State v. MedfordState v. Medford
APPEARANCES:
Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellant
Dillon W. Staas, IV for Appellee
{1} Defendant-appellant, Thomas C. Medford (“Medford“), appeals the April 25, 2024 judgment entry of sentence of the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} On November 2, 2023, the Van Wert County Grand Jury indicted Medford on a single count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse (“OVI“) in violation of
{3} On February 1, 2024, Medford filed a motion “to suppress the alleged prior in Van Wert Municipal Court Case No. TRC 20 01370.” (Doc. No. 22). Specifically, Medford argued that his 2020 OVI conviction “is constitutionally infirm and unavailable as an enhancing prior” because it “was taken with insufficient waiver of the right to counsel.” (Id.). Medford further argued that “the resulting entry [in that case] is so flawed as to not result in a final, appealable order” and that “its use as an enhancing ‘prior’ is res judicata . . . .” (Emphasis in original.) (Id.). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Medford‘s motion to suppress
{4} Thе case proceeded to a bench trial on March 25, 2024. That same day, the trial court found Medford guilty of the charge alleged in the indictment. On April 25, 2024, the trial court sentenced Medford to 30 months in prison. (Doc. No. 37). The trial court also imposed a lifetime driver‘s license suspension.
{5} Medford filed his notice of appeal on May 2, 2024. He raises five assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will begin by addressing Medford‘s first, second, and third assignments of error together, followed by his fourth and fifth assignments of error together.
First Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in denying the defense motiоn to suppress and exclude an alleged prior tainted by an incomplete and ineffective waiver of counsel.
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in denying a defense motion to exclude the sentencing entry as to one alleged Van Wert Municipal Court prior for lack of a final, appealable order in that case.
The Trial Court erred in finding Mr. Medford guilty of a felony O.V.I. for res judicata reasons.
{6} In his first, second, and third assignments of error, Medford argues that trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction from being used to enhance the degree of his OVI offense in this case. In particular, Mеdford contends in his first assignment of error that his 2020 OVI conviction “should not have been used to enhance penalty in this case” because he “was sentenced [in that case] to actual incarceration without the assistance of counsel . . . .” (Appellant‘s Brief at 8). Medford specifically argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court should have suppressed his 2020 OVI conviction due to flaws with the sentencing entry in that case. Finally, Medford argues in his third assignment of error that, because the charge in the April 2023 OVI case was amended “to a first offense,” “the lack оf appeal by the State of Ohio on that reduction should have made the issue of whether the instant offense is a ‘fourth offense’ a matter of res judicata.” (Emphasis in original.) (Id. at 18).
Standard of Review
{7} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competеnt, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. With respect to the trial court‘s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.
Analysis
{8}
Final, Appealable Order
{10} Medford argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction because the sentencing entry in that case contains certain defects which render the order not final and appealable. Specifically, Medford contends that the sentencing entry in the 2020 case is defective because it does not “indicate what the offense was” and “the document itself was fundamentally flawed as to form, in several ways.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 12, 14). Medford identifies those “flaws” as (1) the entry “indicates that it is a ‘Journal Entry’ regarding a plea change and not a ‘Judgment
{11} Courts of appeal in Ohio have appellate jurisdiction over “final appealable orders.”
