean Antoine. Antoine worked the day shift, generally from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., and the victim worked the night shift, generally from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. The cab was registered with Stamford Taxi (company), and the partners paid a weekly fee totaling $475 to the company. The fee was due on Wednesdays at noon. The victim customarily placed his share of the fee in the glove compartment of the vehicle during his Tuesday night shift, and Antoine removed the money and delivered it to the company on Wednesday mornings.
On the evening of Tuesday, August 26, 2014, the victim left home for his shift in the taxi between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. At approximately 12:30 a.m. on August 27, the victim briefly returned home and told his wife that he had forgotten to take the money for his share of the fee that he needed to leave in the taxi; he said he also planned to send some money to his family
While fleeing from the scene, the defendant called a friend, Eugene Goldshtyen, several times and offered Goldshtyen $100 to pick him up. Goldshtyen met the defendant at the defendant‘s apartment and asked whether the defendant received his injuries during a burglary. The defendant falsely replied “yeah” and explained that he encountered the homeowner during the burglary and started fighting with the homeowner, whom he stabbed multiple times. The defendant said that “[w]hen the homeowner ‘kept yelling’ despite the defendant‘s order to ‘shut up,’ the defendant ‘just kept stabbing him and stabbing him.‘” Not believing the defendant‘s story, Goldshtyen called the police.
Later that morning, Stamford Police located the victim‘s body and the taxi at 150 Doolittle Road. The victim‘s body was found on the ground, and an autopsy revealed that the victim had been stabbed 127 times. The taxi‘s glove compartment was open and no money was found inside. The victim‘s and the defendant‘s blood was found on the rear driver‘s side passenger seat and door. The police arrested the defendant and charged him with murder in violation of
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce the testimony of two witnesses: (1) testimony from the victim‘s wife that when the victim returned home briefly from his shift at 12:30 a.m., she saw him retrieve money from the armoire, and the victim then told her that “he intended to use this money to pay his dispatch fees and to send money home to Bangladesh“; and (2) testimony from the victim‘s taxi partner, Antoine, that it “was [the victim‘s] habit and custom to leave his share [of the taxi fee] in the glove compartment” for Antoine to give to the company the next morning. The trial court held a hearing on the matter and subsequently admitted the testimony of both witnesses.
The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder in violation of
“Our standard of review for evidentiary matters allows the trial court great leeway in deciding the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice appears to have been done. . . . The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Russo, 62 Conn. App. 129, 133, 773 A.2d 965 (2001). In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, “the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 299, 303 A.2d 709 (1972).
I
We first address the defendant‘s claim that the trial court erred in allowing
The following additional facts are relevant to this issue. At trial, the state called the victim‘s wife as a witness. She testified about statements that the victim had made to her when he briefly returned home during his night shift. She testified: “He took the money and he told me that he had to take the money because the next day, he had to make the taxi payment. The taxi payment was done once a week. The payment for the taxi was done once a week. And he also said to me that he needed more money to send to Bangladesh and the banks were closed at night, when he was on duty, so he was taking the money at night, so that the next day, when he got off duty, he was going to go to the bank and send some money to Bangladesh.”
The defendant first claims that the victim‘s statements to his wife “had no relevant connection to a fact in issue.” According to the defendant, the only facts at issue were whether the defendant had killed the victim and, if he had done so, whether he acted with criminal intent and without justification. He further asserts that “whether [the victim] had intended or planned to pay taxi related expenses the next day was simply inapposite to the matters to be decided by the jury, and to admit such evidence could only lead to confusion and speculation.” We disagree.
The Connecticut Code of Evidence provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the constitution of the United States, the constitution of the state of Connecticut, the Code, the General Statutes or the common law.”
In the state‘s motion in limine, the state addressed the relevancy of the statements and claimed that it sought to introduce this evidence to controvert the defendant‘s claim of self-defense. The state explained: “[The defendant] claims he was fending off the aggressive sexual overtures of the victim. In such case the unexplained absence of valuables is of utmost rele- vance. The state intends to offer the [victim‘s] statements concerning his intent to bring sufficient money to satisfy his cab fees in order to show robbery as the motive.” The proffered statements reasonably could have tended to make it more likely that the defendant had a financial motive in killing the victim and to make it less likely that the killing was a result of self-defense.
