State v. Mason-CowanState v. Mason-Cowan
Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr., City Attorney, Lara N. Baker, City Prosecutor, and Melanie R. Tobias, for appellant.
Matan, Wright & Noble, and Robert D. Noble, for appellee.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court
CONNOR, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio (“the State“), appeals the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court granting the motion to suppress filed by appellee, Sharmaine N. Mason-Cowan (“appellee“), and dismissing the criminal charges of following too closely in violation of
{¶ 2} The facts of this matter concern a traffic stop initiated by Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Jermaine Thaxton (“Trooper Thaxton“). As a result of the traffic stop, appellee was charged with following too closely in violation of
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE CITING OFFICER DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP APPELLEE‘S VEHICLE FOR FOLLOWING ANOTHER VEHICLE TOO CLOSELY, IN VIOLATION OF
R.C. 4511.34(A) , AND THUS DISMISSED APPELLEE‘S OVI CHARGES.
{¶ 3} When deciding a motion to suppress, the trial court acts as the trier of fact and therefore evaluates the credibility of witnesses and resolves questions of fact. State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308 (4th Dist.1995). Appellate courts therefore must defer to the trial court‘s factual findings if competent, credible evidence supports those findings. Id. However, after accepting those facts as true, an appellate court must nevertheless independently determine whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 (4th Dist.1997). Therefore, appellate review of a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact. Id.
{¶ 4} The Ohio and United States Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391 (2001). To initiate a constitutionally valid traffic stop, an officer must at least have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is imminent. State v. Montelauro, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-413, 2011-Ohio-6568, ¶ 7, citing State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 61 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 182, 83 L.Ed.2d 116 (1984). This reasonable suspicion must be supported by specific and articulable facts. Id. During a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing the validity of a traffic stop. State v. Foster, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-039, 2004-Ohio-1438, ¶ 6.
{¶ 5} In the instant matter, appellee was heading eastbound on Broad Street in Columbus, Ohio, when she stopped her vehicle for a red light. Another vehicle was stopped in front of her. At that point, Trooper Thaxton approached in his vehicle and
{¶ 6} The traffic stop involved
The operator of a motor vehicle * * * shall not follow another vehicle * * * more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle * * * and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} At least three circumstances are considered when determining whether a vehicle is following too closely: the driver‘s reaction time, the distance at which the vehicle followed, and the speed of the vehicle. Id. citing State v. Bush, 88 Ohio Law Abs. 161, 165 (C.P.1962), affirmed by 92 Ohio Law Abs. 63 (C.P.1962).
{¶ 9} After listening to the testimony presented during the suppression hearing, the trial court concluded that Trooper Thaxton did not articulate a reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. While the trial court found Trooper Thaxton to be honest, it also noted that he was unable to offer testimony about the speed of appellee‘s vehicle. The trial court found this to be fatal based upon the circumstances of this case.
{¶ 10} In this appeal, the State contends that Trooper Thaxton‘s testimony should have been sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion despite his inability to testify about appellee‘s speed. According to the State, Trooper Thaxton paced the speed of appellee‘s vehicle and applied the results to a recognized formula, under which vehicles should
{¶ 11} The issue before us is whether Trooper Thaxton articulated a reasonable suspicion for stopping appellee. Again, violations of
{¶ 12} With respect to distance, Trooper Thaxton testified that appellee‘s vehicle was no more than two car lengths between the vehicle she followed. Further, according to Trooper Thaxton, a car length is somewhere between eight and ten feet. While the video depicting the events was taken at a different angle than Trooper Thaxton‘s point of view, it generally supports his testimony in this regard. More importantly, however, the trial court did not reach a factual finding to the contrary.
{¶ 13} The dispute in this matter regards Trooper Thaxton‘s testimony regarding appellee‘s speed. In this regard, the evidence demonstrates that Trooper Thaxton first noticed appellee‘s vehicle as they drove past each other in opposite directions on Broad Street. During this portion of his testimony, Trooper Thaxton recalled that appellee‘s speed was somewhere between 50 and 60 miles per hour. Eventually, he then turned around and came to a stop behind appellee at a traffic light. After the light turned green, the vehicles began accelerating. According to Trooper Thaxton, there was nothing abnormal about the way appellee accelerated from the traffic light.
{¶ 14} Trooper Thaxton testified that he paced the speed of appellee‘s vehicle by maintaining a constant distance between appellee‘s vehicle and his own, in order to determine her speed by looking at his own speedometer. He then applied appellee‘s speed to the one car length per ten miles per hour formula. When asked whether the formula differentiates between vehicles traveling at constant speeds versus those accelerating from a complete stop, Trooper Thaxton testified that it does not. More importantly, however, when asked how fast she was traveling, Trooper Thaxton testified that he had not written
{¶ 15} As the trier of fact, the trial court was free to note the inconsistencies in the evidence and weigh the facts accordingly. It is true that an officer need not always testify about the precise speed of a defendant‘s vehicle to support a traffic stop under
{¶ 16} Based upon the foregoing, we overrule the State‘s sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment rendered by the Franklin County Municipal Court.
Judgment affirmed.
FRENCH and TYACK, JJ., concur.
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