{12}
{13} The entry in the 2020 OVI case comports with the requirements of
{14} In other words, the issues raised by Medford “may require greater attention to detail by the trial court in fashioning its entries, but they do not impact the appealability” of the entry. Ellis at ¶ 15 (rejecting Ellis‘s contention that the entry was not final and appealable, in part, because it did not direct the clerk of courts to serve a copy on him). For instance, “[w]hile it is certainly better practice for a trial court to label its final entry as a ‘judgment entry’ rather than a ‘journal
Assistance of Counsel
{15} Medford further argues in his first assignment of error that his 2020 OVI conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty in this case since he was sentenced to a term of incarceration without the assistance of cоunsel in that case. ” ‘Generally, a past conviction cannot be attacked in a subsequent case; however, there is a limited right to collaterally attack a conviction when the state proposes to use the past conviction to enhance the penalty of a later criminal offense.’ ” Gerken, 2023-Ohio-2244, at ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips, 2010-Ohio-1941, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). “To date, a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel or with an invalid waiver of the right to counsel has been the only constitutional infirmity that has been recognized by the Ohio or the United States Supreme Courts with regard to a collateral attack on a conviction that was used to enhance a criminal penalty.” Id. “Thus, ‘[i]n repeat OVI offender cases where prior convictions for OVI are used to enhance the penalty for a later OVI conviction, a defendant may attack the constitutionality of a prior conviction if the conviction was obtained in
{16} “With respect to ‘uncounseled’ pleas, we presume that the trial court in the prior convictions proceeded constitutionally until a defendant introduces evidence to the contrary.” Id., quoting State v. Thompson, 2009-Ohio-314, ¶ 6.
For purposes of penalty enhancement in later convictions under
R.C. 4511.19 , after the defendant presents a prima facie showing that the prior convictions were unconstitutional because the defendant had not been represented by counsel and had not validly waived the right to counsel and that the prior convictions had resulted in confinement, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the right to counsel was properly waived.
Thompson at syllabus. “In making the showing that a defendant had not been represented by counsel and had not validly waived the right to counsel, ‘a defendant need only provide an affidavit or testimony supporting his allegation[s].’ ” Gerken, at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Biazzo, 2010-Ohio-4485, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the right to counsel was properly waived.” Id.
{18} Under
{19} ” ’ “The requirements of
{20} It is clear to us that the trial court did not err by denying Medford‘s motion to suppress his 2020 conviction because the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of
{21} Nevertheless, Medford contends that the Van Wert Municipal Court failed to conduct a proper colloquy to determine whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Specifically, Medford contends (without any citation to authority) that his waiver of counsel in the 2020 case was invalid because “any discussion of possible withdrawal of counsel and waiver of counsel should not have occurred without counsel present.” (Appellant‘s Brief at 10). Medford further contends that his uncounsеled plea is constitutionally infirm because the Van Wert Municipal Court failed “to engage in a colloquy with [him] regarding ‘the nature of the charges the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges, and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter’ . . . .” (Id. at 10-11).
{23} “To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.” State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (1948). “There is no formula or script that a trial court must follow in every case in order to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Tucker, 2016-Ohio-1353, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Thus, “[t]o be valid, a waiver of counsel ’ “must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of аllowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.” ’ ” Conard at ¶ 14, quoting Gibson at 377, quoting Von Moltke at 723. See also State v. Yeager, 2005-Ohio-4932, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.) (noting that “the trial court‘s discussion of possible defenses and mitigating circumstances need not be fact specific“).
{24} “While no one factor is dispositive, the trial court should consider whether the defendant was advised of the nature of the charges and the range of allowable punishments, and, in addition, may consider whether the trial court advised the defendant of the possible defenses to the charges and applicable mitigating circumstances.” State v. Trikilis, 2005-Ohio-4266, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). “The trial court, however, does not need to ‘undertake pseudo-legal representation of a defendant by specifically advising him of possible viable defenses or mitigating circumstances,’ and, instead ‘a broader discussion of defenses and mitigating circumstances as applicable to the pending charges is sufficient.’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Bloodworth, 2013-Ohio-248, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting Ragle, 2005-Ohio-590, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). “A court may also consider various other factors, including the defendant‘s age, education, and legal experience.” Trikilis at ¶ 13.