The defendant next claims that the statements by the victim to his wife were both backward looking and self-serving and, therefore, did not satisfy the state of mind hearsay exception. The Connecticut Code of Evidence provides exceptions to the hearsay rule, among them: “A statement
In its ruling on the motion in limine, the trial court explained that the victim‘s statement was “a declaration of an intention casting light upon the future, it is distinguishable from any declaration of memory pointing backward to the past and this is not the case here.” We agree. The victim‘s statement to his wife indicated his intention to take money to pay the taxi company in the immediate future. It is true that part of the statement, to the effect that the victim had taken the money for that purpose, was retrospective, but his having taken the money only provided context for the expression of his intention. We also are unpersuaded by the defendant‘s claim that the victim‘s statement was self-serving. At that point, no crime had been committed nor was one foreseeable.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the wife‘s testimony as to statements made to her by the victim pursuant to the Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-3 (4).1
II
We next address the defendant‘s claim that the trial court improperly allowed testimony from the victim‘s business partner, Antoine, pursuant to the habit exception to the hearsay rule, that the victim routinely put his share of the taxi fees in the glove compartment of the vehicle before Antoine‘s day shift on Wednesdays. The defendant claims that such evidence was (1) irrelevant and (2) insufficient to establish a “habit” pursuant to the hearsay exception.
The following facts, as previously set forth, are relevant to this issue. Antoine testified about his business relationship with the victim and their arrangement for payment of the taxi fees to the company that were due weekly. According to Antoine, he and the victim jointly owned and operated a cab beginning approximately a year and a half to two years prior to the victim‘s murder, and that they paid a weekly fee to the company. He explained that they would each contribute $237.50 for the fees every week. Antoine further testified that the victim would always leave his half of the fees in the glove compartment, and when Antoine picked up the car on Wednesday mornings, he would take the money from the glove compartment and drop it off at the company, along with his half.
The defendant claims that Antoine‘s testimony was not relevant to any material issue; the only material issues
In State v. Williams, 90 Conn. 126, 96 A. 370 (1916), our Supreme Court upheld a trial court‘s admission of habit evidence regarding the victim‘s habit of carrying money in his pocketbook to show the defendants’ motive for murdering the victim. Id., 130. It concluded that, based on the habit evidence, “the jury would be justified in presuming that [the victim] had his pocketbook where he usually carried it, in his pocket . . . and it was there found, and thence taken by the [defendants].” Id. In the present case, the jury reasonably could have inferred from Antoine‘s testimony that the victim had placed money in the glove compartment of the taxi that was thereafter taken by the defendant. Although robbery was not charged, financial gain could well have been the motive for murder. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly found that such evidence was relevant.
Next, we turn to the defendant‘s claim that the state failed to provide an adequate foundation for the admission of the habit evidence. Specifically, he claims that the proffered evidence did not rise to the level of habit because there was insufficient evidence as to the number of times that the victim engaged in the conduct. According to the defendant, “[it] was not truly evidence of the decedent‘s personal habit of leaving money in the shared glovebox, so much as it was evidence of Antoine‘s personal experience of having regularly paid taxi related expenses on a certain day of the week.”
The Connecticut Code of Evidence provides that “[e]vidence of the habit of a person . . . is admissible to prove that the conduct of the person . . . on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit . . . .”
We are unpersuaded by the defendant‘s contention that there is a particular numerical threshold that must be met in order for a person‘s conduct to rise to the level of a habit. Here, Antoine‘s testimony established that the victim‘s specific conduct of leaving his portion of the taxi fee in the glove compartment of the taxi on Tuesday nights constituted a sufficiently regular practice. As such, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted Antoine‘s testimony regarding the victim‘s habit, pursuant to Connecticut Code of Evidence § 4-6.2
III
Finally, we address the defendant‘s claim that the trial court improperly
“[I]ndividual jury instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation . . . but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. . . . The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . Thus, [t]he whole charge must be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the [jurors] in guiding them to the proper verdict . . . and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error. . . . Accordingly, [i]n reviewing a constitutional challenge to the trial court‘s instruction, we must consider the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the instruction misled the jury. . . . In other words, we must consider whether the instructions [in totality] are sufficiently correct in law, adapted to the issues and ample for the guidance of the jury. . . . A challenge to the validity of jury instructions presents a question of law over which [we have] plenary review.” State v. Berrios, 187 Conn. App. 661, 705–706, 203 A.3d 571, cert. denied, 331 Conn. 917, 204 A.3d 1159 (2019).
