State v. MeadorState v. Meador
Fred S. Miller, Baden & Jones Bldg., 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011 and Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., Christopher J. Pagan, 1501 First Avenue, Middletown, Ohio 45044, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} On remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio, defendant-appellant, William Brooks Meador, appeals the sufficiency of his convictions in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas for two counts of rape.
{¶2} In 2003, defendant-appellant, William Brooks Meador, began dating the victim‘s mother and, shortly thereafter, the couple began cohabitating together. The mother had two minor daughters from her previous marriage who also moved into the
{¶3} Children services was contacted by a friend of the mother. Following an inquiry into the allegations, appellant was charged with three counts of rape based upon the alleged sexual touching of J.R. Appellant was also indicted for one count of sexual imposition and one count of gross sexual imposition based upon the alleged improper conduct with the O.T.
{¶4} Upon motion by appellant‘s trial counsel, the lower court severed the rape charges from the sexual imposition charges into separate trials due to the potential prejudice that may result from the testimony of two sex offense victims. However, the trial court held that O.T. could testify at the trial on the rape charges for the limited purpose of establishing a time frame of when the incident was reported. Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of two counts of rape and sentenced to two consecutive terms of life in prison.
{¶5} Appellant appealed to this court. In State v. Meador, Warren App. No. CA2008-03-042, 2009-Ohio-2195, this court reversed appellant‘s convictions and
{¶6} “THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE.”
{¶7} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines the evidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State v. Lucas, Tuscarawas App. No. 05AP090063, 2006-Ohio-1675, ¶8; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Haney, Clermont App. No. CA2005-07-068, 2006-Ohio-3899, ¶14, quoting State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶37.
{¶8} Appellant was charged with two counts of rape in violation of
{¶9} “Sexual conduct” is defined as “vaginal intercourse between a male and
{¶10} The only element at issue is penetration. Appellant argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of penetration or insertion of a body part into the vaginal opening of the victim. Appellant urges that the victim in this case never definitively testified that he put his finger inside her vagina.
{¶11} In support, appellant cites the analysis of the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Grant, Montgomery App. No. 19824, 2003-Ohio-7240. “The vagina is the hollow passage leading from the uterus of the female body outward to the exterior genitalia, or vulva, which is comprised of lip-like folds of skin called the labia majora. The term ‘vaginal cavity’ refers to that entire anatomical process and any part of it.” Id. at ¶29.
{¶12} “Penetration of the vaginal cavity requires introduction of an object from without, which necessary implies some forceful spreading of the labia majora. The penetration need only be ‘slight.’
{¶13} “T.K. testified that Defendant put his hand underneath her bathing suit three times. The first time Defendant‘s finger was near her vagina, which is not a form of sexual conduct defined by
{¶14} “T.K.‘s testimony, if believed, is sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to infer that Defendant‘s conduct in inserting his finger one-half inch between T.K.‘s external labia necessarily caused the labia major to spread. That evidence is legally sufficient to establish vaginal penetration and sexual conduct sufficient to support Defendant‘s conviction for Rape.” Id. at ¶32, citing State v. Lucas, Montgomery App. No. 18644, 2001-Ohio-1350.
{¶15} Appellant urges that, as in Grant, the victim in this case testified only that appellant touched, rubbed and pushed on her vagina, which caused it to “hurt real bad.” Appellant argues that this testimony was insufficient to establish penetration.
{¶16} Yet, the victim‘s testimony was not confined to claiming that appellant merely touched or rubbed the outside of her vagina. Specifically, when asked during the trial whether appellant inserted his fingers inside her vagina, J.R. responded, “No, I couldn‘t tell, but it kind of felt like it.” Despite some preceding ambiguity in the response, the child victim testified that it “kind of felt like” appellant‘s fingers were inside her vagina. When construed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, J.R.‘s response was sufficient to establish that penetration occurred. Like T.K.‘s statement in Grant that the defendant‘s finger was “in it,” J.R.‘s response that it “felt like it” similarly demonstrated the penetration element of rape. State v. Tillman, Butler App. No. CA2003-09-243, 2004-Ohio-6240, ¶42.
{¶17} Appellant‘s assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with our prior decision in State v. Meador, Warren App. No. CA2008-03-042, 2009-Ohio-2195.