{25} “Whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel is an issue that we review de novo.” State v. Reece, 2019-Ohio-2259, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). See also Thompson at ¶ 8 (“Generally, Ohio courts look to see whether under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant‘s
{26} In its March 8, 2024 decision denying Medford‘s motion to suppress, the trial court determined that Medford “waived counsel and entered the plea knowingly, intelligently and of his own free will” after he “had an extensive dialogue with the [Van Wert Municipal Court] on his desire to go forward without counsel....” (Doc. No. 26). In reaching its decision, the trial court further found that Medford “appeared for arraignment [in the 2020 case] and was advised of his rights, acknowledged understanding his rights, . . . and was informed of the maximum sentence in [the] matter.” (Id.). The trial court further found that, at the change-of-plea hearing, Medford “reiterated his desire to reрresent himself and requested to enter a guilty plea and proceed to sentencing so he could move on from [the] charge as soon as possible” and the Van Wert Municipal Court “properly and adequately engaged in a
{27} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Medford did not present a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to the assistance of counsel before pleading guilty in the 2020 OVI case. Indeed, the trial court‘s determination that Medford knowingly,
{28} Furthermore, the record reflects that counsel was appointed for Medford after his arraignment. However, prior to the next hearing, Medford‘s appointed counsel filed a motion (at Medford‘s request) to withdraw as counsel in the case. The audio recording of Medford‘s change-of-plea hearing reflects that the Van Wert Municipal Court (before granting the motion) inquired why Medford wished to discharge his appointed counsel. Medford explained that he wanted to resolve the matter quickly so that he could obtain employment. Medford further explained that he desired to accept the offer presented by the State, which Medford believed was more favorable thаn what was presented to him by his appointed counsel. The Van Wert Municipal Court cautioned Medford about the effect of a sentencing recommendation and Medford maintained that he wished to waive his right to counsel and plead guilty.
{29} Moreover, even though his waiver was not required to be in writing, the record reflects that the Van Wert Municipal Court presented Medford with a
Having been fully advised of my right to assistance of counsel at all stages of these proceedings, including my right to have counsel appointed without costs, to represent me if I am unable to emplоy counsel on my own; and fully understanding this explanation, I do hereby KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY & VOLUNTARILY WAIVE my right to counsel.
(Emphasis in original.) (Doc. No. 22). Critically, the record reflects that Medford was presented the written waiver in open court, asked to read it, and then signed it in open court prior to the Van Wert Municipal Court accepting his guilty plea. See Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, at ¶ 47.
{30} Based on that evidence, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Medford knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel before pleading guilty in the 2020 OVI case. See State v. Rodeheaver, 2023-Ohio-3283, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.). As a result,
Res Judicata
{31} Finally, Medford argues in his third assignment of error that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction for use as a penalty enhancement in this case since his April 2023 OVI conviction was amended to a first offense. In other words, Medford contends that the infirmities with the 2020 OVI were litigated in the April 2023 OVI case and, therefore, the 2020 entry is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from enhancing his penalty in this case. We disagree.
{32} Generally, “[u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any [claim] that was raised or could have been raised . . . on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 176 (1967).
{33} In its entry denying Medford‘s motion to suppress, the trial court rejected that Medford‘s res judicata argument. Specifically, the trial court rеasoned that, “[f]or enhancement purposes, Ohio‘s OVI statute merely requires a set number
{34} The trial court did not err by rejecting Medford‘s res judicata argument. Importantly, there is no evidence in the record that Medford‘s April 2023 OVI conviction was amended to a “first offense” because of any alleged infirmity with his 2020 OVI conviction. See State v. Hogue, 2018-Ohio-1109, ¶ 21, 23 (3d Dist.). Even so, based on our resolution of Medford‘s first and second assignments of error, his 2020 OVI conviction is not infirm.
{35} For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Medford‘s motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction. See State v. Ruggiero, 2019-Ohio-2545, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); Gerken, 2023-Ohio-2244, at ¶ 34.
{36} Therefore, Medford‘s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in finding Mr. Medford guilty because the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Fifth Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in finding Mr. Medford guilty because the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review
{38} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997). Thus, we address each legal concept individually.
{39} “An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
{40} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, ” ‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial сourt‘s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Analysis
{41} Based on our resolution of Medford‘s first, second, and third assignments of error in which we resolved that his 2020 OVI conviction is not
{42} Medford‘s fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
{43} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI J., concurs.
MILLER, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
/hls