The following additional facts are necessary for our discussion. The defendant testified at trial and presented a claim of self-defense. The following is the defendant‘s account of the events that transpired on the night of the murder. The victim invited him to ride along for free while he picked up another fare. The victim then instructed him to move into the front seat to allow the paying fare to ride in the back. At some point, the victim stopped the car and indicated to the defendant that he wanted to “have some fun.” The victim subsequently grabbed the defendant‘s genitalia, and the defendant reacted by punching the victim in the face. The victim then grabbed a knife and began attacking the defendant. A struggle between them ensued, and the victim threatened to kill the defendant. The defendant managed to wrestle the knife away from the victim and stabbed him repeatedly.
On May 10, 2017, the defendant‘s attorney filed a request to charge, requiring unanimity on whichever element of self-defense the jury might find to have been disproven.3 The trial court held a hearing on the matter and denied the defendant‘s request.4 In the course of its instructions, the court explained in detail each of the
The defendant relies, in part, on the holdings in United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), and State v. Diggs, 219 Conn. 295, 592 A.2d 949 (1991), to support his claim that a more specific unanimity instruction was required. Where alternative ways to commit an offense are alleged, Gipson set out a “con- ceptual distinctiveness” criterion, specifying that a charge requiring unanimity as to the specific act found proved by the jury is required only if the alternative acts are conceptually distinct from each other. See United States v. Gipson, supra, 458.
Applying Gipson to this case, the defendant claims that each “element” of self-defense is analogous to a conceptually distinct basis of liability. Noting that the unanimity challenge in Gipson was raised as to an offense charged, as opposed to a defense, our Supreme Court, in State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 334–35, 551 A.2d 1206 (1988), declined to require an instruction that the jury must agree unanimously on the element it found disproved in rejecting a claim of self-defense. Our Supreme Court did, however, leave open the possibility that, under certain circumstances, such an instruction may be warranted even in the context of self-defense. Id., 336. “Despite serious reservation about the applicability of the unanimity requirement to self-defense, we do not, at this juncture, express the opinion that a specific unanimity charge would never be required for claims of self-defense, for it is clear that the requirement as refined by case law in the wake of Gipson does not apply to the facts of the present case.” Id., 336.
Our Supreme Court was presented with the same issue in State v. Diggs, supra, 219 Conn. 302, and concluded: “As in Bailey, the defendant here is unable to provide us with any authority for the proposition that a unanimity instruction was required as to the factual basis for the jury‘s rejection of his self-defense claim, nor have we been able to locate any. A determination of that issue, however, is not necessary for the resolution of the instant case.” Our Supreme Court noted that “the encounter between the victim and the defendant was a single incident, which was brief and took place within a small area. . . . We do not perceive in the record a complexity of evidence or any other factors creating jury confusion and a consequent need for a specific unanimity charge. . . . We are, therefore, not persuaded that the trial court was required to deliver such an instruction concerning the statutory exemptions to the defendant‘s self-defense claim.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 302–303.
The defendant addresses the notion of complexity and the policy considerations arising therefrom. First, he suggests that the determining consideration is not necessarily the complexity of the case or its underlying facts, but the complexity of the instructions. He contends that analyzing the four different “elements” involved in a self-defense claim is a complex task for a jury to undertake. As such, the defendant
Our Supreme Court held in State v. Rivera, 221 Conn. 58, 76, 602 A.2d 571 (1992), however, that “where, as here, the trial court did not sanction a nonunanimous verdict, a unanimity instruction on self-defense is not required.” At oral argument, the defendant conceded that the trial court did not sanction a nonunanimous verdict. As Rivera makes clear, because the trial court in this case did not sanction such a nonunanimous verdict, “that ends the matter.” Id.
In light of Rivera, we cannot, then, hold that a specific unanimity charge should have been given. The jury instructions, viewed in their totality, were correct in law and fairly presented the case to the jury. As in Diggs, the factual scenario was not especially complex; as in State v. Bailey, supra, 209 Conn. 336, the defendant‘s course of conduct did not comprise “separate incidents.”5 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury with a general unanimity charge and did not err in failing to grant the defendant‘s request for a specific unanimity charge as to the claim of self-defense.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“I believe the general instruction as drafted is sufficient to ensure that a unanimous verdict is reached. The encounter here between the defendant and the cab driver was a single incident which took place within a small area. While there are, obviously, some conflicts in the testimony, I don‘t believe that the issues this jury has to resolve with respect to what happened are so complicated that jury confusion would result if I did not give a specific unanimity charge.”