THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. ORR, APPELLANT. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SMITH, APPELLANT.
No. 00-408
Supreme Court of Ohio
May 2, 2001
91 Ohio St.3d 389, 2002-Ohio-50
Constitutional law—Search and seizure—Motor vehicles—Criteria for determining constitutionality of a driver‘s license checkpoint. Submitted January 10, 2001. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, Nos. 17476 and 17477.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
In determining the constitutionality of a driver‘s license checkpoint, a court must evaluate, on a case-by-casе basis, the checkpoint‘s intrusion on privacy, the state‘s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and the extent to which the checkpoint advances the state interest.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶ 1} From June 8, 1998 through June 20, 1998, the city of Dayton operated a system of driver‘s license checkpoints designed to identify and remove unlicensed drivers and drivers with suspended licenses from the roads. The checkpoints were set up at various locations in Dayton, including major thoroughfares and “target enforcement areas“—districts characterized by problems of traffic and crime. Upon arrival at a checkpoint site, the police would set up rеflective signs that warned drivers of the upcoming checkpoint. The checkpoints were staffed by anywhere between eleven and thirteen officers. Several police cruisers were also present at the checkpoints.
{¶ 3} Drivers who were unable to produce a valid driver‘s license had their names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers entered into the officers’ computers to check whether they possessed a valid license. If the computer showed that a driver was properly licensed and was not wanted by the police for any reason, the driver would be given the pamphlet, thanked, and released back into traffic. This entire process would take an additional two minutes or so to complete. Drivers without a valid license were cited for the violation, which added approximately ten minutes to the overall length of detention.
{¶ 4} On June 17, 1998, appellant Magus Orr was stopped at a driver‘s license checkpoint and cited for driving without a license in violation of
{¶ 5} Both of the appellants pleaded not guilty. Each appellant also filed a motion to suppress, claiming that his seizure was unconstitutional under the Ohio and United States Constitutions and that all evidence obtained as a result of his
{¶ 6} We are asked to decide whether Dayton‘s driver‘s license checkpoint program violated the search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we sustain the program‘s constitutionality.
{¶ 7} The
The search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions are implicated in this case because a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Ohio and United States Constitutions even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief. Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667.
{¶ 9} The United States Supreme Court‘s cases generally accord more
{¶ 10} In determining the constitutionality of a police checkpoint, courts evaluate the following three factors: (1) the particular checkpoint‘s intrusion on privacy, (2) the state‘s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and (3) the extent to which the checkpoint advances the state interest. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990), 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412. The United States Supreme Court has relied upon this analysis in upholding sobriety checkpoints—roadblocks at which drivers are checked for being under the influence of alcohol or mind-altering drugs—and roadblocks designed to intercept illegal immigrants. See id. (sobriety checkpoints); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (immigration checkpoints). The cоurts of several jurisdictions have extended the analysis to cases involving driver‘s license checkpoints. See, e.g., McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306; Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143. We agree with those jurisdictions that have concluded that the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in its cases on sobriety and immigration checkpoints is appropriate for review of driver‘s license checkpoints. Therefore, we hold that in determining the constitutionality of a driver‘s license checkpoint, a court must evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, the checkpoint‘s intrusion on privacy, the state‘s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and the extent to which the chеckpoint advances the state interest. Applying this three-pronged analysis, we find that Dayton‘s driver‘s license checkpoints were consistent with the search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.
{¶ 11} Like most checkpoint stops, Dayton‘s driver‘s license checkpoints did not greatly intrude upon trаvelers’ sense of privacy. Drivers approaching these checkpoints were warned in advance of their presence. At the checkpoint, drivers could see that they were not the only ones being stopped. Visible signs of the officers’ authority were everywhere. Each checkpoint was manned by at least eleven officers, with police cruisers present. Drivers who were stopped were immediately advised of the purpose of the stop. Most of those possessing a valid license were sent on their way after only about forty-five seconds. Those who had a valid license but could not рroduce it at the checkpoint were dispatched after only a few minutes. Even those driving without a valid license were detained for only ten minutes or so. Every driver stopped at one of Dayton‘s driver‘s license checkpoints was given a pamphlet explaining the checkpoint program and thanking him оr her for cooperating. Clearly, these checkpoints constituted a very limited intrusion into travelers’ privacy and sense of security.
{¶ 12} Weighing against this minimal intrusion on privacy is the state‘s vital interest in using driver‘s license checkpoints to identify unlicensed drivers.
{¶ 13} Compounding the danger to the рublic from unlicensed drivers is the fact that much of the danger is hidden from plain view. While many types of dangerous motorists—drunk drivers, for example—exhibit erratic driving, the unlicensed driver often displays no observable characteristics. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 147. Police officers on roving patrol cannot pull over a vehicle for the solе purpose of checking the driver‘s license and registration. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. Therefore, without checkpoints, the only way in which police can identify an unlicensed driver is by waiting for the driver to commit a driving offense. Cloukey, 486 A.2d at 147. In at least some instances, the offense would not even have occurred had the offending driver been detected earlier and been removed from the roadways.
{¶ 14} The final consideration in our three-pronged analysis is the extent to which the driver‘s license checkpoints advanced the state interest. This requires us to consider the Dayton program‘s effectiveness in identifying unlicensed drivers.
{¶ 15} In one two-week period, the Dayton police stopped 2,110 motorists and issued 224 traffic citations, resulting in a citation rate of approximately 10.6 percent. By constitutional standards, this effectiveness rate of 10.6 percent is quite substantial. Although there was no evidence of how many of these citations were related to licensing, even if only a fraction of the citations were issued for driving without a valid license, the effectiveness rate in the case sub judice would still exceed rates sustained by the United States Supreme Court in analogous checkpoint cases. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455, 110 S.Ct. at 2487, 110 L.Ed.2d at 423 (1.6 percent arrest rate for drunk drivers); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554, 96 S.Ct. at 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1126 (apprehension of illegal aliens in 0.12 percent of vehicles passing through checkpoint).
{¶ 16} In sum, assessing the checkpoints’ intrusion on privacy, the state‘s interest in maintaining driver‘s license checkpoints, and the extent to which Dayton‘s checkpoint program advanced the state interest, we find that Dayton‘s driver‘s license checkpoint program was consistent with the search and seizure provisions of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs in judgment.
Julia L. McNeil, Dayton Director of Law, John J. Scaccia, Chief Administrative Counsel, and Deirdre Logan, Acting Chief Prosecutor, for appellee.
Carl G. Goraleski and Anthony R. Cicero, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellants.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, David M. Gormley, Associate Solicitor, and David V. Patton, Assistant Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio.
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association.
Flanagan, Lieberman, Hoffman & Swaim and Richard Hempfling, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation.
